Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov on downing Shaheds and developing the Air Force's drone component
Ukrainska Pravda
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Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov is one of the most unconventional people of this war. A former TV producer, he joined the military after 24 February 2022 and created Lasar's Group, a highly effective drone unit within the National Guard. During the full-scale war, his team has destroyed billions of dollars' worth of Russian equipment and has become a symbol of how quick thinking, engineering intuition and the right people can change the course of a war.
In early 2026, following an overhaul of the defence management system, Yelizarov was appointed Deputy Commander of the Air Force, with a focus on the development of short-range air defence and counter-drone capabilities.
This interview with Ukrainska Pravda took place 100 days after Mykhailo Fedorov took over the Ministry of Defence – a period that many within the system have described as a time of acceleration, new approaches, and attempts to change the logic of the war.
It took a long time to arrange this conversation, and we are grateful to Pavlo Yelizarov for finding the time to speak to us. In this interview, he outlines the current state of Ukraine's air defence, its weaknesses and systemic mistakes, and the efforts that have been made to fix them. He also reveals how he built up Lasar's Group, why efficiency matters more than scale, and why this war will be won not by those with more people, but those who think faster and are better organisers.
"Sometimes I feel like we're in a car with no pedals. You know what to do and where to go, but there's no pedal to press"
Everything that was good and pleasant has, as they say, turned into hell. Over the past four years, we set up the work in our unit so well that I actually had quite a lot of free time to think about strategy and military tactics. I'd finally started using the leave I'd accumulated over the past three years. And now… we had our first day off at Easter. Enough said.
Why did you agree to it? You already hadan effective and well-known unit, recognition. Why take on the role of deputy commander?
I was on holiday, fishing, drinking beer, looking at the sea and thinking: what a wonderful life. Then I got a call – it was Mykhailo Fedorov. He said: "There's something to discuss." And made me the offer.
I replied: "Mykhailo, you realise the truth is never going to be told here. If one single Shahed attack drone gets through, people will only notice that one." Likethe last time in Lviv: we shot down loads of them, only a few got through, but there was still damage, still tragedy – and that's what the media shows. So it creates the impression that the job wasn't done.
He said: "Look, you and I can sit in front of the TV, watch the football and explain how the players should play. Or we can go onto the pitch and play. I'm inviting you to join the team – to play in the match."
That argument really resonated with me. It was the challenge that convinced me. I cut my leave short and went to Kyiv.
From what I've heard about short-range air defence, until you arrived as deputy commander responsible for this area, chaos reigned. There was no coordination between mobile fire groups, no properly organised processes. Have you managed to change the approach and turn things around since then?
When you do something, first you need to identify the problem. Before treating a disease, you need to understandexactly whatyou're treating. We definitely managed to do that in the first two months, and also to lay down the basic, fundamental elements that would allow us to build on that.
We were all focused on the front line and we assumed the enemy was there. In reality we have a second, no less important front – our airspace, which we are defending. And in my view, that defence wasn't getting enough attention. Things that seemed minor, like Shahed drones, were being overlooked. The result was that everything that was being built was being developed on the basis of whatever was left over.
The people entrusted with this protective coverage were in one branch of the military to start with and then transferred to the Air Force. That meant that the Air Force could not fully change the commanders there. Technically they could, but it required particular phone calls and negotiations.
Basically, it's as if you're running a restaurant, and my task is to provide you with waiters. I take people from petrol stations and assign them to you as waiters. You complain, and I say: "We don't have anyone else – just train this lot."
Within the first month, the commander-in-chief had grasped this problem, we raised it with the president, and a conceptual model was approved that we now follow. Those units have been transferred to us, and now personnel changes are underway to create a foundation on which everything else can be built.
Pavlo Yelizarov: “Shahed drones have now become jet-powered – this is the next level we have to deal with.”
All photos: Ukrainska Pravda
How has the Shahed interception rate changed over this period?
We've made a slight change in the way we view the Shaheds that pass through.
