Talk of war in the Middle East abounds on social media, but not just about the one with Iran. A small, but significant, portion of this chatter relates to a conflict that has not begun. For more than a year now, pundits and politicians have warned of a potential clash between Israel and Turkey. Driving this hypothetical confrontation are a series of issues related to Syria, the Palestinian territories, and regional security as a whole. In December 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu indirectly charged Ankara with wanting to reestablish Ottoman imperial rule over the Levant. To that, he declared, Turks “should not even think about it.” Officials in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey have steered a more neutral course on the prospect of an Israeli contingency. On nightly television, however, commentators have not shied from the prospect of fighting of the Israel Defense Forces. Especially cavalier pundits have asserted that Turkish forces likely would seize Israel’s capital inside of 72 hours.
The fight now raging over Iran has raised temperatures further. Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s warning that Turkey constitutes a new threat akin to the Islamic Republic of Iran touched off a firestorm of reaction. Pro-Israeli voices in America have supported this sentiment. Turkey, in the words of one prominent critic, is potentially “an enemy as dangerous as the Islamic Republic” if left unchecked as a power. To date, Turkish officials have refused to return direct fire. While denouncing the Israeli-U.S. offensive against Iran, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has offered only vague promises of Turkish resolve. “Turkey is no longer the old Turkey,” he declared on the social platform X (formerly Twitter), adding “Everyone should do their calculations accordingly …”
There are several potential settings for an Israeli-Turkish conflict. The bombing of an airbase near Palmyra last year, as well as Israeli expressions of support for Kurdish militants, suggest that Syria may provide the most likely battleground between the two countries. Acts of subterfuge inside Israel or Turkey may also provide a potential spark leading to armed conflict. Yet odds of an immediate Turkish-Israeli war remain low — at least in the estimation of some probability markets. Indeed, the fluidity of the current crisis makes forecasting a future standoff between Turkey and Israel difficult. It may be more appropriate to ask what factors could prompt such a conflict. One possible contingency may arise from a looming crisis confronting Turkey’s military. As it continues a multi-decade effort to overhaul and modernize the country’s armed forces, Ankara must now answer a critical, yet delicate, question: Should Turkey actively prepare to fight Israel? Responding to this question may compel Erdoğan to rethink aspects of his military modernization agenda. Should his defense priorities change, he may hasten the outbreak of war with Israel regardless of whether he desires one or not.
Turkey’s Defense Industry at the Crossroads
Despite continued drumbeat of heated rhetoric, there are indications that both Turkey and Israel have worked to minimize the possibility of a direct confrontation. After Israeli warplanes attacked a prospective Turkish airbase in Syria last March, the two sides reportedly agreed to establish a deconfliction hotline in the hopes of preempting further violence. In January of this year, Turkey took heart after Israel refused to impede Syria’s offensive against autonomous Kurdish forces in the northeast. With Israel now embroiled in a conflict with both Iran and Hizballah, observers in Ankara remain confident that no war with Israel is imminent. Conflicting perceptions over the strength and intent of Turkey’s growing defense industry, however, continue to stoke uneasiness in both Israel and Turkey.
International awareness of Turkey’s growing defense sector has risen steadily over the last decade. Indications of Ankara’s efforts to foster its arms industry span from the use of Turkish drones in Ukraine to a slew of weapons deals in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Domestic audiences could point to the launching of new warships and the testing of fixed-wing aircraft as still further evidence of a brighter Turkish future. The country’s media has championed each of these developments as signs that the Turkish military is built for the present and future. Naysayers are virtually absent in print or on Turkish television. To the contrary, pundits regularly boast of the superiority of Turkey’s arsenal, even when compared to the likes of the Israel Defense Forces.
A closer look reveals a starkly different picture. A significant number of military systems touted in Turkish media remain in development. This list includes the Kaan, Turkey’s much heralded fifth-generation fighter aircraft; the Kizilelma, a fixed-wing drone; and the Cenk and Tayfun, two recently tested mid-range ballistic missiles. Equally telling is the saga of the Altay main battle tank. Despite plans for prototype production as far back as 2007, manufacturers didn’t announce the start of serial production until late 2025. Media sources state that the Turkish army possesses as few as three tanks in service. Among the more modern platforms currently in service, it is likely none may be of great use against a near peer adversary like the Israeli military. Despite initial plaudits, the Ukrainian military now makes little use of the TB-2 Bayraktar, Turkey’s much vaunted drone system. Most worrying, perhaps, is the current state of the country’s air defenses. Despite promises to field a comprehensive anti-air system dubbed Steel Dome, Ankara still appears to rely upon NATO assets to provide Turkey a degree of protection from air attack. Erdoğan’s domestic critics took note of this fact recently after NATO forces intercepted four Iranian missiles over Turkish soil in March.
