Netanyahu’s Reelection Could Hinge on Outcome of Iran War

But Netanyahu has been motivated by more than just strategic considerations. Israel will hold elections no later than Oct. 27 this year and, as strange as it may sound, another round of fighting with Iran might actually improve his dismal election prospects. Most recent polls show the Netanyahu religious-right coalition capturing no more than 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset and probably fewer.

The opposition is also projected to fall short of a parliamentary majority (assuming it refuses to allow the Arab-dominated parties to sit with it in a coalition), but the momentum is working in its favor. Voters in Israel’s far north, long a stronghold for Netanyahu’s Likud Party, are defecting in anger over his inability to eradicate the Hezbollah threat to their communities.

That Israelis still want even more war may seem counterintuitive. Israel has been at war virtually nonstop since Hamas’s attack on Oct. 7, 2023. More than 2,000 Israelis, counting both soldiers and civilians, have been killed. The country has been struck at various times by drones and missiles from Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran (even a few originating from Iraqi militias in Iraq). The burden of increased reserve duty, involving as much as nine weeks a year, has become insufferable. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s fiber-optic guided drones have been picking off Israeli soldiers at a rate of two to four a week. The Israeli army has no defense against them.

But anyone who thinks that Israelis have had enough of war is underestimating the trauma of Oct. 7. Israelis are no longer confident that the army will be able to defend them from Hamas and Hezbollah fighters just over the border and from Iranian and various militia rockets and missiles pointed at them. The Israeli public is no longer content to see these threats merely contained and is willing to pay a very high price to eliminate them. A recent poll by the Institute for National Security Studies found that 59 percent of the public believes Israel should intensify the fighting against Hezbollah. Another study by the Israel Democracy Institute found that 58 percent think ending the war with Iran under the current conditions isn’t compatible with Israel’s security interests.

Netanyahu’s problem is that despite the brutal and destructive wars that he has waged in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, none have achieved the total victory he promised. Many Israelis think Israel’s security situation has deteriorated since Oct. 7 especially vis-à-vis Iran and Lebanon. Nor has Netanyahu been able to erase the stain that the Oct. 7 massacre has left on his image as master strategist and determined defender of Israeli security. The prime minister may actually believe, as he has said in public, that the failure to prevent Hamas’s attack was everyone else’s fault but his own, but the public doesn’t . Netanyahu now seems to be betting that victory on the Iranian or Lebanese front could restore his reputation.

To be sure, entering a third round of war with Iran is risky. The most recent one left the Iranian regime not only intact but more emboldened and in a better position than before to project power in the region. But the rewards arising from potential regime change—however fantastical that seems—remain compelling for Netanyahu, especially if the alternative is a bad agreement between the United States and Iran. In his thinking, toppling the Islamic Republic would not only eliminate the Iranian missile threat, but it would also leave Hezbollah without its patron, making it harder for the group to continue its war with Israel. The feckless Lebanese government might finally stand a chance of disarming the organization, enabling Israel to extricate itself from the quagmire of an unwinnable war in Lebanon. In any case, the price in terms of casualties from an open-ended occupation would fall.

For now, anyway, U.S. President Donald Trump remains Netanyahu’s main obstacle to renewing the war. Trump prefers a deal with Tehran, as he made clear to the Israeli leader this week. He told the Financial Times recently that he “calls the shots” when it comes to Iran, not Netanyahu. But the Iranians have a say, as well, and they seem prepared to risk one-off missile attacks, like the ones against Israel and Kuwait this past week. If those continue and the talks with the United States bog down, Trump may eventually agree to Netanyahu’s go-for-broke war option.

That goes a long way in explaining why Netanyahu is at odds with his coalition partners over an election date. The prime minister wants to delay polling until Oct. 27, while the ultra-Orthodox parties are pushing for a ballot sometime in September, during the Jewish high holiday period, when their voters will be at home and perhaps religiously inspired to go out and vote. In the big picture, the dispute over a few weeks seems trivial, but Netanyahu needs every extra day he can get in the hope that the Iran and Lebanon problems can be solved.

And those aren’t the only problems he faces. On the political front, Netanyahu is still trying to solve a vexing conscription challenge stemming from the refusal of the ultra-Orthodox, or Haredim, to be drafted into the army. They have enjoyed a blanket exemption since the country was founded, but the lives lost in Gaza and the heavy burden of reserve duty have made that privilege no longer acceptable to the great majority of Israelis, including much of the coalition’s base. Netanyahu would like to make the problem go away with a that pretends to set criteria for drafting Haredim but in practice maintains the exemption. But he can’t muster a parliamentary majority to pass it despite an ordinarily obedient coalition.

In the meantime, the two ultra-Orthodox parties have left the government in protest over its failure to pass the law. In the streets, Haredim have been staging angry and often violent , vowing to die rather than enlist. This, as well as the unending burden of reserve duty from Netanyahu’s wars, has only served to sharpen voters’ anger and make Netanyahu’s task of passing the law more difficult.

With all these problems, one might wonder: Why does Netanyahu still want this job? At 76, he has dominated Israeli politics for some 30 years, including three of the toughest ones in the country’s history since the Oct. 7 attack. He must be at least considering retirement. Indeed, Trump hinted at the possibility this week,  ABC News correspondent Jonathan Karl, “I don’t know, he’s had an amazing career. Does he want to continue? Because, you know, he’s a wartime prime minister.” But the prospect of continuing his criminal trial without the benefit of being prime minister provides a strong incentive for Netanyahu to remain in office. And his recent parliamentary maneuvers to buttress the coalition and popularity with his base suggest that he has no plans to step down.

What may yet save Netanyahu is the failure of the opposition parties to unite behind a single leader who can appeal to a broad swath of voters—from the moderate right to what remains of the left. With just months left until election day, leading opposition figures Naftali Bennett and Gadi Eisenkot still can’t agree on who should fill that role. Netanyahu, a skilled and often ruthless campaigner—will surely capitalize on their rivalry. He’s facing major challenges, but he won’t go down without a fight.