The regions used to operate on the principle: if the drones flew past me and didn't strike my region, then thank God, no one's going totell me offtomorrow morning.
Now the model is different: Shaheds enter and exit [a particular area of airspace]. If they exit, that's a bad thing. They were able to leave –how come? So now there's monitoring: how many entered, how many exited.
We also analysed all the radar coverage. Sometimes groups or people responsible for radar were making decisions at their own discretion, like: "I want to stand here because I like it here."
Now it's more structured: the radar systems are placed according to a certain logic and repositioned depending on what happened during the previous attack. There's constant analysis of errors.
Personally, I have more faith in short-range missiles, even though drones are my field.
In reality, there is no single universal solution. There are different components. No one'sabolishedthe mobile fire groups.
Interceptor drones have their place too, as they are indeed a fairly effective and cost-efficient solution. But for them to work, you need three key components.
The first is radar systems. Without them, there's no point using interceptor drones: flying blind in the dark in search of a target is expensive, inefficient and pointless. The second component is the quality of the drone itself. The third is the level of pilot training.
When these three elements work together, the system is highly effective, and the drone really does its job.
Interceptor drones are now reaching speeds of up to 700 km/h. They're evolving as fast as the attack drones that are attacking us, effectively becoming comparable to cruise missiles in their specifications.
What is currently the main bottleneck in Ukraine's air defence? A lack of resources, lack of equipment, or lack of political will?
Ukraine's air defence should be divided into at least two components. The first is, let's say, long-range air defence. We havehighly skilledpersonnel there with specialised training that you just can't acquire if you joined as a volunteer soldier in 2022.
But in short-range air defence, which is what counters the Shaheds, there's a lack of structure and system. And that's where we need to sort things out.
So for now, you don't regret taking that call when you were fishing…
I regret it every morning (smiles).
What about when you see the statistics, or when fire groups don't perform the way you'd like them to?
You know, sometimes I feel like we're in a car with no pedals. You know what to do and where to go, but there's no pedal to press.
In Lasar's Group, everyone was in the right place. Now, as we build a team within the command structure, Yevhen Khlebnikov, Commander of the Close Air Defence Forces, and I are effectively our own assistants and secretaries.
So the problem isn't just resources, but people as well?
Yes. Effective people. The kind where you explain something to them once and they immediately get it. There's no need to be constantly supervising them or checking up on them. If anything isn't clear, they'll call and get clarification themselves.
Right now, the key issue is forming a team of high-quality people.
Yes. Every day. We aren't standing still, we're moving forward.
What will be unique about this system? Will it be something like Israel's Iron Dome, or a completely new solution?
There will definitely be no direct equivalent. What makes it unique is that we have to build it using the means available.
Ukraine is too big a country, and we can't afford a system like Israel's. Even the one they have in the UAE – a multi-layered defence system with advanced assets – is beyond our reach physically and financially. And no one's going to give one to us.
You know, a Shahed is like a cockroach. It might look simple, but it's incredibly persistent…
"Lasar's Group is the full stop at the end of the sentence"
[Defence] Minister Mykhailo Fedorov came into office with a new team. Yet at the same time we see that almost nothing has changed in the General Staff. Is there a conflict between the new team that wants change and the old guard in the army?
I'm comfortable talking to both the General Staff and [Commander-in-Chief] Oleksandr Syrskyi. We first met back in 2022, when I brought the first drone group to the Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group and we started working together. So when I have questions, I can call Oleksandr directly and discuss them.
We definitely have different ways of thinking. That doesn't mean one is better or worse; it's like oil and water. They are hard to mix, but if the system is organised properly, it can contain both.
The military has its own logic of development. If you look at the American army, European armies, or ours, they're more or less structured the same way: there's a clear daily routine, there are set tasks and activities to keep the troops ready and engaged. This shapes a certain approach to executing missions.
