In the midst of a three-year-long civil war, Sudan has few friends. The international community has largely left – no Western country maintains an embassy within the country. The World Food Programme and the International Red Cross run limited campaigns to deliver water or medical supplies, but the United States closed its embassy in April 2023 at the outbreak of the civil war and ceased all aid in January 2025. The European Union has committed over €200 million for aid, but deliveries rarely arrive in an appropriate manner. Meanwhile, the de facto government of Sudan, General Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), controlling the Eastern half of the country, is well over $56 billion in debt. Aid does little to mitigate Sudan’s debt spiral, and almost no creditors are prepared to help fund the campaign against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the west. China remains one of the few who continue to negotiate with the Sudanese Army on any economic level.
Chinese diplomats recently announced the forgiveness of four no-interest loans totaling $50 million, signaling an apparent olive branch to the faltering regime, as well as a willingness to foster diplomatic ties when no one else is. Dr. Gebreil Ibrahim, the Sudanese finance minister, praised the deal, seeing it as opportune for Chinese entry into Africa and for Sudanese skills development. He noted that the deal comes at a time when no Western country has invested into Sudan. In fact, China is actively seeking investments in Sudan, including a $300 million copper deal that would leave Sudan with 30 percent of the profits over a 30-year timeframe. This would be paid out only after debts to China were paid off. Notably, Sudan currently owes China over $5 billion in outstanding debt. The terms are quite striking and hint at a different picture than economic cooperation. China’s strategy in Sudan goes well beyond diplomatic friendship.
China formally entered into diplomatic and economic relations with Sudan in 1996, when state-owned CNPC opened Block 6, an oil venture in partnership with Sudan’s Ministry of Energy. The Petrodar pipeline, a 1,500-kilometer consortium led by CNPC, Sinopec, and Malaysia’s Petronas, carried South Sudanese crude from the Melut Basin north through Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. China helped to build all-weather roads for oil transportation, while also providing military equipment to Sudan for increased security for production. This inadvertently led to the Sudanese bombing of southern militias, clearing the area for more oil extraction. China continued to invest roughly $3 billion into oil extraction, yet Amnesty International found that almost no revenue helped to fund further economic, social, or cultural development.
By 2023, the civil war completely broke the oil supply chain to China. The CNPC relocated from Khartoum to Port Sudan and then eventually back to Beijing. Sabotage and blockades repeatedly struck the oil blocks, causing production to effectively cease. In March 2024, Sudan declared force majeure on the pipeline, directly halting South Sudan’s crude exports as well, leading to the termination of the Production Sharing Agreement between north and south. This meant that South Sudan no longer had any port access, severely restricting exports. On December 7, 2025, the CNPC issued a formal ultimatum that it was terminating its Block 6 partnership. The following day, Sudan’s largest oilfield at Heglig was seized by opposition forces. The decision to withdraw could not have been timed better.
China is playing a bigger game than aid and economic development in Sudan. Instead, the recent loan forgiveness to Burhans’ regime, which is illegitimate and undemocratic, was paired with Chargé d’Affaires Xu Jian’s statements that China would continue $30 million of grant-funded projects in Sudan and aim to resume CNPC operations within the country. China’s trust shown to the SAF comes with its public calls for peace. The deals, however, expose that it is benefiting from the weak regime; it can control assets more easily and establish long-term deals with incredibly one-sided terms. China has made substantial claims for peace, voting for an immediate cessation of hostilities with the November 2024 UN Security Council resolution. Beijing has sent envoys, joined multilateral formats, and stayed clear of the direct military involvement that has drawn Western sanctions onto Russia and Iran. But while this rhetoric calls for peace, the position effectively stays real intervention and allows for more time to finalize deals with the current junta.
China needs Burhan to maintain power, since the legitimacy of their contracts rely on personal relationships with him and his leadership. A civilian government would likely renegotiate Chinese arrangements. In fact, the Eastern Sudan Advisory Council and the Beja Congress called for a freeze on any deal-making with China. Eastern Sudan is mineral-rich and chronically poor, and its residents rarely receive any of the resource wealth that flows outward. They face water shortages, failing infrastructure, and international isolation while suffering from the effects of the civil war.
The Eastern Sudan Advisory Council further warned that contracts signed under current conditions could face legal challenges from any future government. The junta has no legislative authority to bind the state even while a government delegation was, as of June 2026, preparing to travel to Beijing to finalize the contracts. There is no functioning national legislature, no record of community consultation, and no published environmental or social impact assessments. The Burhan government holds Port Sudan, which is enough to legitimize the contracts with China. Beijing’s formal neutrality gives it political cover to do all of this without attracting the scrutiny that military involvement would invite. Yet, this essentially sets up a violation of Sudan’s long-term sovereignty and causes a dependency trap for Sudan.
Western policymakers are entirely missing what China is actually doing in Sudan. China is sequencing its debt, offering small tokens of grace through debt forgiveness and then locking in longer-term and fully extractivist deals. The Eastern Sudan Advisory Council’s warning should be taken seriously beyond Sudan as well. Agreements concluded under these conditions carry real legal exposure once the war ends, and the communities whose resources are being contracted away extend into South Sudan and beyond.
Paul Mwirigi is a Kenya-based writer specializing in African affairs. His contributions explore political, social, and economic dynamics across Africa. He holds a degree from the University of East Africa and has developed a strong foundation in building scalable and efficient digital solutions to issues around the continent.
