Iranian Kurds Can Fight, but How Effectively?

To date, many analysts and pundits have criticized Iranian Kurdish involvement in the war. Some argue that they should not join the fight without concrete promises because the United States has a track record of abandoning the Kurds. Others fear that arming Iranian Kurdish opposition groups would stir Persian nationalism, incite secessionism, and help the Iranian regime reconsolidate.

These views are overstated and miscalculate realities on the ground. Kurdish opposition groups in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey have served as auxiliary and partner forces for decades without formalized agreements. Throughout the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, for instance, different Kurdish groups aligned with foreign governments and at times against one another to fight. Kurdish militia groups in Syria willingly accepted U.S. and other foreign assistance to help defeat the Islamic State, knowing that this assistance was temporary, transactional, and tactical. Iraqi Kurds have maintained their important partnership with the United States even though past assistance was short-lived.

Similarly, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are not passive actors. They will fight if the right incentives and strategic conditions exist. Like other nonstate armed groups, they benefit from external patronage to advance their political agenda, gain semi-legitimacy, and enhance their military capabilities.

Concern about Iranians “rallying around the flag” in response to armed Iranian Kurdish opposition groups is exaggerated. It assumes a national cohesion that does not exist in the Islamic Republic today. Some Iranian diaspora opposition groups, especially those led by former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, have vocally criticized the Iranian Kurdish alliance as separatists who threaten Iran’s territorial integrity. Yet Persian Iranians are divided between regime loyalists, reformists, nationalists, and a growing anti‑regime youth population. Non-Persian groups that comprise half of Iran’s population—Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, Azeris—are equally diverse. Iranian Kurds, who represent some 10 percent of the population, are about 60 percent Sunni Muslim, 35 percent Shiite, and 5 percent heterodox and minority groups with different dialects and local and tribal affiliations. This heterogeneity creates complex group affiliations that extend beyond ethnonationalism and separatism.

The issue, therefore, is not whether Iranian Kurds are willing to fight or whether arming the Kurdish opposition will reinforce Persian nationalism. Rather, it is about the effectiveness of Iranian Kurds as an opposition force.

The key challenge here is military capabilities. For decades, Iranian Kurdish forces have trained and fought in the mountains and conducted cross-border raids against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and at times other Kurdish forces. Yet Iranian Kurdish Peshmerga—numbering in the hundreds or thousands—have not fought in a full-scale conflict since the Iran-Iraq War. These forces have light weapons but lack air defense systems and armored vehicles. They have limited experience with modern warfare. Unlike their counterparts in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria, Iranian Kurdish forces also lack strong leadership (as many leaders have been assassinated by the Iranian regime) and effective political institutions that could provide strategic direction, build capacity, and ensure durability of efforts.

To be sure, individual groups have conducted successful operations against Iranian regime forces for decades. One of the most active and capable fighting forces is the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). PJAK is an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is an officially designated terrorist organization by the United States, European Union, NATO, and other U.S. allies. According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, since 2014 PJAK attacks have accounted for an estimated 70 percent of all confirmed attacks by Iranian Kurdish opposition groups against the regime. PJAK can also potentially draw on the thousands of PKK fighters from their base in the Qandil Mountains in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.

Still, this is just one organization. Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are not a cohesive fighting force. The six groups that comprise the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan are divided politically and militarily. Fissures are between conservative and leftist nationalist groups, tribal and urban groups, and/or those tied to the two main Iraqi Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Bafel Talabani. Some groups are fragmented within. For instance, when I visited the Komala opposition forces camp in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, in the 2000s, I had to meet with two distinct groups at different locations in the same neighborhood. These fragmentations continue today and affect group loyalties and allegiances of local populations.

Further, while PJAK is the most militarily capable group, it comes with the greatest political risk. PJAK poses a security threat to the Turkish government, which is a NATO member and important U.S. ally. A resurgent PJAK would raise alarm in Ankara and create new strains on the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership and fuel regional instability. Turkey has targeted PJAK operations in the past and could continue to do so.

An activated Iranian Kurdish opposition force, even in a weakened form, also poses security risks for Iraq. Even before the current war commenced, the Iranian regime and its proxy forces conducted missile and drone attacks against U.S. military bases and oil and gas installations in the country. Iranian strikes on oil fields across Iraq, included an oil field in the Kurdistan Region operated by the U.S. firm HKN Energy, have temporarily halted production. Iran could also close parts of the 200-mile border it shares with the Kurdistan Region and strangle local trade and economies. This is why Iraqi Kurdish leaders do not want to get drawn into the fight. Iraqi Kurdish officials have insisted that “not a single Iraqi Kurd has crossed the border” and that the Kurdistan Region “will not be part of conflicts.” The government in Baghdad has taken a similar position.

These realities have implications for any effort to support, engage, and/or arm Iranian Kurds. These opposition groups are willing to fight the Iranian regime—despite the abandonment narrative that argues otherwise. Depending on incentives, levels of support, and the operating environment, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups could be an effective although limited asset. They could potentially fill security vacuums, take control of territories and border areas in western Iran, conduct attacks, disrupt logistics, and share intelligence. Yet, to sustain such activities, these groups would need targeted military support, training, and coordination with other anti‑regime actors. This, in turn, would create risks for regional stability and alliance management.

Ultimately, however, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups will not be effective in achieving their political objectives. Any plans to overthrow the Iranian regime and gain Kurdish autonomy in a democratic Iran will be unattainable without regional backing and internal support—neither of which is currently available or likely to be so in the future.