In parts of the world such as Ukraine, Myanmar and Japan, the Chinese government has been accused of employing “two-faced diplomacy.” It’s a strategy of publicly pledging peace, economic cooperation and regional stability while aggressively positioning its military and taking actions that fuel violence.
There are examples in Africa as well, where Beijing’s official stances are in direct contradiction with its actions. In Sudan’s civil war, China claims to seek peace as a potential mediator. But that position is starkly contrasted by the proliferation of weapons manufactured by its state-owned companies, which prolong the conflict by supplying both sides.
Geopolitical analyst Samir Bhattacharya says China’s two-faced diplomacy is at play in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where it has partnered with the government while maintaining defense and economic ties with Rwanda and Uganda. Independent United Nations experts accuse both African countries of backing the DRC’s M23 insurgency.
“Beijing’s growing military and defence-industrial activities in the region signal a narrow, opportunistic turn that risks fueling further instability,” Bhattacharya, an associate fellow at Observer Research Foundation, wrote in a May 11 essay. “This two-faced diplomacy — designed to protect investments and enhance influence — risks ultimately undermining the very investments it seeks to secure.”
China’s primary interests in the DRC are economic. Companies closely tied to Beijing control the majority of cobalt, coltan, copper and uranium mines, and the Congolese armed forces have been deployed repeatedly to mining sites in the east to protect Chinese assets.
In the east, the DRC’s ongoing deadly battles with M23 rebels feature Chinese drones and weaponry on both sides, as the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda have purchased significant quantities of Chinese arms.
“[China] has supported training programmes for Congolese security personnel, provided logistical assistance, and encouraged the deployment of local troops to protect Chinese-operated mining facilities,” Bhattacharya wrote. “This approach allows Beijing to safeguard its interests while maintaining the image of a country that adheres to non-intervention as official policy.”
Experts say that by keeping security ties simultaneously with the DRC and its rivals, China is prolonging the conflict while claiming it seeks peace. In recent years, Norinco, China’s largest weapons supplier, and other Chinese companies have sold artillery systems and other arms to Rwanda. The DRC, meanwhile, purchased its first batch of three CH-4 attack drone systems from China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. in 2024.
“On one hand, China seeks stability in the DRC to protect its extensive mining investments,” Bhattacharya wrote. “On the other, its continued engagement with neighbouring states limits its willingness to take a definitive stance in regional disputes. The result is a form of strategic ambiguity that preserves access and influence but may also constrain conflict-resolution efforts.”
