“Let us not deceive ourselves. This was an extraordinary operation and achievement. However, the problem is not over. Terrorism continues to operate. What further problems terrorism will place before us and what lessons we must still learn from this matter, it is too early to say. We finished one battle, but the war continues.”
This is how Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin summarized Operation Yonatan, the rescue of Israeli hostages at Entebbe Airport on July 4, 1976.
Ahead of the 50th anniversary of the Entebbe operation, the State Archives at the Prime Minister’s Office has unveiled an extensive collection of tens of thousands of documents, including minutes from cabinet meetings, the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, as well as records of telephone conversations, telegrams, and consultations held by the special team former prime minister YitzhakRabin established to handle the crisis.
Alongside previously released materials, the State Archives is publishing in full the files related to the Entebbe operation, some of which had already been partially disclosed.
“This was fascinating work, a mosaic of tens of thousands of documents creating a complex picture of an unprecedented historic operation,” said Michal Zeft, head of documentation and commemoration at the State Archives, who oversaw the project. “
You see a human picture of decision makers, moments of hesitation, and long days of uncertainty and tension, which ended in a historic operation.”
Review of the documents, minutes, and records sheds light on the doubts and concerns, the different scenarios that were examined, and the painful decision-making process that ultimately led to the successful rescue mission. The materials also include a transcript of an open conversation between Rabin and newspaper editors, in which he asked for their cooperation in preventing the publication of details that could endanger the lives of the hostages.
The outcome is well known: about a week after the plane was hijacked, in the early hours of July 4, IDF forces stormed the terminal at Entebbe Airport and freed the Israeli hostages and French pilots, who were flown back to Israel. Four people were killed during the operation, including Sayeret Matkal commander Lt.-Col. Yonatan “Yoni” Netanyahu and three hostages. In addition, five soldiers and six hostages were wounded.
France was responsible for Israelis in Air France hijacking, Rabin says
The drama began on June 27, 1976. “Before we continue, I have an announcement,” Rabin interrupted a cabinet meeting, reporting that contact had been lost with an Air France plane that had departed Israel en route to Paris after a stop in Athens. The following days were long and tense, marked by negotiations, concerns, secret preparations, intelligence gathering, and deliberate misinformation, culminating in the daring rescue operation in Entebbe.
“The plane has probably been hijacked," Rabin said. During the meeting, he was updated that the aircraft had landed in Benghazi, but at that stage it was still unclear whether Libya was the intended destination, who the hijackers were, and what their intentions were.
Eli Mizrahi, Rabin’s bureau chief, recommended that ministers update the cabinet secretary on their actions later that day, but Rabin replied that there was no need. Rabin said: “My intention is to hold the government of France responsible for the fate of the Israelis flying on the Air France aircraft and not to release the French government from that responsibility.”
In the intensive discussions held by the government since the hijacking, and in correspondence with the French authorities, France’s responsibility was repeatedly emphasized. However, just two days later, the non-Israeli hostages were separated from the Israeli hostages and later released. At that point, it became clear that additional options for resolving the crisis, which had already been considered at the beginning of the emergency, needed to be examined more seriously.
To do this, Israel needed to buy time and delay the ultimatum issued by the terrorists as much as possible. On Wednesday, July 1, the Israeli government, which until then had adhered to its principle of not negotiating with terrorists, announced its willingness to enter negotiations for the release of the hostages. The negotiations continued almost until the last moment, when a military operation to rescue the hostages already appeared possible and was about to be launched.
The State Archives disclosure also includes audio recordings of 26 telephone calls conducted by Mizrahi with the Prime Minister, the Director General of the Foreign Ministry, and other senior officials during that dramatic week, as well as transcripts of five telephone conversations held by Colonel Baruch Bar Lev (“Borka”), who had served several years earlier as IDF and Defense Ministry attaché in Uganda, with the then ruler of Uganda, Idi Amin, in an attempt to leverage their previous connection to resolve the crisis.
“I think you have an opportunity given to you by God to save people and show that what people have said and written about you is not true,” Bar-Lev urged the Ugandan leader. “If you remember, I always gave you good advice, never bad advice. Is that correct?”
Amin replied: “I know very well. But you know I am in difficulties now, but you can help me save people’s lives by releasing all their demands.”
Bar Lev clarified: “I will do my best through my friend, but this is your country, and you are the president, and you have the power to do something. If something happens, you will be blamed, and if you save the people, you will be a holy man. What is the situation now, Your Excellency?”
Rescue could have caused international complications while non-Israeli hostages were present
The documents further show that since some of the hostages were not Israeli, there was concern that a military rescue operation, which could endanger them, would cause international complications. However, after the hijackers released the non-Israeli passengers, Rabin convened an operational consultation in which Defense Minister at the time Shimon Peres and IDF Chief of Staff Motta Gur, along with other senior officials, began examining various military options for the first time.
