Sanctions, logistical disruptions, and new conflicts — from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf — have turned the fertilizer market into a key arena of geoeconomic competition.
Amid growing instability in the global fertilizer market, Central Asia is increasingly emerging as a region with tangible chemical potential. Yet this potential remains only partially realized. No country in the region ranks among the world’s leading producers, but there is meaningful capacity in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan, the region’s largest agricultural producer, meets only about 59 percent of its scientifically recommended fertilizer demand, underscoring the scale of unrealized capacity. This points to a deeper structural issue: Central Asia remains a resource base still in transition toward full industrialization. This issue takes on added significance in a global context where around 673 million people face chronic hunger, and agricultural productivity depends heavily on the availability of fertilizers.
In the 2020s, this supply chain has come under mounting pressure: sanctions, logistical disruptions, and new conflicts — from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf — have turned the fertilizer market into a key arena of geoeconomic competition. As a result, a paradox is emerging: the same geopolitical dynamics that open a window of opportunity for Central Asia simultaneously constrain access to markets, limiting the region’s ability to translate potential into real economic influence.
Against this backdrop, countries in the region are seeking to strengthen their role in the agrochemical sector. With significant phosphate reserves, natural gas, and prospective potash resources, they are well positioned to enter the global fertilizer market and reduce their exposure to external price shocks. This dynamic is most clearly illustrated in Kazakhstan, where large-scale agriculture intersects with a substantial resource base. Fertilizer production is concentrated around two key players — Kazphosphate and KazAzot — which together account for roughly 96 percent of domestic output. Kazphosphate relies on the Karatau basin’s phosphate deposits to develop phosphate-based fertilizers, while KazAzot produces ammonia and ammonium nitrate in Mangystau. For a country that is one of the region’s largest grain producers, the strategic imperative is clear: reduce dependence on imports by expanding domestic production.
This dynamic is driving a new wave of projects. In western Kazakhstan, KazAzot is developing a large-scale gas-chemical complex in Aktau, designed to produce ammonia, urea, nitric acid, and ammonium nitrate. Its location on the Caspian coast offers potential access to Trans-Caspian export routes. Another strategic direction is the development of the potash sector. The flagship Satimola project, led by Qazaq Kalium, is expected to require around $2.4 billion in investment, with production slated to begin in 2028. At full capacity, it could produce up to 6 million tons of potash fertilizers annually, potentially positioning Kazakhstan as a new entrant in the global potash market. In southern Kazakhstan, Russia’s EuroChem, in partnership with China’s CNCEC, is developing a fertilizer complex in Zhanatas with a projected capacity of over 1 million tons per year.
Uzbekistan, by contrast, follows a more centralized industrial model. The state holding Uzkimyosanoat consolidates the country’s major chemical enterprises, enabling coordinated sectoral development. The flagship facility is the Navoiyazot complex in Navoi, which produces around 660,000 tons of ammonia and 577,500 tons of urea annually, making it one of the largest gas-chemical plants in Central Asia. Unlike its neighbors, Uzbekistan produces all three major categories of fertilizers at scale. Moreover, in 2025, the Uzbek-Spanish joint venture Maxam-Chirchiq produced the region’s first batches of green ammonia using hydrogen derived from renewable energy sources, positioning Uzbekistan as an early mover in this emerging segment.
Turkmenistan, meanwhile, has pursued a more export-oriented strategy focused on nitrogen fertilizers. The Garabogazkarbamid plant in the Balkan region produces more than 1 million tons of urea annually, primarily for export. At the same time, Ashgabat is expanding its fertilizer sector. In 2024, South Korea’s Daewoo Engineering & Construction won a tender to build a new facility in the Lebap region, which will produce up to 350,000 tons of phosphate fertilizers and 100,000 tons of ammonium sulfate annually, diversifying the country’s chemical industry.
The region is gradually expanding its production capacity, yet its role and prospects are shaped less by internal dynamics than by external market conditions and access to them. To understand both the limits and the potential of this growth, it is necessary to examine how the global fertilizer market has evolved in recent years.
The global fertilizer market has been defined by persistent geopolitical volatility. A structural shift occurred in 2022, when the energy crisis, sanctions, and logistical disruptions shattered long-standing supply predictability.
