On April 29, the shocking news broke that RightsCon 2026, one of the world’s largest human rights-related convenings, would be cancelled. On April 30, Access Now, the organizers of RightsCon, issued a statement saying that RightsCon would not take place either in-person or online. The news came less than a week before opening day and left over 3,000 participants scrambling to cancel their flights and accommodations.
RightsCon is an annual gathering of primarily civil society and human rights advocates, joined by business leaders, policymakers, government representatives, technologists, academics, and journalists, on topics exploring the intersection of human rights and technology. In 2025, it was held in Taipei, Taiwan and before that in Costa Rica, Tunisia, Canada, and Belgium, as well as virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic. The May 5-8 gathering in Lusaka, Zambia was celebrated as a historic event, being the first time RightsCon would be held in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was also coming at a critical moment for the global human rights community, which has been under tremendous pressure due to funding cuts.
In a follow-up statement issued on May 1, Access Now provided disturbing details on the reason behind the RightsCon’s sudden cancellation: foreign interference from China.
On April 27, one day after a government press release endorsed RightsCon, we received a phone call from [the Ministry of Technology and Science] MoTS about an urgent issue and were told that diplomats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were putting pressure on the Government of Zambia because Taiwanese civil society participants were planning to join us in person.
After multiple failed attempts to meet with their Zambian government contacts, Access Now was told informally from multiple sources that if they wanted RightsCon to continue, they would have to “moderate specific topics and exclude communities at risk, including our Taiwanese participants, from in-person and online participation.” Based on the lack of communication and good faith from the Zambian government and the conditions put forth, Access Now decided to cancel the conference.
Soon after this news broke, a number of organizations and publications came out with statements and analysis condemning the foreign interference that led to RightsCon’s cancellation. Still others, including Eric Olander of the China and Global South Project, argued that the charge of Chinese interference was a red herring with no supporting evidence. Citing the social media post of a Zambian scholar, Olander said the real culprit was the political situation in Zambia, which was becoming increasingly hostile to human rights.
It seems highly unlikely that Access Now would rely on unsubstantiated information to accuse the Chinese government of interference. If the domestic political environment was the true reason, then why did that not come up as a red flag in Access Now’s careful vetting of Zambia as a location for RightsCon 2026? And why would Access Now have gotten approval from the Zambian government in the first place?
It’s more likely there is truth to both explanations. In other words, Chinese diplomats did raise their concerns to Zambian government officials, and those officials were more likely to listen and not stand up for RightsCon given the domestic political environment.
If we go with this explanation, none of the above commentary answers the question of why the Chinese government would go to such lengths to pressure the Zambian government to put conditions on RightsCon 2026, how it was able to exert such pressure, and how future human rights convenings might deal with this precedent given China’s growing global influence.
Access Now in their April 30 statement mentioned the participation of Taiwan CSOs as the main sticking point. This makes sense at a superficial level. Taiwan (formally the Republic of China) was expelled from the United Nations in 1971 and its seat was given to the People’s Republic of China, which is governed by the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP sees Taiwan as a renegade province that belongs to the PRC and has sought to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. Since the 1970s, so many countries have switched their diplomatic relations from the ROC to the PRC that the ROC now only enjoys diplomatic relations with 11 countries, mostly small Pacific and Caribbean island states. Taiwan is also barred from other international organizations such as the World Health Assembly and Interpol, although it is still a member of dozens of multilateral institutions. Due to pressure from the PRC government, Taiwanese citizens are also barred from U.N. venues and meetings.
Taiwanese participants, however, are generally not excluded from non-governmental meetings. In fact, Taiwanese CSOs have participated in past RightsCon convenings as well as other international civil society meetings with no repercussions, and only a few Taiwanese CSOs were participating in sessions in RightsCon 2026. So why did the Chinese raise these concerns now? And how were they able to exert enough influence on the Zambian government to make these extraordinary last-minute demands on Access Now? These are important questions because without an informed understanding of the motives behind the Chinese government’s actions, Access Now and other civil society organizations run the risk of repeating history.
