These are tricky times for Russian President Vladimir Putin. The “special military operation” he launched against Ukraine in 2022, intended to last a few days until a puppet regime in Kyiv could be installed, has now gone on longer than both the Soviet fight against Nazi Germany and all of World War I. His forces have long ceased making significant gains on the battlefield; some data even suggest that Russian forces lost territory in April and May. What gains the Russians have made have come at enormous cost: Last month, Anna Keast-Butler, the director of British intelligence agency GCHQ, cited new intelligence indicating that Russian war deaths had likely reached almost half a million; various Western sources put total Russian casualties at significantly more than 1 million.
In relative terms, the attrition losses are even more staggering. By some accounts, Russia is now incurring eight men killed or seriously wounded for every one lost by Ukraine. With average monthly casualties running at more than 30,000 this year, the Russian army is struggling to replace them with fresh recruits. It is offering sign-up bonuses as high as $80,000, and up to $140,000 in debt relief to encourage more men to enlist.
Those who do have little to look forward to. According to Russian military bloggers, the average life expectancy of a new recruit—from arrival at a training ground to death in a combat zone—lies somewhere between 10 days and three weeks. Once they are sent onto the battlefield, Russian fighters survive an average of 20 to 35 minutes. Much of the reason for this is the extraordinary shift in battlefield technology and tactics—in particular, the ways that drones have become the primary killing machines in this war, with stark implications for the future of combat in other parts of the world.
More ominously for Putin, the mood in Russia is changing. For years, most Russians supported the invasion of Ukraine because of the relentless patriotic news they’ve been subjected to by Kremlin-controlled media and the limited impact that the war had on most Russians’ daily lives. Now, however, Ukraine has brought the war home to Russia. Kyiv’s new, domestically produced long-range drones, such as the FP-1, FP-2, and Hornet, are proving extremely effective in hurting Russia economically, strategically, and psychologically. Ukraine now regularly strikes targets deep inside Russia, including a massive attack on Moscow in mid-June that has apparently disabled the Russian capital’s largest oil refinery until 2027.
Besides military targets such as airfields and missile launchers, a particular focus of Ukraine’s deep strike campaign has been Russian oil refineries, pipelines, energy export infrastructure, and fuel depots. Reuters estimates that Ukrainian drones have reduced refining capacity by 700,000 barrels per day. Russian bloggers—virtually the last element of somewhat free expression in Russia—are up in arms as they realize that Russia is much more defenseless than the Kremlin had them believe.
There have been other dramatic attacks. On the first morning of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in early June, Ukrainian drones attacked an oil terminal in the city. Huge plumes of black smoke were plainly visible to guests arriving at the conference. Three days later—and again on June 20—drones hit the Antipinsky oil refinery in Tyumen, western Siberia, which converts around 160,000 barrels of oil to fuel per day. It is more than 1,000 miles from the front line. Facilities as far away as Vladivostok and Sakhalin have started to invest in anti-drone defense. Nowhere in Russia, it now seems, is safe.
Russians are feeling increasing economic pain. New reports of fuel rationing and other shortages are a regular occurrence. In Russian-occupied Crimea, fuel supplies are so low that the authorities have suspended sales to the public; in Russia itself, more than half of the country’s regions have started rationing fuel. The country’s diesel output fell by a further 10 percent in May, and Moscow has temporarily banned gasoline exports—likely as a result of the Ukrainian refinery strikes, which have hurt Moscow’s ability to benefit from the high oil prices caused by the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran.
Ukraine’s drone attacks have put pressure on an already war-strained economy. Earlier this year, Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service reported that Russian military spending already accounts for half of Russia’s entire state budget, significantly more than the Kremlin has publicly acknowledged. Thomas Nilsson, head of Sweden’s Military Intelligence and Security Service, assessed that the Russian economy “can only enter one of two scenarios: long-term decline or shock.” Either one, he said, leads to “financial disaster.”

Black smoke rises from Russian oil producer Gazprom’s oil refinery on the outskirts of Moscow on June 18. AFP via Getty Images