When Ankara’s modernization efforts first began, relatively modest security priorities influenced Turkey’s agenda. Early investments in drone technology, for example, reflected a desire to improve how the military countered insurgents — particularly those linked to the Kurdish Workers’ Party. Developing cheaper locally crafted weaponry has also offset or replaced the higher costs of foreign military purchases previously made by the Turkish military. It is likely Erdoğan long discounted the possibility of a confrontation with Israel. In the wake of campaigns against Gaza and Lebanon, his sentiments changed. “We must be very strong so that Israel cannot do these things to Palestine,” he told an audience in 2024. “Just as we entered Karabakh and just as we entered Libya, we will do exactly the same to [Israel].” It was for this reason, he continued, that Turkey’s developing defense sector was so important. “There is nothing stopping us from doing so. We just need to be strong enough to take these steps.”
How or whether Ankara is planning for any kind of Israel contingency is not clear. For generations, the National Security Politics Document — Turkey’s official national security strategy — was a state secret kept from the public. Media reports in 2024 declared that the country’s National Security Council completed a four-year interagency review of Turkish security imperatives. An official summary of the document references Israel as a barrier “to ensuring regional stability,” particularly in regions such as Syria and Gaza. The full contents of the document, to date, remain unpublished.
Prepare to Fight or Not?
What Erdoğan says publicly offers only a basic picture of how he perceives Turkey’s rivals and adversaries. His recent record of statements, unfortunately, has added little in the way of sharpness or clarity. Beyond declaring that the new Turkey is stronger than the old, Erdoğan tends to refrain from dubbing neighboring states as enemies. Rarer still have been his explicit threats of military action. Arguably, his most explicit and extraordinary expressions of belligerence have been directed at Greece. Nothing, he once vowed, could stop Turkey from invading Greek territory in the middle of the night. On other occasions, he has subtly boasted of his ability to launch ballistic missiles at Athens.
Erdoğan clearly finds himself in a very different predicament in the case of Israel. He has demonstrated little restraint in denouncing Israeli policies, going so far as to call upon God to “destroy and devastate Zionist Israel.” Yet he has refused to countenance calls from his own coalition partners to intervene militarily on behalf of Palestinians in Gaza. Though he has remained aloof to Israeli statements directed at Turkey, Erdoğan clearly faces a difficult choice: Does he ignore the rhetoric and hope relations with Israel remain manageable? Or does he direct his ministers to prepare for armed hostilities?
There is good reason for Erdoğan to choose the former. Israel faces its own sticky situation when it comes to confronting Turkey militarily. As a NATO member and close ally of the United States, Turkey has significant international support it can call upon. Moreover, in the wake of successive wars on multiple fronts, it is possible that Israel may lack the political will — let alone the material and financial resources — to take on Turkey. Domestic uncertainty also reigns in Israel. At some point, Netanyahu’s hold on power will break, leading to a new administration with different ideas about Turkey. All these factors may allow Erdoğan to sleep more easily at night.
But if Erdoğan reasons that preparing for a military confrontation with Israel is warranted, a great deal of work and uncertainty lie ahead. He first must consider the serious shortcomings facing his military as of today. The backbone of the country’s air force, its fleet of F-16s, requires significant material upgrades that are not forthcoming due to American sanctions. Recently purchased Eurofighters from Qatar and the United Kingdom may help ameliorate the problem, yet the fighters still haven’t arrived. How Turkish pilots will be trained, and the aircraft kitted out with arms, are also matters that will take time to fully work out. Turkey possesses noticeable advantages when it comes to the size of its naval and ground forces. Yet if Israel’s battle-tested squadrons of F-35s do command the skies, Turkish sailors and soldiers may find themselves greatly disadvantaged.
Turkey and the Lessons of the Iran War
Depending on the circumstances, Ankara may not go to war with the army it has today. A sufficient amount of time — and a bit of luck — may allow certain upgraded platforms to be finished and brought into service. Yet integrating aircraft like the Kaan or missiles like the Tayfun into the armed forces may be easier said than done. Training air and missile crews, building new facilities, and devising their use in coordination with other branches of the military will also demand time and patience. Then there is a question of resources and scale. Given what the world has witnessed during the air war over Iran, officials in Ankara must now consider on what systems they should invest most of their resources. Put another way, just how many new planes, missiles, and other systems do they need and why?