I do not have inside information about the Chinese government’s motives, but what I can provide is a more informed understanding about their actions, relying on my years of experience working with civil society organizations in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan and three trips to Africa over the last eight years. Two of those trips were to Zambia to interview dozens of local stakeholders and Chinese companies on the human rights impacts of their investments.
Two observations stand out from my experiences that help to explain the cancellation of RightsCon 2026. The first is China’s sensitivity toward criticism of its human rights record, particularly as it impinges on their sovereignty and ability to operate in other countries.
A close look at the RightsCon 2026 program suggests it was not only the presence of Taiwan participants but also the form their participation took that raised red flags for the Chinese government. In this case, Taiwanese CSOs were organizing sessions critical of China’s influence overseas, including Africa. Three sessions in particular fit this category: 1) Amnesty International’s Taiwan affiliate’s roundtable on “Confronting fear, exclusion and nationalism: how should civil society respond to China’s digital authoritarian practices;” 2) Open Culture Foundation’s dialogue on “Cybersecurity with Chinese characteristics, from exporting authoritarian norms to civil society resilience;” and 3) Doublethink Lab’s co-organized dialogue on “Networked authoritarianism: unpacking the China-Russia FIMI nexus in Ukraine, Taiwan, and Sub-Saharan Africa.” Doublethink Lab’s participation stands out among this group. In 2025 one of its founders was placed on a Chinese government list of “Taiwanese independence separatists” who would be investigated and put on trial in a Chinese court in absentia.
Two other sessions were organized by a Uyghur group on confronting Uyghur forced labor in Chinese supply chains, a very sensitive topic in China, and a Hong Kong group on citizens setting digital rights standards. While the Uyghur and Hong Kong groups were not explicitly mentioned in Access Now’s statements, they do advocate for greater autonomy and even independence from China, which added to the sensitivity of their participation. Still other sessions organized by non-Taiwanese participants were devoted to Chinese surveillance in the Belt and Road Initiative, which includes Africa, and how China is exporting its Great Firewall to other countries.
The second observation is that Zambia is one of the more vulnerable countries in a vulnerable continent when it comes to Chinese influence. China has been a major development partner of Zambia going back to the 1960s and ‘70s with the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), China’s largest foreign aid project at the time. In the last few decades, Chinese investment grew quickly particularly after Edward Lungu became president in 2015, when China became one of Zambia’s top bilateral investment partners. The current president, Hakainde Hichilema, has tried to strike more of a balance between the West and China, pursuing renewed ties with Western partners while also entering into a comprehensive strategic partnership with China in 2023.
From 2000 to 2022, China committed around $14 billion, mostly in the form of loans, into mining, infrastructure, power generation, and communication projects. These include the recently-opened international airport terminal where RightsCon participants would have passed through, the main Zambian government office building, two industrial zones, the highway connecting Lusaka to the Copperbelt province in the north, and a number of hydroelectric and coal projects that generate valuable energy in a country that experiences regular interruptions in power. The Chinese presence in Zambia is ubiquitous: driving through Lusaka and in the provinces, one sees Chinese restaurants, banks, medical clinics and large China Malls carrying a wide range of affordable, cheaply made Chinese goods labeled in English.
This investment is accompanied by significant financial, social, and environmental costs. Chinese loans, for example, have been a major contributor to Zambia’s debt burden. In 2020, Zambia became the first African country to default after the COVID-19 pandemic, when it could not repay a Eurobond loan. It entered into an IMF debt restructuring program, and renegotiations with Chinese lenders, which have severely limited its ability to take on new loans.
There is a general perception among Zambians that this debt is the result of non-transparent dealings between the Zambian government and Chinese government and business officials. Zambians also complain that Chinese projects import Chinese workers and equipment rather than use local labor and supply chains, and reserve managerial positions for Chinese, while locals dominate the more dangerous, lower-paying jobs as construction workers and miners. And then there are the environmental harms, such as the disastrous Kafue dam failure in February 2025, which resulted in 50 million liters of acidic waste from a Chinese-owned mine flowing into one of Zambia’s largest rivers.
