What Boots On The Ground In Iran Could Entail, According To Former CENTCOM Commander

The Pentagon has reportedly drawn up plans to send American troops into Iran, possibly to Kharg Island or far deeper into the country to seize enriched uranium. These moves would represent a huge escalation for Operation Epic Fury. Former CENTCOM commander Joseph Votel offers us exclusive insights into the challenges and dangers of having U.S. boots on the ground in the Islamic Republic, and what it would take to seize Kharg Island or attempt to snatch Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium that could be very challenging to access.

In the second part of our conversation, the first centering on the current situation around the Strait of Hormuz, the retired general, now a Distinguished Military Fellow at the Middle East Institute, also addressed concerns over America’s magazine depth of interceptors and other high-end weapons, what China may be learning from the operation, and how long Epic Fury could last, among other topics.

The interview took place before news broke that a second Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) – with at least 2,200 Marines – was being deployed to the Middle East. As we previously reported, Trump ordered another one to the region in the last week.

Some of the questions and answers have been lightly edited for clarity.

Q: Does a seizure of Kharg Island, or an insertion of SOF to recover enriched uranium from Pickaxe Mountain or elsewhere in Iran, seem feasible? What would either of those operations take, in terms of troops and assets?

A: Both of those things are feasible. Let me just start with Kharg Island. We can put troops on there. We can air mobile them in. We could land them by boat. I guess the comment I have about Kharg is, I’m not sure what the significance is of putting troops there. It’s only about 20 miles off the coast of Iran. So you’re definitely under the threat of their weapon systems. You’d be very, very vulnerable there. And I don’t know that it would give us any particular tactical advantage that we don’t already have or couldn’t get someplace else at an offset location where we have established bases and other things like that. So I’m not sure what the tactical advantage of it is.

I get that it has an informational and kind of messaging advantage against the Iranians that we are on their territory. And it may send a message to the broader energy community that we are safeguarding these vital Iranian infrastructures. That might give them some confidence [but] kind of an odd thing to do. But I just don’t really see the big advantage of going to Kharg. But we could certainly do it if we had to. 

We would be vulnerable. When you start putting troops on the ground – I know there’s some mishmash and words on that – but that’s troops on the ground right there. It also implies that you are going to have to take care of them, you’re going to have to resupply them, you’re going to medevac them, you have to do all the things that keep them in place for whatever period of time. And that requires that you have a logistical tail, and at some point that tail has to be protected as well. So these are not insignificant considerations and they’re often bigger operations.

I would imagine on a little island like Kharg, you would need a battalion sized force of Marines or soldiers could probably do that. So you’re probably looking at 800 to 1,000 troops, kind of size, maybe a little bit smaller, probably not much larger than that.

Going after the fissile material I think is a bigger operation. Again, I think we have the capabilities to do this. Within our Special Operations community, we have people that are trained to do this and have the right relationships and connections and other things to allow us to get in and do that. So you’d have to be able to project that force onto the ground. This would be going to a place like Natanz or Isfahan – probably one of those locations. Those are well inland – several hundred miles into Iran, a country of the same size as the state of Alaska. So it’s big and it’s diverse. It’s largely in an open plain, so you don’t have a lot of natural terrain protection there. That would have to be taken into consideration.

In addition to the kind of operators you put on the ground, you’d also have to bring in a security force, but probably a sizable security force – a brigade size or 1,000 to 3,000 or 4,000 troops to just secure while they did that work. You’d have to do that. You’d have to make sure you dedicated air power. You’d have to put CAPs [combat air patrols] up over, you’d have to have ISR [information, surveillance and reconnaissance] in place.

Again, you’d have the challenge of people on the ground, so you’d have to logistically sustain them and then be prepared to protect that tail. And then you have to have all of the lift, whether it’s rotary wing or fixed wing, to get them in and get them all back out. And then you have the added challenge of handling nuclear material. So about 450-some kilograms. That’s roughly 1,000 pounds of 60% highly enriched uranium. And that’s a lethal material. So ideally, that would be packaged already, but we’d have to make sure we packaged that and moved it and had someplace to actually take it back to. 

So, yeah, could we do a military operation? Sure. I think it would kind of look like I described there. It would be a big operation, and it wouldn’t be something that would be done in a single period of darkness. It probably takes some time. You’d have to have some special capabilities to go in and excavate these things and identify them.

There’s no real open-source discussion of what the conditions are at these things, you’d have to be prepared for the worst, and the worst would be having to dig down and find it. I’m hoping that our intelligence community understands this a little bit more, and I suspect that is the case. But this is a pretty big, pretty significant operation.

An alternative to this would be waiting until there is a cessation of hostilities and then trying to go in in a more semi-permissive environment with elements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who really have responsibility for this. They would bring expertise in to do this. We – or some other military force – would probably assist with some of that. But that may be another option as well. I’m sure they’re looking at all these.

