War on Iran has triggered a fundamental crisis of trust in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
Submitted by Seyed Hossein Mousavian on Wed, 04/29/2026 - 12:55
Washington and Tel Aviv's belligerent actions have highlighted the pact's flaws - compliance neither protects a state's security nor ensures equal treatment under international law
Iran accused Israel and the US of having attacked its nuclear facility at Natanz, Isfahan province, 2 March 2026 - the plant was previously targeted by both countries in June 2025. Satellite image (Vantor/AFP) On As diplomats convene in New York from 27 April to 22 May for the latest session of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference, its credibility is under unprecedented strain.
Designed as a grand bargain between nuclear restraint and security assurances, the treaty now faces a deeper crisis - one not of technical compliance, but of political trust. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the case of Iran.
For over two decades, Iran has been the most intensively monitored state under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Of the IAEA’s entire budget, the highest portion is dedicated to monitoring, verification, and oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme - more than any other state.
In the past two decades, successive IAEA reports, alongside publicly available US intelligence assessments, have not established conclusive evidence of an active nuclear weapons programme.
Since 2003, Tehran engaged in sustained negotiations with major powers, most notably reaching the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under which it undertook significant nuclear restrictions and remained in compliance.
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However, the subsequent withdrawal of the United States from the agreement marked a critical rupture. In the years that followed, diplomatic efforts resumed, including US Iran talks in 2025 and 2026 as well as the Islamabad track, both of which reportedly achieved meaningful progress.
Yet these negotiations were ultimately overshadowed by renewed military action involving the US and Israel, alongside intensified sanctions and forms of economic and political blockade.
Strategic lessons
This experience has crystallised into a set of strategic lessons that now shape Iran’s nuclear outlook.
First, compliance does not guarantee security. Membership in the NPT and adherence to IAEA’s safeguards not only provided security guarantees, but instead coincided with escalating vulnerabilities - manifested in comprehensive sanctions, sustained cyber operations such as the Stuxnet attack that damaged nuclear infrastructure, and ultimately military strikes - contributing, in Tehran’s view, to an existential threat reinforced by war and economic blockade.
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Second, transparency can increase strategic exposure. Detailed disclosures and intrusive inspections reveal sensitive facilities and personnel, potentially increasing vulnerability by providing information that will be exploited in coercive actions, including cyber operations, sabotage incidents, targeted killings of nuclear scientists, and military strikes against key nuclear infrastructure, such as enrichment and heavy water facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak during US and Israeli operations.
At least 14 nuclear scientists are believed to be among those killed in Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, launched on 13 June 2025. Prior to 2025, several other Iranian scientists were killed in assassinations spanning from 2010 to 2020, including Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (2020), Majid Shahriari (2010), and Masoud Ali Mohammadi (2010).
Third, the IAEA is perceived as politically influenced. Iranian officials increasingly view the IAEA not as a purely technical body, but as one shaped by geopolitical pressures, particularly from western states.
Senior figures - including Iran’s Foreign Ministry and Atomic Energy Organization - publicly criticised the agency’s reporting as “politically motivated” and reflective of external influence, especially in the context of Board of Governors resolutions and post-conflict assessments. Such statements underscore a growing perception in Tehran that the IAEA has deviated from strict technical neutrality and operates, at least in part, within broader political dynamics.
Erosion of trust
Distrust of the IAEA inside Iran has grown steadily over the past two decades, particularly amid allegations that inspections were exploited for intelligence purposes. In 2010, Iran’s Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi accused the IAEA of sending “spies working for foreign intelligence gathering organisations among its inspectors”.
After the 2025 Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, such suspicions intensified. Senior Iranian lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian accused IAEA inspectors of espionage and alleged that surveillance microchips had been discovered concealed in inspectors’ shoes during security checks at nuclear sites.
Years of compliance and intrusive inspections did not produce security or normalisation; instead, they culminated in sanctions, coercion, sabotage, and ultimately military attack
These accusations, whether accurate or not, further eroded Iranian confidence in the neutrality of the IAEA and strengthened calls in Tehran to restrict inspection access.
Fourth, verification processes facilitate coercive measures. Safeguards reporting and resolutions are perceived as providing legal and political justification for sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and other forms of pressure.
A few days after the 2025 Israeli-US strike on Iran, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the IAEA of providing 'pretexts' that enabled Israel to justify its recent air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.
Fifth, US and Israeli primacy in shaping the Iranian nuclear dossier. The trajectory of Iran’s nuclear negotiations since 2003 - culminating in the JCPOA and followed by subsequent developments, including the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement and escalating tensions that extended to military actions involving the United States and Israel - leaves little doubt that the primary and decisive role in shaping the Iranian nuclear dossier has been played by these two actors.
In practice, the direction, pace, and outcomes of the process have been driven largely by Washington and Tel Aviv, while multilateral institutions have occupied a secondary and largely ineffective position. Bodies such as the UN Security Council and the IAEA, along with the broader framework of the NPT, appear in this context to have functioned primarily in reactive or procedural capacities rather than as independent and influential actors.
From this perspective, their inability to adopt even minimal positions - such as issuing clear condemnations of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists or military strikes targeting nuclear facilities - has been interpreted as evidence of diminished effectiveness and constrained autonomy.
This pattern raises critical questions regarding the capacity of the nonproliferation regime to function as an impartial and authoritative framework in the face of major geopolitical conflicts.
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Viewed through this lens, the recurring review conferences of the NPT risk being perceived not as effective mechanisms of governance, but as largely procedural exercises that consume time and resources without delivering meaningful outcomes.
Credibility undermined
Taken together, these developments have severely undermined the credibility of the NPT, the IAEA, and the UNSC in the eyes of many states, particularly in Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, years of compliance, intrusive inspections, and negotiated agreements did not produce security or normalisation; instead, they culminated in sanctions, coercion, sabotage, and ultimately military attack.
At the same time, other non-nuclear-weapon states continue to maintain advanced enrichment capabilities without facing demands for their elimination, while nuclear-armed states outside the NPT framework remain largely immune from comparable pressure.
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Most notably, Israel has remained the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East while refusing to join the NPT, effectively blocking implementation of long-standing UN resolutions calling for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.
Yet neither the IAEA, nor the UNSC, nor the major world powers have exerted meaningful pressure on Israel regarding its nuclear arsenal. The contrast with North Korea has further reinforced the perception that strategic deterrence - not treaty compliance - provides the ultimate guarantee of survival. As a result, the foundational bargain of the NPT is increasingly being called into question.
If states conclude that adherence to nonproliferation obligations neither protects their security nor ensures equal treatment under international law, then confidence in the entire nonproliferation regime will continue to erode.
Restoring legitimacy will require far more than procedural reaffirmations; it demands rebuilding trust in the impartiality of international institutions and closing the widening gap between legal principles and geopolitical realities.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
War on Iran Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29
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