North Korea solar panels — Solar panels on North Korean houses (KCNA)

North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un attended the groundbreaking ceremony for Phase 5 of the Hwasong District development on Feb. 18, 2026, in Pyongyang — the latest milestone in the Korean Workers’ Party’s campaign to build 50,000 residential units in the capital before the Ninth Party Congress, which convened in early 2026, raising questions about who actually benefits from the country’s construction-first economic policy.

One of the defining shifts in the Kim Jong Un era has been the regularization of the Workers’ Party Congress. Following the Sixth Party Congress, the party moved to holding the congress every five years on a fixed schedule, as stipulated in party rules — a move widely interpreted as a signal of political normalization and stability, both domestically and internationally.

At the Eighth Party Congress, held in January 2021 in Pyongyang, Kim openly acknowledged the failures of the previous five-year economic plan and pledged a new development strategy. The Hanoi summit’s collapse and the economic hardship caused by border closures during the COVID-19 pandemic were likely significant factors in that reckoning. While the majority of Kim’s signature policy initiatives have centered on nuclear weapons development, large-scale construction projects have been a constant feature — and at the Eighth Party Congress, he announced a plan to supply 50,000 residential units in Pyongyang. He pushed ahead with city-scale development projects near the capital despite concerns about potential failure.

With the Ninth Party Congress in early 2026, North Korean state media covered the final construction push to complete those 50,000 units. The coverage is designed to demonstrate that the core targets set at the Eighth Party Congress are being visibly met — and to project the supreme leader’s commitment to improving the people’s housing welfare. However, if residency in Pyongyang’s upscale apartment complexes is limited to privileged classes, the outcome may diverge sharply from stated intent. When the Botonggang riverside terraced housing complex in Pyongyang was completed in April 2022, reporting at the time confirmed that the residents were not ordinary citizens but members of the privileged class.

Beyond Pyongyang: rural housing and local development

Kim Jong Un has also pursued residential construction beyond Pyongyang, extending the campaign into rural areas. As of early October 2024, North Korea announced it had completed approximately 40,000 residential units across 141 cities and counties nationwide. In addition, in January 2024, the country launched the “Local Development 20×10 Policy,” a plan to build local factories in 20 cities and counties per year for 10 years. In 2025, the regime also announced plans to build modern health facilities in cities and counties across the country, following the opening of Pyongyang General Hospital as a catalyst in the medical and public health sector.

Construction is an inevitable component of policy implementation. But the substantive goals of any policy are more important than the construction itself. Observing how North Korea pursues its policies, however, one gets the impression that construction leads the way — that completing a building is treated as equivalent to achieving the policy’s purpose. Once a project is finished, the policy is deemed a success and credited as an achievement of the supreme leader. This pattern, which means treating visible construction outcomes as proof of Kim Jong Un’s success, has repeated itself consistently.

Pyongyang’s skyline continues to grow, driven by an appetite for visible results. Another persistent weakness in North Korea’s construction sector is the near-total absence of a trickle-down effect. Successful policy implementation requires that the benefits generated during execution be distributed among all participants. In other words, everyone involved in construction should receive adequate compensation or a share of the gains. Only then can local economies benefit in any meaningful way and spread the gains broadly to the people. Regardless of the socialist economic framework, so long as the state’s normal rationing system is not functioning, construction projects represent one of the few potential sources of genuine local economic stimulus.

Construction creates something from nothing. For that reason, those who hold political power can accumulate enormous wealth and achievement through construction — and, in turn, consolidate even greater power. Moreover, because construction generates substantial added economic value, it has the potential to produce direct and indirect value-creation effects and the economic development that follows.

The problem is that such effects are difficult to achieve within North Korea’s socialist economic system. When the state controls and supplies materials and labor, cost calculation becomes meaningless, and profit generation becomes nearly impossible. This leaves workers on the ground with little incentive to improve productivity. The final output of any project flows to the supreme leader as a political accomplishment; the circular process of calculating economic value, reinvesting it, advancing technology, and reducing costs is virtually unattainable.

Furthermore, when the state formulates and implements policy, the benefits should flow to the general population, not to a specific privileged class. The current dual-track development approach — Pyongyang on one track, the provinces on another — makes it difficult to satisfy the population at large.

Policy must pursue the common goal of regional equity and balanced development, delivering projects that satisfy both Pyongyang residents and those in the provinces, if polarization is to be narrowed. Construction projects that appear to disproportionately benefit Pyongyang residents or select segments of society risk generating a pervasive sense of deprivation among the broader population.

Construction can function as a growth engine in North Korea’s economic development. Indeed, South Korea has already proven this through its own developmental experience. The two systems are not directly comparable, but the economic energy embedded in construction must be fully leveraged.

The real test of any construction project is not the ribbon-cutting. It is whether the people who built it, and the communities surrounding it, are measurably better off once it is done.

Read in Korean

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