It's different with civilians: there's no need to invent things to do – we don't have enough time to implement all our ideas. Sometimes I think that if meetings were cancelled in the military, they really wouldn't know what to do for six hours.
Oil and water: can the teams in the Defence Ministry and the General Staff work together as one "engine", or is conflict inevitable?
I would very much like this to work, because it would benefit all of us. In this matter, I'm more of a peacemaker – I'm all for synergy. But it's crucial that both sides move towards each other.
You are now fully immersed in air defence efforts. But how does Lasar's Group function without Pavlo Yelizarov?
I'm always curious about that myself (laughs). There's a principle: a good manager is one who does nothing. That's how I've always built systems.
When we set up Lasar's Group, over the past two years my role was communication and support. In each area, there are people who are self-sufficient and understand what needs to be done. They don't need daily tasking or constant oversight.
And I'm very pleased that the group continues to perform.
If we take March as an example, the Ministry of Digital Transformation has performance indicators called e-points that measure effectiveness – the number of tanks, multiple rocket launchers etc. that were destroyed. [E-points are earned by Ukrainian units for confirmed strikes on Russian soldiers and equipment – ed.] There are eight categories, and Lasar's Group is top in all eight. That shows that the quality of work has not declined.
What's the key to that success?
We're focused on results. And everyone who joins Lasar's Group is too.
I always rely on people. My key process is selecting the right people. And when you're building a system out of them, there are different ways you can do it.
You can build it like a stone wall: each stone is different – big or small – but together they form a structure. Or you can build it like a brick wall, with a pattern and standard-size bricks. These are different approaches.
In Lasar's Group you have both civilians and military personnel. And did some of the civilians use to work at Savik Shuster Studio[the production company co-owned by Yelizarov, which produced a political talk show hosted by well-known journalist Savik Shuster]?
Yes. More than 10 people from the studio went to serve from the early days [of the full-scale invasion]. And many of the key innovations in the unit came from them.
We joined the Territorial Defence Forces and started launching drones. Our tech guys looked at what we were doing and said: "This is so primitive." I replied: "Less of the comments – this works for me, it's better than a rifle. But if you can suggest something better, we'll make progress."
And what happened next?
We attached Starlink to a drone. The first launch was on 6 May 2022.
And that was an initiative by people from the studio?
Yes.
Was that a turning point?
Absolutely. It was thanks to Starlink that we overcame the limitations of the radio horizon. Before that, since the Earth is round, if you flew too far, without a signal you couldn't descend below a certain altitude.
And we managed to drop almost to ground level without losing the video signal. It was truly a game changer.
Lasar's Group has always delivered impressive statistics in terms of the value of the equipment destroyed. The last figure I remember was around US$12 billion. What is it now?
Now it's over US$13.8 billion.
How do you calculate it?
It's very simple. From the earliest days, we realised that the model was effective, but that people might not believe that. So I kept a notebook and wrote everything down: the coordinates, what was destroyed, which brigade it was for, which drone was used, the drone's serial number. We even had names for the drones.
Then the notebook wasn't big enough, so we created an Excel spreadsheet. All these years, we've recorded everything. Each strike has a corresponding video clip.
If you open up those spreadsheets, you can see exactly what happened and why the target was hit.
But now such detailed tracking is rare?
Tanks?
Equipment in general.
Yes, there are a lot of strong and capable units doing excellent work. And when we meet up, they say: "Of course, no one can catch up with you on tanks now because there aren't any left [within the range of FPV drones – ed.]."
There is competition between units for the same e-points, because the same tank can appear in different units' statistics. I've also heard that the statistics don't always reflect reality.
There are different statuses – a target is either "hit" or "destroyed". We're like the full stop at the end of a sentence: we usually finish the job. That's because an FPV drone causes damage, but a tank is protected, and the munition carried by an FPV drone is not that large.
Sometimes the guys hit very precisely, and the shaped charge jet causes the ammunition inside to detonate. But in general, when we properly pierce the tank from above, it's destroyed.
