Trump’s ‘Shield of the Americas’ Leaves Many Outside the Armor

In 1994, at the first Summit of the Americas, all the nations of the Western Hemisphere minus Cuba signed comprehensive declarations that set the agenda for hemispheric relations for a generation.

It wasn’t easy. I represented President Bill Clinton at a series of draining negotiating sessions. But in the end, the leaders of 34 nations joined Clinton at the historic meeting, where one by one they added their signatures to the consensus Miami accords.

For the 10th Summit of the Americas, scheduled for last December, President Donald Trump would not commit even to attend, leaving the Dominican Republic, the host, with no choice but to cancel the gathering. Instead, on March 7 at his country club in Doral, Florida, he assembled 12 fellow conservative leaders at a “Shield of the Americas Summit.”

Only American officials got speaking slots, including Trump, who wondered aloud whether the Argentine and Honduran leaders should have paid him for his endorsement in recent elections. In the “family photo,” the U.S. president alone is seated, surrounded by an idiosyncratic smattering of Latin American and Caribbean presidents.

The White House invited Chile’s conservative president-elect, José Antonio Kast, instead of the center-left incumbent, Gabriel Boric, defying diplomatic protocol. It also failed to include the leaders of Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, home to more than half of the region’s population. Trump did mention the U.S. southern neighbor and top trading partner, but only to insult its president and observe, “The drug cartels are running Mexico.”

Prime Minister Mark Carney, an outspoken critic of Trump’s foreign policy, was also pointedly absent – an ominous sign as Canada, the United States, and Mexico prepare to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement.

The diminutive Doral summit was symbolic of Trump’s overtly ideological approach to the Americas, and a reminder of the costs of that strategy. The historic Summit of the Americas in Miami had produced 23 detailed action items, on topics that included strengthening democracy, promoting economic integration and free trade, and fighting poverty. Leaders debated policies to combat drug trafficking, organized crime, and corruption.

In contrast, the Shield of the Americas Summit narrowly focused on drug gangs, and even on that topic, the conversation was limited to the role of the region’s armed forces. “We’ll use missiles, right into the living room” of cartel bosses, Trump said.

For the MAGA base, the “shield” will protect against drugs and thugs from the Americas, an old standby since the days of President Richard Nixon and his “war on drugs.” The message was also consistent with Trump’s broader approach to the Americas, a stunningly ambitious yet surprisingly narrow agenda. In last year’s National Security Strategy, the White House set the goal of U.S. “preeminence” in the Western Hemisphere. It has dedicated impressive attention and military resources to achieve it. The U.S. Navy now patrols the Caribbean, striking speedboats helmed by suspected drug smugglers and chasing oil tankers away from Cuba. In January, Army commandos abducted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

At the same time, the United States has turned its back on economic integration, instead imposing tariffs on Latin America’s exports. Trump gutted foreign aid programs that originated in President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, and he ditched policies designed to reduce corruption and strengthen the rule of law. Though Trump warns the region’s leaders about ties to Beijing, he offers few concrete alternatives to Chinese trade and investment.

Even in the fight against drug gangs, it is not entirely clear what the United States brings to the table. The “Americas Counter Cartel Coalition,” unveiled at the U.S. Southern Command in advance of the summit and including 17 countries, does not yet appear to offer new resources for Latin America’s cash-strapped armed forces.

All of that raises the question of how Trump managed to recruit even 12 leaders to his Florida golf club. For some participants, such as President Javier Milei of Argentina, there are genuine ideological bonds, including shared skepticism about the role of government. For others, including President Daniel Noboa of Ecuador, public demands to reduce violent crime made the summit’s theme attractive, and the prospect of direct support from the formidable U.S. military was welcome. (The U.S. and Ecuadorian armed forces recently conducted joint strikes against cartel targets.)

In other cases, attendance was likely a defensive maneuver, with leaders such as President José Raúl Mulino of Panama fearful of retribution, including tariffs or worse. If a mercurial Trump might punish the rejection of his invitation, better simply to fly to Florida, smile, and keep a low profile.

Finally, many governments in the region no doubt welcome opportunities to gather without the authoritarian regimes of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, whose representatives too often disrupt regional coordination. Debate over whether those governments should have been invited to the Dominican Republic in December had contributed to the cancellation of the 10th Summit of the Americas. Under these circumstances, “coalitions of the willing” to address specific issues, such as security, make sense.

Still, excluding Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia is puzzling, given their size and influence. It is even less defensible for a conversation about security. After all, all three struggle mightily with organized crime, and all three have developed sophisticated law enforcement institutions and a capable military. Either way, given high polarization in Latin America, imposing a narrow ideological litmus test for regional summits guarantees a rotating cast of participants and impedes continuity.

Trump’s pivot to Latin America and his aggressive Monroe Doctrine attitude have raised the costs of ignoring U.S. interests in the region. The question is how best to use that leverage. Gathering friendly leaders makes it easy to dictate a summit communique – but makes it difficult to deliver practical, durable results. Rather, the United States should take advantage of its influence to build large coalitions – ideally, at least on some issues, including all the nations of the Americas – to address common concerns, from organized crime to hemispheric supply chains, and one day soon, democratic governance as well.