However, the chief of staff warned that at that stage, only a limited operation to kill the terrorists was possible, not a hostage rescue mission. He explained that a rescue operation was far more complex, requiring aircraft deployment and intelligence that was still lacking, and it was unclear whether some hostages were inside the aircraft or whether it was booby-trapped.
Given the lack of precise intelligence, Peres suggested considering a military option and warned that about two days would be needed for preparation. “Yitzhak, a military operation is seemingly possible, but not before two nights and a day from the decision, and without the possibility of returning the passengers,” Peres wrote in a note to Rabin during a special meeting.
The note further stated: “Under these conditions and at this time, the matter does not seem right to me. But the urgency is that if there is a tendency toward a military operation, twelve fighters (disguised as passengers) must be sent immediately to Kenya. From an intelligence perspective, this is possible (so I was told). The plane is due to depart in the evening and only flies once a week, and this is the source of urgency.”
Later that day, Rabin met with newspaper editors.
“In Israeli chatter, we have reached a situation where there is no choice but to turn to newspaper editors and their national conscience,” he warned, explaining the complex situation and the risks if classified details were published. That night, Transport Minister Gad Yaakovi met with families of the Israeli hostages, who demanded that the government negotiate for their release.
Rabin also updated opposition leader Menachem Begin on the situation. In another security consultation, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon suggested traveling to Paris to promote an international initiative in which leaders from various countries could serve as mediators, including former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, former UN secretary general Kurt Waldheim, and Pope Paul VI.
However, the proposal faced opposition, with critics arguing that Israel should not be the first to enter negotiations with the hijackers, and that such a trip would effectively signal the start of negotiations. There were also ideas to send senior Israeli officials to negotiate in Uganda, but there were concerns that they could themselves become hostages.
Minister Israel Galili warned that even negotiations would not guarantee the safety and release of the hostages, since if Kenya did not release five detainees held there following the attempt to down an Israeli aircraft, the hijackers could derail any deal. The chief of staff later sent a note to the prime minister warning that if the IDF could not rescue the hostages in Entebbe, he recommended accepting the terrorists’ demands.
However, he suggested extending negotiations until the very last moment, up to another 24 hours before the ultimatum expired, after which a decision would be made according to circumstances. Indeed, as the ultimatum approached its July 1, 1976, deadline, a special ministerial team was established to negotiate with the hijackers. It was also clarified that the team would continue efforts to secure the hostages’ release, and that all action would be conducted solely through France, which Israel continued to see as responsible for their safety. Meanwhile, letters from relatives of hostages arrived demanding negotiations.
The dramatic turning point came on Friday, July 2, when the chief of staff announced that a military operation plan existed, but only once sufficient intelligence was available, while in the meantime, the political leadership should continue negotiations. The small ministerial team met with the chief of staff and the head of the Mossad for a military consultation on a rescue plan.
Rabin initially questioned the feasibility of the proposed rescue operation.
“We have no ability to operate without the consent of the relevant countries. And what do we do, attack Uganda? How do we even reach Uganda? The goal is not to carry out a military act, but to save people. If possibilities arise, we will discuss them. At the moment, I see no way.”
But after the release of the non-Israeli hostages and the stagnation in negotiations, Rabin convened an operational consultation in which the defense minister and chief of staff examined military options in greater depth. The chief of staff responded that at this stage, only a limited operation to kill the terrorists was possible, not a hostage rescue, due to a lack of intelligence and the complexity of deploying forces.
Negotiations continue as Israel prepares for military operation
Negotiations continued on the surface, while covert preparations and intelligence gathering for a daring military operation accelerated. In one of the meetings, Peres recommended that, if a military operation were approved, deception measures be taken, including a press conference announcing ongoing negotiations with the French. On July 2, the ministerial team met with the chief of staff and the head of the Mossad for a military consultation, during which Gur presented a detailed operational plan for the first time, which would ultimately be approved.
“There is still missing intelligence to execute the plan, but it is possible,” the chief of staff noted. The next day, Saturday, he presented the detailed plan to the ministerial team along with its risks, but assessed that the chances of success were now high. Foreign Minister Allon said he would take responsibility for diplomatic and media deception efforts, and suggested that an El Al flight from South Africa to Israel scheduled at the same time should proceed as normal to avoid suspicion.
Regarding US questions the previous day about a suspicious aircraft at Ben-Gurion Airport, it was decided not to respond. The issue of refueling aircraft en route to Entebbe was also raised. Mossad chief Yitzhak Hofi clarified that it was unclear whether permission to land in Kenya would be granted, since this had not been requested directly.
Rabin assessed that Kenya would not expel Israel if its aircraft needed to refuel in Nairobi. He asked Air Force commander Maj.-Gen. Benny Peled to describe the flight route. Peled placed the operational map before the prime minister and explained: “We depart from Sharm el-Sheikh and begin climbing in altitude to trigger Egyptian radar. We fly along the Ethiopian coast.”
