In May 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a highly anticipated summit in Beijing. The meeting immediately fueled debate about the future of China-U.S. relations, cross-strait stability, and Washington’s commitment to Taiwan. Yet while much of the discussion focused on the implications for great power relations and regional security, far less attention has been paid to how Taiwanese themselves interpret these developments. Recent survey data suggest that many Taiwanese fear that Taiwan’s interests could be overlooked or sacrificed as Washington and Beijing seek to stabilize their relationship.
Because public perceptions can shape how democratic societies respond to external challenges, understanding how Taiwanese interpreted the Trump-Xi summit is particularly important. To examine these views, the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) commissioned the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University to conduct a nationwide telephone survey between May 28 and May 31, 2026. The survey interviewed 1,127 adults aged 18 and above across Taiwan, including both landline and mobile phone samples. At the 95 percent confidence level, the margin of error is ±2.92 percentage points.
One of the survey’s most striking findings is the extent to which Taiwanese worry that their interests could be marginalized in the wake of renewed China-U.S. engagement. When asked which statement they agreed with more following the Trump–Xi summit, 51 percent of respondents said that Taiwan’s interests could be overlooked or sacrificed, while only 29 percent believed that Taiwan’s interests would be properly considered. The remaining respondents either held mixed views or did not express a clear opinion.
These findings suggest that many Taiwanese view the summit through a lens of uncertainty rather than reassurance. While the meeting may have reduced tensions between Washington and Beijing, a substantial share of the Taiwanese public appears concerned that closer interaction between the two powers could come at Taiwan’s expense. This concern is particularly noteworthy because it reflects anxieties not simply about China-U.S. relations themselves, but about Taiwan’s role in a changing regional environment.
Concerns about Taiwan’s place in future China-U.S. relations are also reflected in changing expectations about American military support. Since 2021, INDSR has regularly tracked Taiwanese views on whether the United States would send troops to help defend Taiwan in the event of a cross-Strait war. Throughout most of this period, roughly half of respondents believed that U.S. military intervention was either definite or likely. However, the latest survey conducted after the Trump-Xi summit recorded a noticeable shift in public sentiment.
In March 2026, about 54 percent of respondents said that the United States would either definitely or probably intervene militarily if China attacked Taiwan. By May 2026, that figure had fallen to 44 percent. At the same time, the share expecting that the United States would probably not or definitely not intervene increased from 37 percent to 42 percent.
Although public opinion remains divided, the latest survey represents a noticeable departure from the relatively stable pattern observed in recent years. This shift is particularly noteworthy because expectations of U.S. military intervention had rebounded to 54 percent in March 2026, before falling by 10 percentage points in the survey conducted after the Trump-Xi summit.
What explains this apparent shift in public sentiment? One possibility is that the Trump-Xi summit revived long-standing concerns that Taiwan could become a bargaining chip in efforts to stabilize China-U.S. relations. The survey findings suggest that many Taiwanese are evaluating not only the likelihood of U.S. military intervention in a future conflict, but also Taiwan’s position in a potentially changing China-U.S. relationship.
For many countries in the region, improved communication between Washington and Beijing may be viewed as a positive development that reduces the risk of confrontation. Taiwan, however, occupies a unique position. Because its future remains one of the most sensitive issues in China-U.S. relations, closer engagement between the two powers can generate mixed reactions. Taiwan has long benefited from strong U.S. political and security support, but public debate has also been shaped by recurring concerns that Taiwan’s interests could become entangled in broader China-U.S. negotiations. Unlike most countries affected by China-U.S. relations, Taiwan is often the subject of discussion rather than a participant in it.
High-profile leader-to-leader meetings often amplify such concerns because Taiwan is directly affected by their outcomes while having little influence over the discussions themselves. While some may welcome a reduction in tensions, others may worry that Taiwan’s interests could receive less attention if maintaining stable relations with Beijing becomes a higher priority for Washington. The survey results suggest that these concerns remain influential in shaping how many Taiwanese interpret major developments in China-U.S. relations.
Importantly, these findings should not be interpreted as evidence that Taiwanese have turned against the United States. Even after the summit, 44 percent of respondents still believed that the United States would definitely or probably intervene militarily if China attacked Taiwan. Rather than signaling outright distrust, the results point to a broader sense of security uncertainty. Viewed together, the charts above suggest that many Taiwanese remain uneasy about how Taiwan’s interests may be treated in future high-level diplomacy between Washington and Beijing.
Whether these concerns ultimately prove justified remains uncertain. The future trajectory of China-U.S. relations, as well as Washington’s policy toward Taiwan, will depend on a wide range of political and strategic factors that extend well beyond a single summit. Nevertheless, the survey results highlight an important reality: many Taiwanese are increasingly attentive to how their interests may be affected by high-level diplomacy between major powers.
The Trump-Xi summit may have been intended to stabilize relations between Washington and Beijing. Yet for many in Taiwan, it also served as a reminder that their security and future can be shaped by decisions made far beyond the island. Fear of being left behind is therefore not simply a reaction to one diplomatic event. Rather, it reflects a broader concern that Taiwan’s future could be shaped by decisions in which Taiwan itself has little voice. That is a concern policymakers in Washington, Beijing, and Taipei would be unwise to ignore.