Q: This is not a job for a Tier One unit like SEAL Team Six or Delta, to go in and grab it, right? There’s a lot of discussion about that.

A: Yeah. First of all, you’re not just going to go in and grab 1,000 pounds of nuclear material and then ferret it right out. That’s not the case. Those unique capabilities reside within the Special Operations community. I won’t identify organizations, but they reside within the tip top of our special operations capability. They’re trained and maintained and normally exercise and rehearse on a regular basis. So, yeah, we have the ability to do that. But it’s unlikely – in my view, my estimate, with what I know – that you just send a few folks in there, grab the stuff and get it out. I don’t think that’s the case. I think it’s going to take more. You might be able to do that in a permissive environment, but I don’t think you want to take the risk associated with that in the environment that we’re seeing right now, or perhaps even in a semi-permissive environment.

Q: Was there proper planning to ensure enough missile and drone interceptors were in place prior to the start of Epic Fury?

A: I have no reason to believe that it wasn’t. Is there pressure on our magazine depth? There sure is. We’ve talked about that for a while. CENTCOM planned – which has been developed and modified over the last 20, 25 years – to do this. Every commander had their fingers involved in it. I do not know the current plan. I’m sure that [CENTCOM commander] Adm. [Brad] Cooper has done that. It was a significant discussion, not only about the targets, but certainly about what was required to execute that and also to protect themselves. So my assessment is, yes, I think we have. And I don’t think we’ve seen an instance where we’ve not been able to defend ourselves because we didn’t have any missiles. 

There’s no doubt we’ve expended a lot, and that’s put a lot of pressure on the magazines, but the Department of Defense and CENTCOM and Joint Staff, I think, have been able to make sure that they’ve been able to move enough materials into place so we can sustain this operation, now well into its third week.

Q: How concerned are you about America’s magazine depth of these defensive weapons?

A: We should be concerned. I think the challenge may not necessarily be in CENTCOM. The challenge may be in other areas like the Pacific, Korea, you know, Europe, you know this. This could be impacting our ability to send things to the Ukrainians, or through our NATO partners, the Ukrainians. So I think that’s where the concerns are. And by the way, you know, all of our Gulf Arab partners and many of our partners around the world use THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] and use Patriot missile systems, and so they require resupply as well, and stocks available to them. 

I think we have long had an issue with making sure we had sufficient magazine depth. We went through this several years ago when North Korea was flexing its muscles and firing missiles towards Guam and over Japan. We had a serious discussion about this. We saw this with the response to Ukraine as well with artillery rounds. The Army’s ramped up production, three or four fold over the last couple of years. But it’s taken a little bit of time. That’s good. But we need to do that with all these other munitions. So a portion of our resources needs to be dedicated to making sure we have sufficient munitions in place for our contingencies and for our partners who have bought our systems they are relying on.

Q: What’s your assessment of Iran’s magazine depth of missiles, operable launchers and drones? How long can they keep presenting a threat?

A: There’s been pretty serious damage done to their missile system and I say the system, because it’s not just the missiles. It’s the launchers, it’s the command and control sites, manufacturing sites, it’s the storage sites. I think we’ve done a lot of damage to that. And you’ve probably heard some of the numbers that have come out of CENTCOM – in the 70, 80% range of destruction. I think we’ve done a lot with the drones as well. I think the concern is the last 15 or 20%.

Don’t pay attention to the numbers. The fact of the matter is, they’re going to have a remnant portion of capabilities, and that’s a portion we’re focused on right now. Iran’s strategy has been to broaden the conflict by hitting a lot of different places, 12 or 13 different countries, and then to extend it by continuing to present this threat to us over a long period of time. They don’t have to shoot large volleys of missiles and drones. They just have to get some across. They just have to launch some every day. And that’s going to keep our focus, and it’s going to keep us occupied doing that. So that’s their strategy on this. 

They’ve taken a significant hit in some of their capabilities, and I imagine some of the magazines, but there’s some left. I think at the start of the war, their missile strength was somewhere in the 2,000 to 3,000 range. Some of the numbers I’ve seen show there are probably over 1,000 that have been launched now, and so that leaves a considerable number. They don’t have the ability to launch these. And now that we have air superiority over those locations, we can go anywhere we want. We see something, we can take it out right away. So the missiles are very, very vulnerable, but the drones are much easier [for Iran to protect]. They don’t require all that much, and they probably got larger stores that it’s important to appreciate. They were manufacturing these things for Russia, so they probably have fairly sizable stores of drones left.

Prior to Operation Epic Fury, the Iranian regime used the Karaj Surface-to-Surface Missile Plant to assemble ballistic missiles that threatened Americans, neighboring countries, and commercial shipping. The photo dated March 1, 2026, shows the plant prior to U.S. strikes. The… pic.twitter.com/QEs5toZQpX