On April 23, Bangladesh’s Police Headquarters issued an “urgent and confidential” letter, warning of possible extremist attacks on parliament, the Shahbagh intersection, mosques, and even armories. The warning ignited discussion and debate in the country about the security landscape and the political uses of militancy.
The alert followed the arrest of Istiak Ahmed Sami alias Abu Bakkar and two dismissed army personnel linked to banned outfits. Officials described the suspects as “extremely risky for the overall security of the country.” Law enforcement units were ordered to increase their vigilance across districts, underscoring the seriousness of the threat.
Yet, amid this heightened threat perception and security alert, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed publicly insisted that militancy “no longer exists in the country.” He argued that the term militancy was used during the “fascist era,” a reference to the authoritarian rule of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, for political gain.
In contrast, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s adviser Dr. Zahed Ur Rahman has admitted that militancy persists. “Militancy has existed in Bangladesh and continues to exist,” he said.
While it is a fact that past regimes, particularly that of Hasina, securitized militancy to delegitimize opponents, denying the existence of extremism and terrorism is misleading and potentially dangerous.
My own interviews conducted in June 2024 with 32 extremists in custody under the Anti-Terrorism Act revealed that more than 10 percent were involved or were at least sympathetic to radical ideas and actions. This indicates that extremist networks do exist in reality, are not imaginary or mere allegations, even if their activities are less visible than in the past.
According to a student leader of an opposition political party, “as the Jamaat-e-Islami moves from far-right to right-centric positions, the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) wants to capture far-right sympathy by denying terrorism altogether. This is what they did from 2001 to 2006 to counter left-wing extremists.”
This statement reflects how the terrorism discourse is weaponized in Bangladesh’s competitive party politics. Both overemphasis and denial of terrorism have political and security implications.
Recent cases highlight the ongoing risks. A 16-year-old boy from Habiganj was arrested after investigators found evidence of his ties with Neo-Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), bomb-making training, and plans to attack Shia and Ahmadiyya mosques. Neo-JMB is an Islamic State-affiliated extremist group in Bangladesh.
In this context, it may be recalled that the Islamic State’s Wilayat al Hind, i.e., the jihadist group’s India branch, released a pamphlet in September 2004, soon after the July Revolution, titled “Oh Muslims of Bangladesh: Halfway Done. Now, Strive for the Rule of God.” This suggests that the Islamic State and its South Asian affiliates are keenly interested in spreading their influence in countries in the region, including Bangladesh.
The Islamic State network continues with its online recruitment in Bangladesh. The teenage boy from Habiganj also revealed connections with two dismissed military personnel. This indicates that disgruntled military personnel are feeding extremist networks.
Another jihadist group that remains interested in Bangladesh is al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). In the wake of the July revolution, AQIS also released a pamphlet titled “Bangladesh is the rising hope for victory of Islam.”
Investigations have also revealed that several Bangladeshis have joined the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, which has close ties with the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida.
A Bangladesh Air Force warrant officer was discovered at a TTP hideout in Pakistan, triggering a crackdown on suspected extremist links within the Air Force. Two Bangladeshi youths, Ratan Dhali and Foysal Hossain, were confirmed dead while fighting for TTP in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Intelligence officials traced their journey from Bangladesh through India to Pakistan, underscoring militant pathways that connect local recruits to regional conflicts. These reports strengthen the case that denial of terrorism is a political move rather than a reflection of reality.
In an article I wrote for the Journal of Asian and African Studies in 2021, I drew attention to the quiet recruitment and fundraising activities by Islamist militants in Bangladesh post-2017. This argument remains relevant to date.
While public attacks have declined in Bangladesh, underground networks continue to mobilize resources. This silent phase, even if it lacks the dramatic visibility of earlier waves of violence, seems to be capitalized on by extremist groups for recruitment and fundraising.
Historically, militancy in Bangladesh has required external ideological or organizational triggers. The Israel–Palestine conflicts in the late 1970s inspired Islamist mobilization. Afghan veterans returning home in the 1990s motivated youth at home and built networks. The declaration of the Islamic State Caliphate between 2014 and 2017 energized recruitment in Bangladesh.
Today, despite ongoing wars in Palestine and Iran, no Bangladeshi groups are fighting militants there. This suggests that while recruitment and fundraising are ongoing activities, the likelihood of large-scale attacks remains limited without West Asian networks and renewed motivations or triggers.
Bangladesh’s militancy landscape continues to be shaped by the old ideological frameworks of al‑Qaida and the Islamic State. These narratives once failed to garner broad support in the country, and there is little indication that they will succeed in the future. Recruitment and fundraising may persist quietly, but without fresh ideological innovation or external triggers, these networks are unlikely to transform into a mass movement.
Evidence from militants themselves underscores this point. Former JMB fighters in police custody told me in June 2024 that the countrywide serial blasts of 2005 were premature. “Violence was not a good idea then; we could have done better if we were more prepared,” they said. This suggests that current networks are focused on recruitment and fundraising, waiting for a triggering event to justify escalation. Once such an event occurs, the scenario could change dramatically.
The government should not play with extremist fire, either with overemphasis of the threat or its denial. Denial of the threat of terrorism by ignoring recruitment and fundraising or overemphasizing its threat, which alienates communities, are both dangerous. A balanced approach that acknowledges extremist presence without securitizing politics is needed.