Media and think tank attention in Turkey suggests that air defense will be the source of considerable attention in the months and years ahead. Even before the Iran war began, a variety of Turkish outlets emphasized Steel Dome’s critical importance. When an Israeli news site declared Turkish air defenses “a dangerous development,” commentators in Turkey nodded approvingly. Yet even the most jingoist appraisal of the system admits that Steel Dome’s full implementation will not be complete until 2030. The Israeli-U.S. war against Iran may compel Erdoğan to push for an even faster timeline.
Ankara’s own ballistic missile program attracts an equal amount of discussion in Turkey today. Like Steel Dome, newspaper and television reports speak glowingly of Israeli anxiety amid recent tests of systems like the Tayfun and the longer range, Cenk. With Turkish news networks regularly broadcasting videos of successful Iranian attacks on Israeli targets, some analysts have noted government plans to begin mass production of its new missiles this year. Just how many missiles the Turkish arms industry produces, however, likely constitutes only one question Ankara must consider. Where to house and how to deploy these assets will be issues likely addressed in light of lessons learned from Iran.
The early May opening of Istanbul’s annual International Defence and Aerospace Fair led to still more questions about Turkey’s security agenda with the surprise unveiling of Yildirimhan, the country’s first intercontinental ballistic missile. Developers billed the missile as capable of striking targets at a range of 6,000 kilometers with a payload of up to 3,000 kilograms. Yildirimhan’s debut prompted a familiar chorus of cheers among senior Turkish leaders and pundits. One cable network repeatedly aired clips of Israeli commentators reacting gravely to the missile’s destructive potential. Some Turkish experts, however, question the utility and intent of such a weapon. Why, one analyst asked, did Turkey need a missile with such range? If it is meant to deter war with states beyond Israel, what other potential targets did Yildirimhan’s developers have in mind? One video released by the Turkish Ministry of Defense infers that the United States may be one possible target. The clip, which was uploaded to social media and replayed on cable news, shows the missile pelting civilian and military targets along the American eastern seaboard.
The continued development of Turkish missile capabilities, including long-range weapons, also begs important questions regarding the cost and financing of the country’s new weaponry. The National Assembly in Ankara recently awarded the country’s Ministry of Defense a 30 percent increase in funds in contrast to the previous year. Exactly how Turkey allocates this money among the services, particularly in terms of acquisitions, very much remains a black box. A more important factor, perhaps, is the effect rising inflation may have on Ankara’s spending power. With Turkey’s current inflation rate hovering around 30 percent, the impact of this budget increase likely will diminish over the course of the year ahead. Shouldering larger infusions of cash into the defense sector may constitute a still greater challenge.
Damned If You Do….
Accelerated investment into these and other elements of the Turkish armed forces requires Erdoğan to accept a critical degree of risk. Warranted or not, boosting defense spending and allocating further attention to new weapons systems undoubtedly will heighten Israeli concerns. Expanding the scale of Turkish defense production — especially of drones, aircraft, and ballistic missiles — may further Tel Aviv’s belief that Ankara is preparing for war. Committing to such an ambitious rearmament program likely would undermine any diplomatic or public efforts aimed at soothing Israeli anxieties. Rather than deter, such steps may press Israel to make equally proactive measures in anticipation of a potential Turkish conflict. Israeli leaders likely will have drawn their own lessons when it comes to their experiences fighting Iran, lessons that may lead to an intensification of the arms race to come. As a result, chances for an Israeli-Turkish détente may dwindle.
Erdoğan may yet place his faith in diplomacy and serendipity. Israel, he could decide, stands to lose as much, if not more, if war breaks out. His own domestic considerations, however, may pull Erdoğan in the opposite direction. Presidential elections are currently scheduled for May 2028. As of now, the country’s constitution bars him from running. Regardless of whether he finds a way to circumvent this constraint, the stakes in this contest are immense. On the line is more than his political future. Erdoğan’s legacy and the continued rule of his Justice and Development Party are both potentially in jeopardy. Looking weak in the face of an Israeli challenge, in this light, may not be an option.
Ryan Gingeras is a professor in the Institute for Regional and International Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle Eastern history. He is the author of numerous books on the history of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. His most recent book is Mafia: A Global History. The views expressed here are not those of the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.
Image: Anadolu Agency
