Deadly clashes between protesters and security forces in Pakistan-administered Kashmir this month have underscored the widespread public discontent in the territory, and highlighted Islamabad’s continued overreach there. The Pakistani state’s violent crackdown following popular demands for governance reform in the semi-autonomous region has killed at least 15 people, creating a political crisis for Islamabad and prompting international condemnation. Ahead of legislative assembly elections at the end of July, unrest in Pakistan-administered Kashmir poses a significant domestic challenge for the Pakistani government, which no amount of diplomatic activism or efforts to position itself as a peacemaker can conceal.
On June 5, the electoral commission in Pakistan-administered Kashmir announced that legislative assembly elections would be held on July 27, the first such vote in the territory since 2021. On the same day, the region’s home department proscribed the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), alleging that it was “engaged in terrorism.”
The timing of these simultaneous announcements is unlikely to be coincidental. Anticipating unrest against of the July elections, the local government, almost certainly acting under instruction from Islamabad and more specifically Pakistan’s military establishment, has moved swiftly to curtail the public’s capacity to organize, by targeting the region’s most influential protest movement. The JAAC, a loose coalition of lawyers, traders, transporters, and civil society activists, had previously mobilized large-scale demonstrations across Pakistan-administered Kashmir, including a major protest campaign in September 2025.
The issue at the heart of this month’s disorder can be traced back to the events of that month. At the time, the JAAC presented Pakistan-administered Kashmir’s government with a 38-point charter of demands, which included the abolition of 12 legislative assembly seats reserved for migrants from Indian-administered Kashmir. The government’s refusal to entertain the proposal triggered JAAC-led demonstrations, which were met with a heavy-handed response from the authorities. At least one protestor was killed and dozens more injured amid an internet and communications blackout. This dispute has remained unresolved ever since and the announcement of legislative assembly elections for July 27 has thrust the question of these reserved seats back into the political foreground. For the JAAC, there is a clear urgency to secure reform before voters go to the polls, with the aim of ensuring that the next assembly constitutes a more representative body of lawmakers.
Elections for these 12 seats, which represent just over a quarter of the total membership of Pakistan-administered Kashmir’s legislative assembly, take place outside the geographical confines of the territory itself. Eight are allocated to Kashmiris residing in Punjab, while the remaining four are distributed across Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. As a result, voters with no direct stake in the outcome of local elections play a significant role in determining the composition of Pakistan-administered Kashmir’s government.
For the JAAC and its supporters, this amounts to “electoral engineering” and a distortion of the will of local voters. These concerns are reinforced by longstanding allegations of voter fraud and electoral interference surrounding these reserved seats, which tend to resemble the governing party in Islamabad. Consequently, political control in Pakistan-administered Kashmir often mirrors the political landscape at the federal level, largely owing to the influence of these reserved seats. This arrangement has helped successive governments in Islamabad maintain a degree of political control over the territory and curb the influence of secessionist and pro-independence movements.
It was therefore unsurprising that the JAAC responded to its proscription, the announcement of legislative assembly elections, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Pakistan-administered Kashmir to uphold the 12 reserved seats by calling a “wheel-jam strike” for June 9.
The reserved seats issue, however, is only one of several grievances underpinning the current unrest. Economic hardship has also been a major driver of protest over the past two years, with the JAAC repeatedly harnessing public frustration over the rising cost of living. Electricity prices are a particularly sensitive issue, given the region’s vast hydropower resources and the widespread perception that local communities have not benefited proportionately from the resources they provide.
For many in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the social contract is fraying at the edges and exposing the limits of Islamabad’s influence over the territory. Overt election interference has been compounded by sharp increases in the price of fuel and wheat and has contributed to a perception that continued subordination to the federal government has delivered few benefits to residents. This has amplified discontent and created a major challenge to the existing political order.
The central government’s unwillingness to cede ground on the question of the 12 reserved seats points to its determination to maintain political influence over Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In recent years, Pakistan has faced significant internal security challenges, including persistent secessionist movements and militant violence, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Further unrest and challenges to Islamabad’s authority in Pakistan-administered Kashmir are therefore highly unwelcome within this broader, increasingly militant, security environment.
It is precisely because Islamabad is viewing mass mobilization and grassroots activism in Pakistan-administered Kashmir through a militarized lens that it is so willing to invoke anti-terrorism legislation against what is, at its core, a civil society movement. Alongside mass, arbitrary, arrests following the JAAC’s proscription, the Pakistani authorities have once again imposed internet and communications blackouts, which have in turn compounded shortages of food and medicine and drawn criticism from human rights organizations.
The protests have also attracted international condemnation, particularly among the Pakistan-administered Kashmir diaspora. In the United Kingdom, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of London to express their opposition to the actions of Pakistani security forces.
Owing to Britain’s large ethnic Mirpuri population, many of whom trace their family roots to Mirpur, Kotli, Bhimber, and the surrounding districts, the unrest has become a point of political contention. Communities in Bradford, Birmingham, Luton, Oldham, Rochdale, and parts of London maintain close familial ties to the region, generating pressure on MPs to raise the matter in Westminster.
As a result, in Parliament, an Early Day Motion was tabled by 45 MPs calling on the British government to express “grave concern” over reports of the crackdown carried out by the Pakistani state against residents of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani government has rejected this criticism and urged British MPs to avoid supporting proscribed organizations. Nevertheless, Islamabad must tread carefully to avoid allowing the Pakistan-administered Kashmir issue to become linked with wider, international movements protesting state repression and human rights violations, which have mobilized diaspora communities and sympathetic supporters across capitals around the world.
Back in Pakistan, Islamabad has justified its decision to retain the 12 reserved seats on the basis of legal precedent, arguing that, as they are constitutionally enshrined, only the legislative assembly itself has the authority to amend them. Consequently, any change must therefore wait until after the election, when newly elected representative can consider proposed reforms. Yet if the current arrangement remains the same, meaningful reform is unlikely, with the reserved seats able to do the bidding of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. There should be little doubt that this is the desired outcome from Islamabad. Once the newly elected assembly determines, under considerable pressure from the federal government, that no such amendments will be introduced, the authorities will hope that the issue can finally be put to rest.
Such an assumption, however, is both short-sighted and misguided. While Pakistan-administered Kashmir residents continue to struggle with the rising costs of essential goods, grievances over political representation will remain a powerful means of mobilizing opposition against the state. Irrespective of its new terrorism designation, the JAAC and groups like it are likely to continue to seek means of challenging the status quo that Islamabad is determined to preserve. Therefore, both in the run-up to the election and beyond, the question of the 12 reserved seats will remain a significant source of tension between Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Islamabad.
