Once upon a time there was a U.S. president who had a unilateralist streak and intervened in the Middle East to prevent and eliminate a threat that was allegedly sponsoring terror, causing a diplomatic crisis with European allies. This description fits neatly how President Donald Trump has prosecuted the war against Iran, but it is also eerily similar to a U.S. president from another era: George W. Bush.
While Bush had campaigned for a “humble” foreign policy, the terrorist attacks of September 11 transformed his presidency into a hawkish one that would not tolerate risks. He ultimately invaded Iraq to eliminate alleged weapons of mass destruction and disrupt a network supposedly aiding terrorism. The Iraq War caused a rupture among NATO allies, and the insurgency it sparked – leaving the United States embroiled in a prolonged conflict – was seen as an inflection point at which the unipolar moment began to ebb.
Beyond the continuities that can be observed in U.S. foreign policy – what might be described as a never-ending obsession with the Middle East – Hattori Ryuji, a professor of political science at Chuo University in Japan, offers further insights for today’s state of affairs in his recent book on Japan-U.S. relations during the War on Terror period, “After Terrorism.” Hattori’s work highlights how an ally can turn a crisis into an opportunity to reinforce alliance unity, a lesson especially pertinent given the uncertainties surrounding the Iran conflict.
Although the Bush era marked a low point for European-U.S. relations, for the Japan-U.S. alliance it was a period in which the bilateral relationship was elevated into a global alliance tackling international problems, notably terroism. As Hattori noted, although Japan’s willingness to stand by the alliance was driven by reputational concerns – a reaction to the backlash from the Gulf War of 1991, when Japan’s assistance was criticized as “too little too late” – during the War on Terror, Tokyo proactively supported the U.S. war effort. While not playing a direct role in combat, Japan took the lead in humanitarian missions in Afghanistan and provided logistical support for U.S. vessels in the Indian Ocean.
Japan’s alliance support was not without strategic calculation. When the U.S. posture toward the Iraqi regime began to tilt toward regime change, Japan cautiously sought to bundle its support for potential action in Iraq in exchange for sustained U.S. attention to the North Korean problem – a threat that was not only military in nature, given Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear capabilities, but also deeply political for Japan due to the abduction issue. In his work, Hattori traced this linkage back to December 2002, when the two geographically distant issues – Iraq and North Korea – were linked together in a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting, and then included in a joint statement.
However, Japan’s attempt to use its leverage as a loyal ally came with a cost – a predicament that Hattori sought to explain through the concept of the “global alliance security dilemma.” According to his definition, this type of dilemma arises when an alliance extends “beyond its initial geographic or functional parameters, thereby generating an expanded set of responsibilities and risks for the participating entities.” Hattori argued that the seminal SCC meeting put in place conditions under which “Japan could not decline to support the American use of force in Iraq”, boxing Tokyo into a dilemma whereby it was compelled to accept the geographic expansion of the alliance’s scope to the Middle East – in contrast to the pre-agreed notion that the Japan-U.S. alliance was primarily concerned with East Asia.
Overall, it is debatable whether Japan’s strategy – to encourage the United States to focus on North Korea by supporting the Iraq War – was actually successful. No weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq, which had been the foremost justification for launching the military campaign in the first place. Today, North Korea’s nuclear capability has grown greater than ever, and the abduction issue, which has hardened Japan’s posture toward the country to a significant extent, continues to remain unresolved. While then-Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro attempted to mitigate the alliance dilemma during this period through a rapprochement with North Korea and calls for reforming the United Nations, these initiatives in fact only “exacerbated the situation,” according to Hattori.
At the same time, it is hard to disagree that Japan’s struggle to navigate the alliance dilemma ultimately resulted in a stronger Japan-U.S. relationship, as Tokyo gained the trust of its American counterparts. The strategic document entitled “The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century,” released following Koizumi’s final visit to the United States during his tenure, speaks to this point. The document described the alliance as “one of the most accomplished bilateral relationships in history” and celebrated the way in which the Bush-Koizumi partnership “broadened and enhanced cooperation achieved in the alliance.” The document closed on a forward-looking note, affirming the global role that the Japan-U.S. alliance had come to occupy in the post-9/11 era: “The two leaders shared the view that the U.S.-Japan global alliance remains a constant and positive force. They shared the expectation that the U.S.-Japan friendship and global cooperation shall continue to grow stronger.”
The global character that the Japan-U.S. alliance came to embody has been both a blessing and a curse for Japan’s foreign policy heading into the Takaichi era. With the expanded mission scope of the alliance, there is growing pressure from the United States and serious debate within Tokyo over whether to dispatch the Maritime Self-Defense Force to secure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz – a prospect that has divided opinions among the Japanese public.
However, the expanded role and vision that Japan has come to embrace has encouraged the country to play a more active role not only in the Indo-Pacific region – through the promotion of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and arms transfers – but also in cultivating a global network of partners to enhance Japan’s deterrence and diversify supply chains.
The history narrated by Hattori shows that Japan has some leverage over the United States, as demonstrated during the debates over linking the Iraqi and North Korean problems. During one of the most diplomatically isolated periods in U.S. history, Japan stood firmly by Washington’s side, and while the fruits of that loyalty remain debatable, it ultimately strengthened the Japan-U.S. alliance and expanded Japan’s role on the international stage.
Within its toolkit, Japan can find measures that extract leverage without harming the alliance, including non-military options that Japan may be more willing to assume. Although speaking up to its “only ally” – a phrase preferred in Japanese diplomatic circles – can be difficult at times, the perception of Japan as an obedient partner may damage the alliance in the long term, particularly in light of polls showing diverging views toward the alliance between the public and policymakers. The Koizumi administration demonstrated that Japan could do precisely this on the North Korea issue when the stakes were high enough.
These insights would help Japan navigate the current demands from the United States regarding the safety of the Strait of Hormuz. By leveraging its position as one of the key geopolitical actors in the Indo-Pacific and a close U.S. ally, and by assuming an increasing burden in an area that the United States sees as the cornerstone of global prosperity, Japan may turn the current crisis into a true opportunity to advance its interests – as the history of the Japan-U.S. relationship during the War on Terror demonstrates.
