When Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on March 12, nearly two weeks after the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran began, one photo from the meeting stood out.
In it, Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir is seated near the two leaders in combat camouflage. Munir’s attire seemed to reflect a country precariously balancing military mobilization and diplomacy—just as he was directing strikes in Afghanistan one moment and discussing the conflict in the Middle East with regional leaders the next.
On April 7, the United States and Iran reached a fragile, two-week cease-fire mediated by Pakistan, with help from China. In facilitating these negotiations, Pakistan assumed a role that it had not occupied in any previous regional crisis. Now, as it hosts talks between the two sides in Islamabad, another Pakistani balancing act is coming into view.
Avoiding the Middle East’s core rivalries has long been a pillar of Pakistani foreign policy. Pakistan shares a long and uneasy border with Iran, while millions of Pakistani workers live in the Gulf countries, sending back remittances that help sustain a fragile economy. In particular, Pakistan has historically maintained working relations with Iran while deepening informal economic and security ties with Saudi Arabia.
However, last September, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense agreement that suggested a shifting calculus. In addition to security guarantees, the pact formalizes military coordination, intelligence sharing, and strategic consultation. After the March meeting between Sharif and Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistan echoed that commitment, pledging to “always stand firmly with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and strive for their mutual desire for peace in the region.”
But even as it reaffirmed its commitment to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan moved quickly to position itself as an indispensable go-between in the wider conflict. Pakistan’s mediator role and its defense pact seem to pull in opposite directions: Playing honest broker to Iran requires visible neutrality, while the pact with Saudi Arabia signals alignment. But perhaps it is because of the defense pact that Pakistan has emerged as a facilitator.
If Pakistan’s mediation succeeds, it will elevate its regional standing and help it avoid a direct military confrontation it cannot afford. If the war sharpens and Saudi Arabia invokes the pact, Pakistan’s hedge will collapse, and it will face the choice it has spent weeks trying to avoid.
The Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defense pact formalized financial and military reciprocity developed over generations. Pakistani troops have rotated through Saudi Arabia as a standing security guarantee since the 1960s, with officers trained with and embedded in Saudi forces and retired generals taking on advisory roles in Riyadh. During the Cold War, Saudi financial flows sustained Pakistan’s military capacity, while Islamabad served as a conduit for Gulf money reaching Afghan resistance networks. That history created durable expectations on both sides, even without a treaty.
Formalizing the relationship was therefore a political signal as well. Both countries wanted the commitment on paper at a moment of shifting dynamics in the Middle East. In 2020, the Abraham Accords normalized relations between Israel and Arab states including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, shaping a bloc that served to counter Iranian influence. And by mid-2025, Iran’s nuclear program had become stronger than ever before.
Meanwhile, Pakistan was dealing with its own economic crisis and needed Saudi Arabia’s help through loans, deferred oil payments, and investment—making a formal agreement worth the diplomatic cost.
“Saudi Arabia is a major source of energy supplies, financial assistance, and remittances from Pakistani workers in the Gulf,” said Sehar Kamran, a Pakistani member of parliament with long-standing connections in Saudi Arabia. “These ties naturally push Pakistan toward a closer alignment with Riyadh.”
The defense pact likely served to assuage some doubt in Riyadh that Islamabad was a reliable security partner. “Under [former Prime Minister] Imran Khan, Pakistan flirted with a different posture, leaning toward Iran and stepping somewhat away from its traditional Saudi alignment,” said Asfandyar Mir, a senior fellow for South Asia at the Stimson Center.
“What we have seen since then is a decisive return to a Saudi-first orientation. From Riyadh’s perspective, the defense agreement was always understood as part of a broader framework aimed at Iran,” Mir said.
This commitment is now being tested in real time. The Iran war has rippled through Pakistan’s economy: Within days of the first strikes, Qatar suspended export shipments of liquefied natural gas, resulting in a 21 percent increase at the time in Pakistan’s domestic fuel prices. (Pakistan hiked the price of diesel by another 55 percent and gas by 43 percent in early April.) The Pakistani government also imposed emergency austerity measures, rationing gas supplies to fertilizer plants and raising concerns about agricultural production during the winter crop cycle.
In March, Pakistan announced a four-day federal workweek, a two-week closure of educational institutions, and restrictions on nonessential energy use. To navigate disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, Pakistan launched navy escort missions and separately requested that Saudi Arabia provide an oil supply route through its Red Sea port of Yanbu to bypass the strait.
Saudi Arabia has come under attack from Iranian missiles and drones since the start of the war, but it has not formally invoked the defense pact with Pakistan. Last month, the two sides discussed what the agreement calls “mechanisms to halt” Iranian attacks. Saudi Arabia’s implicit ask is clear: political solidarity now and military readiness if escalation crosses a threshold sufficient to trigger the pact.
In an interview with Bloomberg Television on March 11, Mosharraf Zaidi, Sharif’s foreign media spokesperson, was asked whether Pakistan would assist Saudi Arabia if the war expanded. “The question isn’t whether Pakistan might come to Saudi Arabia’s aid,” Zaidi said. Both countries “have always operated on a principle of being there for the other before they need the other. … We will, no matter what and no matter when.”
Pakistan’s commitment to Saudi Arabia likely pushed it to prioritize de-escalation. Further, with its military already engaged in Afghanistan, any scenario that redirects forces toward the Middle East would put significant strain on the Pakistan Army.
Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif warned in the first few days of the war that a weakened Tehran could leave Islamabad exposed to pressure from multiple fronts, particularly if Iran drifts toward alignment with India and Afghanistan. By reframing Pakistan’s interest in containing escalation as geopolitical prudence rather than sympathy for Iran, Islamabad has so far managed to stay connected to Tehran without undercutting Riyadh.
Indeed, Pakistan has engaged Saudi Arabia, alongside Egypt and Turkey, in its efforts to facilitate peace efforts. Late last month, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar hosted Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, along with their Egyptian and Turkish counterparts. Shortly after, Dar traveled to Beijing for talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, resulting in a joint five-point peace proposal that ultimately shaped the cease-fire.
By positioning itself as an indispensable channel between the United States and Iran, Pakistan has converted geographic and diplomatic proximity into strategic currency. If its mediation efforts ultimately succeed, Islamabad will emerge from the conflict with enhanced standing in Washington, goodwill in Tehran, and proof of value to Riyadh beyond military manpower. That combination would translate directly into relief on debt, energy, and investment.
Senior Pakistani officials speaking on background described Pakistan’s approach as a calibrated hedge rather than strict neutrality—an active diplomatic push to contain the conflict in the Middle East combined with a clear security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Any direct threat to Saudi Arabia, they said, would trigger a firm response under existing defense arrangements.
In practice, a Pakistani military response would likely begin with air defense and intelligence support, or—in extremis—advisory or specialized troop deployments. A more direct Iranian attack on Saudi territory could bring Pakistani naval assets into the Gulf corridor and even raise questions about the nuclear dimension of the pact—which both governments have carefully avoided so far.
For now, Pakistan continues to operate on two tracks, maintaining contact with Iran while reinforcing its commitments to Saudi Arabia. But if the cease-fire fails—and if the war sharpens into a direct confrontation involving Saudi territory—the hedge ends. What remains is the mutual defense pact and the obligations that come with it.