Rabin was concerned about Ethiopia’s response, but Peled said they had no radar, and the prime minister had to deliberate until the decisive Saturday afternoon meeting. At that meeting, the final IDF plan for the hostage rescue was presented and Rabin convened a special cabinet session, which approved the operation. “Only the government can make such a decision, so immediately after this meeting (the restricted one) ends, all cabinet members will join,” he said. Preparations for the military operation entered their final stage.
Gur presented the operational plan on a map: “The idea is that a force of 200 men, including fighters and staff, will fly in four Hercules aircraft tonight, arrive at Entebbe airport, land at the airfield, and operate at the terminal building. The force will free the hostages, load them onto the aircraft, and fly back,” he explained, emphasizing that the information gathered in recent days, including from released hostages, demonstrates how essential it is to act.
He also said: “We must take into account that we will need Nairobi and there are already several people there, in order not to encounter last-minute difficulties. Although from a military perspective, we were not allowed to establish overly close ties, so as not to reveal that we were going ahead with such an operation and not to expose its nature.” He continued his explanation: “If necessary, we will land the aircraft there, with the understanding that our people may remain there for some time in the hospitals there. For all of this, we will need to find a solution at the last moment and on the spot.”
Rabin responded: “I assume that if the aircraft are forced to land in Nairobi, the Kenyans will not expel them, but Israel will need to stand alongside Kenya if, as a result of the operation, Uganda acts against it.” At the cabinet meeting, which convened on Saturday at 2:00 p.m. at the Kirya in Tel Aviv, ministers asked difficult questions about the continuation of the negotiations.
Security of the state vs security of individuals
Peres summarized the dilemma as facing two very difficult options: one is responsibility for the security of the entire state, and the other is responsibility for the security of every individual within it.
Rabin acknowledged that in the exchange alternative there is a possibility of freeing most of the Israelis, but its cost would be the release of 40 prisoners: “If I do not present it this way, I will not see myself as fulfilling my duty to bring the matter to the government,” he explained, and proposed that the government approve the operation, even if not with a light heart, given the risk that some of the hostages might be harmed during it. At the end of the meeting, the operation was approved unanimously.
The aircraft departed on the long flight from Sharm el-Sheikh at 3:30 pm, even before the formal government decision was taken. Meanwhile, negotiations continued. Shortly after midnight between July 3 and 4, 1976, four Hercules aircraft of the Israeli Air Force landed in total darkness at Entebbe Airport.
IDF forces deployed from them stormed the terminal and, in a daring operation, freed the hostages who had been hijacked six days earlier after terrorists boarded the plane in Athens. The hostages were reunited with their families, and feelings of helplessness and anxiety turned into joy and pride at the success of the operation. However, the celebrations were overshadowed by the news that Sayeret Matkal commander and assault force leader Lt.-Col. Netanyahu and three hostages were killed in the operation.
It later emerged that passenger Dora Bloch, who had fallen ill that week, had been taken to a local hospital and was therefore not at Entebbe airport during the rescue. When this became known, concern grew for her fate. Messages were urgently sent to Israeli embassies in London, Geneva, and New York, instructing them to secure her release, but it was later revealed that she was murdered on July 4.
The cabinet meeting held after the return of the aircraft with the Israeli hostages opened with a moment of silence for the fallen. Rabin described the circumstances of Netanyahu’s death.
“The force led by Yonatan ran toward the terminal, encountered a group of Ugandan soldiers who opened fire on them. The resistance came from fire on the second floor. One bullet struck Yonatan in the heart, and he was killed.”
"Yonatan’s father, Prof. Benzion Netanyahu, one of the early leaders of Revisionist Zionism, a historian and sociologist, is now in the United States," he added. "I had the opportunity to speak with him at length when he was in Israel. His sons are here, but he is not. We should try to reach him, and he deserves to hear the news, not from the press.”
Peres supported the prime minister.
“I want the cabinet members to know that we have lost one of the finest fighters of the Jewish people," he said.
"Yonatan and his brothers (Benjamin and Ido Netanyahu) both served in the same Sayeret Matkal unit. This is a very heavy loss. We all had great hopes for him. He put his whole heart into this operation and played a key role in its planning.”
After Air Force commander Beni Peled described the air force’s role in the operation and the refueling stop in Nairobi to treat the wounded, the prime minister said:“If we had needed to guarantee a 100% positive response in Nairobi, we might not have been able to receive such a response. I believe we will overcome the difficulty with Kenya. If we do not get too closely entangled with the Kenyans, we will overcome this issue.”
After the operation, Israel asked French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to use his influence in Francophone African countries to support Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta against Idi Amin's efforts to isolate him. The documents show that despite extensive efforts to maintain secrecy, vague information about the Israeli operation in Entebbe began to spread, but the historic mission was not compromised.
Against the backdrop of relief and national euphoria in the cabinet and the public, Rabin concluded with words that still resonate 50 years later.