There are plenty of powerful interests in Zambia – both local and Chinese – who advocate for China’s interests and help tamp down concerns about the negative externalities. Even Eric Olander, who was skeptical that Chinese influence resulted in the RightsCon 2026 cancellation, acknowledged that China has the influence. He noted that the Chinese company responsible for the Kafue dam failure was never held accountable by Hichelema’s government for the tremendous damage done.
Zambia is home to one of the larger populations of Chinese in Africa numbering in the tens of thousands. Some have been in Zambia for decades and others more recently arrived to work on Chinese projects and provide services to the growing number of Chinese there. Some work for the large Chinese state-owned enterprises contracted to build airports, industrial zones, roads, and dams and enjoy a cozy relationship with Zambian authorities; others work for Chinese private companies and still others have started up shops, restaurants and other entrepreneurial ventures. They have formed a number of associations and networks, some providing a sense of community and services to Chinese far from home, while others – such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (CCC) and Zambia Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification of China (ZCPPNFC) – have a close relationship with the Chinese government and advocate for Chinese interests in Zambia. This includes a defamation lawsuit filed by the CCC against a Zambian investigative journalism outlet’s documentary about the impacts of Chinese commercial activity in the country.
My first visit to Lusaka in 2018 brought me unknowingly face to face with two ZCPPNFC members – a man and a woman – whom I had arranged to meet for dinner through a Chinese researcher. Both had been in Zambia for decades. When I asked what ZCPPNFC did, the man said it was a pro-Beijing, United Front organization that seeks to promote friendship between China and Zambia and counter efforts by “splittist” forces who seek to sow division between China and Zambia. He was also an overseas member of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a high-level advisory body and central pillar of China’s United Front system, and said he had close ties with the Chinese Embassy and ambassador in Zambia.
The fate of RightsCon 2026 was the unfortunate result of two conditions being present. The first condition – the presence of Taiwan CSOs organizing sessions that were “splittist” in nature, accusing China of exporting its repression overseas (and indirectly positioning Taiwan as the good “China”) and thereby threatening China’s sovereignty and reputation on the continent – was the main reason why Chinese diplomats got involved. The second condition – Zambia’s dependence on Chinese investment and the presence of a sizable China lobby that is the product of close engagement between the Chinese and Zambian government on large development projects (in addition to the domestic political environment) – helps explain how China was able to get the ear of Zambian officials.
What does all this mean for international NGOs like Access Now who want to bring their human rights convenings to regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa? The above analysis suggests that they need to be sensitive to both of these conditions in their planning especially for large, high-profile meetings such as RightsCon. If there are heightened risks, they need to take measures to mitigate those risks.
My experience participating in the Sixth General Assembly of the African Coalition for Corporate Accountability (ACCA) held in Cote d’Ivoire in 2019 is an instructive example of how meetings addressing China’s impact on Africa can take place on the continent.
One important step the ACCA organizers took was to work closely with Chinese civil society advocates to plan the assembly and frame it as a forum for understanding Chinese investment in Africa, rather than naming and shaming China. The theme they chose was “Impacts, Opportunities and Accountability in the Context of Chinese Investments in Africa.” (Note that this framing did not stop either the speakers or attendees from making critical comments in the meeting sessions about the Chinese government, banks, and companies and their impacts on Africa.)
In addition, the speakers were mostly from the PRC, with a few others such as myself, coming from the United States or Europe. By taking these measures, ACCA minimized any appearance of threatening China’s sovereignty or ability to operate in Africa. ACCA also enjoyed other advantages over RightsCon: its General Assembly was not nearly as large nor as high visibility and was held in an African country where China had less influence.
Access Now might have been unwilling to make the compromises that ACCA made, particularly screening out Taiwan participants. But at the very least, given Zambia’s exposure to Chinese influence, it could have consulted with trusted Chinese civil society advisors who could help identify any risks they faced, and possibly made changes in the way RightsCon identified Taiwanese, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Hong Kong speakers and framed topics sensitive to China. The thought of making even these changes to avoid offending an authoritarian state thousands of miles away might of course offend human rights advocates. But those changes might also have allowed Access Now to hold RightsCon for the first time in Sub-Saharan Africa and provide an important opportunity for a beleaguered global human rights community to come together in solidarity.
