The modern battlefield is transforming. New operational concepts are emerging, additional domains such as the digital and cyber spheres are expanding in scope and intensity, and advanced technologies are reshaping capabilities and achievements.
Among all these shifts, the air domain is experiencing the most profound evolution. Its rapid technological and conceptual changes are creating far‑reaching implications for the modern battlefield.
The evolving air domain is also reshaping the very geometry of conflict. Long‑range strike capabilities have dramatically reduced the traditional importance of geography; a threat originating 2,000 kilometers away (such as in Iran) can now be as immediate and actionable as one positioned just beyond the border.
Concurrently, the distinction between front and rear is eroding. Ballistic and long‑range weapons can bypass the “frontline,” placing civilians and critical infrastructure at the center of the battlefield and making the home front a primary arena of conflict.
Parallel to this shift, classical aerial threats are undergoing a profound transformation with manned aircraft, like expensive fighter jets, no longer the sole or even dominant platform. Unmanned systems are diverging in two directions, some becoming smaller, cheaper, and more numerous, while others grow larger and more capable, rivaling traditional fighter jets in range, endurance, and payloads.
The air domain introduces a host of complex challenges, and while much has been written about the difficulty of countering missiles and rockets, recent events have exposed an additional layer of vulnerability. Over the past week, the widespread use of fiber-optic and First Person View (FPV) drones by Hezbollah has brought this threat sharply into focus and has revealed gaps in preparedness, leaving IDF forces in southern Lebanon exposed.
The result has been a painful reminder of the cost of insufficient readiness, measured in lives lost and many more wounded.
Understanding the significance of the drone threat begins with recognizing how fundamentally different these systems are from traditional aerial platforms. Their small size, low‑altitude flight profiles, and slow speeds make them exceptionally difficult to detect. Their low cost enables the mass acquisition of thousands of units, allowing forces to deploy them at the level of individual soldiers in the field.
Compounding the problem is the ease with which drones can be operated and fielded. A soldier can become a competent drone operator within a single day, and the devices themselves require virtually no logistical infrastructure for storage, maintenance, or deployment.
Their flexibility further amplifies their impact – with hundreds of types and configurations available, drones can be tailored to almost any operational need – from reconnaissance and intelligence gathering to precision‑guided attack roles. This adaptability, paired with accessibility and simplicity, makes drones one of the most disruptive and demanding threats on the modern battlefield.
When these factors are weighed against manned aircraft, it becomes clear why the shift toward unmanned systems is accelerating. Additionally, this transition is no longer limited to non‑state actors, for whom drones once served as a “poor man’s air force.” Increasingly, state militaries are adopting the same technologies, recognizing that unmanned platforms offer operational advantages that manned aircraft cannot match.
Learning competition
The rapidly evolving battlefield requires flexibility, swift adaptation, and clarity in our actions. Without this, the pace of change will leave us preparing for the wars of the past rather than the conflicts of the present, and certainly not for future threats.
The Israel Defense Forces and, in particular, the Israeli Air Force’s response to the threats posed by Hezbollah’s unmanned aerial vehicle offer compelling examples of rapid learning and high‑quality adaptation. In October 2023, drones repeatedly penetrated deep into Israel, reaching the center of the country dozens of times. These incidents resulted in significant losses and considerable embarrassment, as the military struggled to detect and intercept the aircraft before they crossed the border or executed their missions.
Two years later, the contrast is striking. Beginning with Operation Roaring Lion and continuing with Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict, the terror organization launched over 300 unmanned aerial vehicles. Yet fewer than 5 percent managed to evade interception by the Air Force. This dramatic improvement reflects not only technological advancement but also a swift evolution in operational doctrine and battlefield problem‑solving, an example of how effective adaptation can close critical gaps on the battlefield.
On the other hand, the drone threat itself is not new.
Long before October 7, 2023, Israel was already confronting it along the southern border with Egypt, where drones were used for cross‑border smuggling of drugs and weapons – a phenomenon that continues today. Similar patterns emerged with Hamas and Hezbollah, both of which routinely flew drones along the border to photograph Israeli territory and return unhindered to their positions and outposts along the borders.
In the years leading up to the Israel-Hamas War, the IDF began developing and fielding capabilities to detect and neutralize these systems.
Israel is considered a global hub for counter-UAS technologies, offering a wide range of solutions including radar sensors, electro‑optical systems, RF detectors, and various neutralization methods ranging from kinetic interception to radio‑frequency jamming and laser‑based systems.
Yet despite this technological ecosystem, not all of these capabilities have been fully integrated into IDF units, and those that do exist are not available in sufficient quantities, whether due to resource constraints, prioritization decisions, or other factors.
Ukraine as a case study
The war between Ukraine and Russia offers a revealing glimpse into the evolution of aerial threats such as ballistic and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). At the outset of the conflict, Ukraine faced a severe disadvantage, lacking effective responses to the new wave of aerial challenges. Over the course of the four years of war, however, it has developed a range of systems and operational methods to counter this emerging dimension of warfare.
Ukraine became an early global pioneer in acoustic detection capabilities, creating a network of acoustic sensors around strategic sites to identify and neutralize incoming drones and other low‑signature aerial threats. According to Ukrainian reporting, which cannot be independently verified, these systems have contributed to very high interception and neutralization rates.
The war in Ukraine has effectively become a live laboratory and operational testing ground for the evolution of modern aerial threats. Countries and organizations around the world are closely observing it – studying its lessons, tracking its innovations, and adapting its emerging methods and technologies to their own areas of conflict.
Russia, for example, relied heavily on capabilities it received – or appropriated – from Iran. The close alignment between Iran and Hezbollah enabled a steady transfer of operational knowledge and battlefield lessons, making it almost inevitable that the methods refined in Ukraine would eventually appear in our own combat arenas.
Ukraine, for its part, has turned both the fight against the threat of drones and their operational use into one of its most significant tools in the war -largely for the reasons outlined at the beginning of this article. What began as a response to a threat has evolved into a central pillar of Ukraine’s military strategy against Russia.
What needs to be done?
The IDF does not have the privilege of taking the drone threat for granted.
Hezbollah has closely studied Israel’s existing defensive capabilities and adapted accordingly, shifting from radio‑controlled drones to passive platforms guided solely by onboard cameras and connected to operators via fiber‑optic cables with an operator located kilometers away. This effectively bypasses many of the detection methods previously relied upon, forcing Israel to quickly adapt capabilities available in the civilian market and that operate on three channels:
- Detection: Establishing a comprehensive network of radar, optical, acoustic, and other sensors with integrated AI to create a complete and reliable aerial picture. Without detection, forces cannot receive early warnings to take cover, nor can threats be tracked and neutralized in time.
- Kinetic neutralization capabilities: Primarily missiles integrated with detection capabilities to enable precise engagement of small, low‑threat targets. This must continue to evolve alongside the rapid progress in laser‑based defenses against drones. High‑power lasers of the type used against missiles and rockets are unnecessary; a lower‑power system capable of reliably disabling attack drones is sufficient.
- Passive layer of defense: building high‑quality protective barriers around assembly points, outposts, and even around individual vehicles. These “protective blankets,” whether fences or grille frameworks, should be engineered to stop a drone upon contact. Such barriers must meet a high professional standard – not be improvised field solutions that are inconsistent in performance and unbefitting a modern, advanced military.
The IDF has proven its ability to adapt to challenges. The threat of fiber‑optic guided drones exposed a serious operational gap, and there is only one viable path forward: rapidly developing effective solutions and ensuring that they reach frontline units before we pay even heavier prices from the fighting in Lebanon
The writer is a former Israeli Air Force Defense commander