Why Turkey will be a key regional powerbroker after Iran war
Submitted by Taha Ozhan on Mon, 04/06/2026 - 17:10
How Ankara wields its influence could determine whether the Middle East moves towards stabilisation or renewed fragmentation
Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan speaks after a cabinet meeting in Ankara, Turkey on 9 March, 2026 (Reuters) On A weakened Iran - or worse, an Iran that collapses into a failed state - would not stabilise the Middle East. It would plunge it further into chaos.
Such an outcome would reshape the regional balance of power, potentially enable the expansion of Israeli territorial control, intensify fragility in Iraq and Syria, and generate new waves of cross-border conflict and migration.
No country would be more directly affected than Turkey - nor would any regional actor be more central to managing the order that follows.
Turkey and Iran are not just two of the largest countries in the Middle East. They are also among the oldest states, whose histories, cultures, demographics, languages and political trajectories have been intertwined for centuries.
Their shared border has been unchanged since the 17th century - a rare continuity in a region defined by shifting frontiers. Even a brief look at the 20th century illustrates the depth of their parallel experiences.
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In its first half, both countries endured foreign occupation. At the beginning of the century, they underwent constitutional revolutions within a few years of one another, driven by comparable political movements seeking representative government. Yet neither revolution achieved lasting liberal transformation.
In both cases, authority became consolidated in the hands of a single leader or party. Each state pursued ambitious westernisation projects, accompanied by forms of secularisation that sought to marginalise Islam from public life. These transformations were reinforced by new historical narratives and state-sponsored cultural reinventions.
By mid-century, elected prime ministers had come to power in both countries. In Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in a US-backed coup after attempting to nationalise the oil industry. In Turkey, Adnan Menderes was deposed in a military coup and executed.
Western-aligned order
Within a year of one another, Iran’s oil nationalisation was reversed, while Turkey made a decisive geopolitical choice by joining Nato.
In Turkey, a regime of military tutelage took root, constraining democratic development for decades. In Iran, the shah consolidated a western-aligned authoritarian order.
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By the late 1970s, both societies were convulsed by unrest. In Iran, upheaval culminated in revolution. In Turkey, it resulted in a bloody military coup.
Iran’s early revolutionary leadership - including its president and prime minister - fell victim to assassination campaigns. In Turkey, political leaders were imprisoned and banned from public life.
This past is not merely a chronicle of events; it courses through the present, shaping how Turkey understands today's crises
When Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, Tehran entered a prolonged and devastating war. In Turkey, the closure of political space during the Cold War created conditions for the emergence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, fuelling a conflict that would cost tens of thousands of lives and persist for more than four decades.
The postwar trajectories of the two countries again revealed striking contrasts. By the late 1980s, Iran faced a deep crisis of democracy, symbolised most visibly by the compulsory veiling of women.
In Turkey, military tutelage defined political life throughout the 1980s, and one of its most striking social tensions revolved around the prohibition on headscarves in public institutions - forcing many women to remove them in order to participate in higher education or public service.
In different ways, both states struggled to reconcile religion, authority and democracy. This past is not merely a chronicle of events; it courses through the present, shaping how Turkey understands today’s crises and charts its geopolitical vision for the near future.
Turkey cannot - and will not - regard Iran as the Gulf states, Israel or the West do.
Turning point
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq marked a decisive turning point for both countries. In Turkey, the rise of the Justice and Development Party initiated a period of economic growth and a more assertive foreign policy.
For Iran, the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime across the border created a geopolitical vacuum that Tehran sought to fill. Buoyed by high oil prices, Iran expanded its regional reach, relying heavily on sectarian networks and proxy actors - particularly in Iraq.
Throughout the 2010s, Ankara and Tehran found themselves on opposing sides of regional upheaval. Turkey supported movements for political change during the Arab Spring. Iran worked to preserve the existing order, most decisively in Syria.
The Syrian conflict became the bloodiest arena of this competition. Turkey backed the opposition; Iran intervened to sustain the Assad regime. Although political change in Damascus eventually occurred after years of devastation, the broader outcome was catastrophic: massive humanitarian loss and a shattered regional landscape.
Within that wreckage, Israel became increasingly assertive. The strategic map of the Middle East shifted, and Iran’s model of forward defence - projecting influence through regional non-state actors - encountered structural limitations.
Now, with Israel and the US confronting Iran more directly, the region faces another potential inflection point.
The prospect of an Iranian collapse recalls the unintended consequences of the 2003 Iraq invasion. Then, the removal of a regime triggered ethnic and sectarian fragmentation that reverberated across the region.
Today, a severely weakened Iran could once again unleash destabilising dynamics - but this time in a more volatile environment. Israeli territorial expansion could accelerate.
It is conceivable that Washington would recognise further annexations, as it did with the Golan Heights. In such a context, Israel could move towards consolidating control in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, while sustaining its military posture in Lebanon and Syria.
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Landscape transformed
For Turkey, the implications of Iranian weakening would be immediate and concrete. Firstly, instability in Iraq and Syria would directly affect Turkish security and trade. No other regional actor is as economically and geographically exposed to developments in those theatres. Border security, refugee flows and cross-border militancy would demand sustained attention.
Secondly, formalised Israeli annexations would transform the region’s legal and strategic landscape. Israel’s military presence in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon already exports instability; codifying territorial expansion would intensify polarisation and undermine prospects for negotiated settlements.
Thirdly, a weakened Iran could once again create permissive conditions for transnational terrorism. During earlier periods of regional fragmentation, terrorist networks flourished amid power vacuums. The reemergence of such dynamics would pose risks not only to Turkey, but to the wider region and Europe.
Fourthly, Turkish-American relations could enter another period of strain. Following the 2003 Iraq invasion, disagreements over Iraq, Syria and Israel generated lasting mistrust. In a future scenario shaped by Israeli territorial expansion and regional realignment, Ankara and Washington could again find themselves at odds - particularly if US policy is perceived as enabling destabilisation.
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Finally, competing geopolitical perspectives between Turkey and the Gulf states could harden into structural divergence. Ankara views regional stability as requiring balance among major actors. A regional framework centred exclusively on Israeli primacy is unlikely to align with Turkish strategic interests. In this context - in addition to Qatar, Turkey’s natural ally - the path Saudi Arabia chooses will be decisive.
Overall, the weakening of Iran would not automatically yield equilibrium. It could instead create a vacuum in which more assertive actors could expand their reach. The post-2003 period demonstrated how rapidly disorder can spread when regional balances collapse.
Today, the risks are greater. Ethnic and sectarian fault lines persist. State institutions in several countries are fragile. External powers are deeply embedded. In such an environment, a sudden Iranian implosion could produce cascading instability rather than strategic clarity.
Turkey enters this moment as the region’s most capable state actor: militarily experienced and diplomatically engaged across multiple fronts. But capacity alone does not guarantee stability. Ankara needs to pursue an assertive strategy aimed not at domination, but at equilibrium: preventing territorial expansionism, limiting proxy warfare, and reinforcing state sovereignty where possible.
The central lesson of the past two decades is clear. Removing or weakening a major regional power does not eliminate competition; it redistributes it. If Iran fragments or turns into a failed state, the Middle East will not become less contested. It will become more so.
Regional stability in the coming years will depend on whether a new balance can be constructed - one that restrains expansionism and reduces zero-sum alignments. Failing that, the region risks entering another prolonged cycle of confrontation.
In that emerging order, Turkey will not be a bystander. It has a chance to be a decisive factor. Whether the Middle East moves towards stabilisation or renewed fragmentation will depend in no small measure on how Ankara chooses to wield its influence.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
War on Iran Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29
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