Russia has since consolidated its position as the world’s largest fertilizer exporter. According to the Russian Association of Fertilizer Producers (RAPU), the country exported a record 45 million tons in 2025, with more than 75 percent directed toward what Moscow defines as “friendly states,” including major BRICS economies, which account for roughly half of total shipments. With its scale of production and control over logistics, Russia has demonstrated the capacity to influence global price dynamics well beyond Eurasia. Moscow has also set an explicit target of increasing its share of the global fertilizer market to 25 percent by 2030.
China, meanwhile, remains the world’s largest producer but is increasingly focused inward. A significant portion of its output is absorbed domestically to ensure food security, limiting its role as a global exporter. In 2024–2025, Beijing imposed export restrictions on urea and phosphate fertilizers in an effort to stabilize domestic prices and protect its agricultural sector. These measures have further reinforced Russia’s position in global markets. At the same time, the fertilizer market is shaped not only by production but by control over logistics. The case of Belarus is illustrative: after losing access to the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda in 2022, its potash exports were rapidly rerouted through Russian infrastructure. The lesson is clear — in today’s market, control over transport routes can be just as important as production capacity itself.
According to Precedence Research, the global fertilizer market is valued at approximately $214.1 billion in 2025 and is projected to grow at an average annual rate of around 4.1 percent through 2034. Beyond Russia and China, several key actors shape global supply. Canada and Belarus dominate potash exports, Morocco anchors the phosphate market, while Gulf states play a central role in nitrogen-based fertilizers.
The escalation that began on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran, marked a turning point, pushing an already strained market into one facing direct supply disruptions. The Strait of Hormuz — a critical chokepoint for global energy and chemical trade — remains central to this dynamic. Any disruption in the strait quickly feeds into higher gas prices, shipping costs, and insurance premiums, ultimately raising the cost of ammonia and urea. The situation was further aggravated by a series of attacks in early and mid-March 2026, when Iranian drones and missiles targeted QatarEnergy’s LNG facilities in Ras Laffan, the world’s largest export complex, leading to a temporary shutdown of part of its capacity.
Given that up to 90 percent of nitrogen fertilizer production costs are tied to natural gas, the implications for global supply are immediate. Gulf producers — including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Oman — account for roughly 15 percent of global urea production. As a result, even limited disruptions in production or logistics can rapidly tighten supply and drive prices upward. These shocks are particularly acute ahead of the Northern Hemisphere planting season, when fertilizer demand typically peaks.
The Central Asian region has the resources. Projects are already underway. Market demand is rising. Yet without resolving its transport constraints, Central Asia remains trapped between its potential and geopolitical realities. The global fertilizer market has moved beyond the confines of the chemical industry and evolved into a space of strategic competition, where not only production volumes matter, but also control over logistics, access to affordable energy, and the resilience of supply chains. Recent developments in the Middle East have only reinforced this dynamic: even limited disruptions can rapidly translate into global price shocks.
For Central Asia, this means that the primary constraint lies not in production capacity, but in market access. Southern routes — the most natural in terms of demand — are effectively blocked. The Iranian corridor, including logistics projects via the ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, has come under pressure amid escalating conflict in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, trans-Afghan routes, long viewed as a key gateway to South Asian and African markets, remain unstable due to ongoing tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, effectively freezing their development. The northern route via Russian infrastructure remains operational but reproduces the very dependency the region seeks to overcome. The Trans-Caspian corridor stands as the only viable alternative, yet its capacity and institutional maturity still fall short of the region’s stated ambitions.
A second constraint lies in the structure of financing. Large-scale projects require capital that regional states struggle to mobilize independently, reinforcing reliance on Russian and Chinese investors. Meanwhile, the participation of Western and multilateral capital remains limited, constraining technological and institutional diversification in the sector.
Finally, expanding production does not automatically translate into durable market positioning. This requires established commercial networks, product standardization, and the ability to ensure stable supply — elements that are still in the process of formation across the region.
Central Asia thus finds itself in a paradoxical position: endowed with resources and growing production capacity, yet unable to fully realize its export potential. In the near term, the sector is likely to evolve primarily as a tool of domestic stabilization and import substitution. However, if infrastructure constraints are addressed, the region has the potential to emerge as a new industrial hub of Eurasia — and the foundations for that transition are being laid today.