"Unfortunately we've lost our drone advantage. With what we had in 2022-2023, we could have done game-changing things"
You have always said that Lasar's Group is managed like a business. Right now, many units are trying to scale up and even export their solutions. What is your business logic here?
For a long time, we received no funding from the state. At first we used our own money, then friends joined in.
Our model was this: people would contribute US$20,000 and get the chance to name a drone. We built the drone, it went into action, striking targets, we recorded the results on video and sent it back with a note of thanks. People could clearly see their contribution and see exactly what they'd helped destroy. At this point we'd already destroyed US$30-40 million worth of equipment – things were looking very promising.
Later we were invited to a meeting and told: "You know what you're doing – here's some funding." I remember that meeting well: there were intelligence representatives,White Wolf,and us. Back then even five drones, or seven, felt like a big number. They asked: "How many do you need?" Someone said "100." And there was a pause. When you have five or seven, 100 sounds huge. Someone else said "150."
But on the way to the meeting, I'd realised we needed 1,000. I said: "We need 1,000." Everyone looked at me: "Do you even understand what 1,000 is?" At the time, it really did sound like the stuff of fantasy.
I explained: "Look, we need to deploy a certain number of groups at a certain density. If we want to operate systematically for six months, that's how many we need."
I said: "Give us 1,000 – I'll recruit the people and build a systemic model." In the end, we received funding for that volume and began working with state resources.
From what I've heard about the drone assault forces, conflict between Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov's team and Oleksandr Syrskyi's seems almost inevitable, because their approaches are different. Is that the case?
You know, conflicts arise in any family. We're dealing with large-scale issues and different approaches. Time will tell whether compromises and solutions can be found. The ability to compromise is itself a sign of intelligence.
Since Mykhailo Fedorov arrived, there's clearly been innovation and movement – that's absolutely right. Put it this way, the system's "metabolism" has speeded up significantly.
But unfortunately we've lost our drone advantage. In 2022-2023, we had a chance to do game-changing things. We managed to stop the Russians, destroy a significant portion of their equipment and stabilise the situation – they weren't expecting that. But we didn't regain territory.
If the "metabolism" had been faster then, we could have retaken some territory as well. That moment was lost.
So if I understand you correctly: if the decisions we're discussing now had been implemented two years ago, the frontline situation would be different?
They are short of manpower. We could do more according to the plan. But, you know, it's hard to pick apples in an orchard where there aren't any left.
So Russia's problem now is a lack of personnel?
Yes. They need to increase the pace a bit.
But overall, the strategy chosen at the time was the right one?
Yes, absolutely.
How many Russian troops are we killing per month now, if those figures can be disclosed?
They're publicly available – it's around 35,000.
If they increase the intake, losses will rise. If they move slowly, it will remain at around 30,000-35,000.
"Out of over 300 Air Force crews, 66 had shot down more than 10 Shahed drones that year, but 170 hadn't downed a single one"
What currently determines what happens on the front line: the human factor and the shortage of personnel, or the ability to adapt and scale up technological solutions?
It's a matter of effective use. When we arrived, the first thing we did was analyse what was happening in the Air Force as regards interceptor drones and the quality of pilot training.
In one oblast, we did an experiment and tried to implement our model. There were 28 crews there, and 24 of them hadn't shot down a single drone over the past year.
How is that possible?
It is possible. We went further. We looked at all the crews under our command – there were over 300. Of those, 66 had shot down more than 10 Shahed drones, while the rest had downed fewer than 10. And 170 crews hadn't shot down a single one that year. [The Air Force later explainedthat this is because many crews were set up fairly recently, are still undergoing training and do not have sufficient equipment to deliver results – ed.]
When we talk about human resources – whether there are many or few – I believe that even the resources that have been mobilised are enough. They simply need to be used effectively, structured and analysed.
Everyone says: "Give us people, give us people." But where would we assign them? Lasar's Group, for example, hasn't grown in three years. We built the structure from the beginning and have never been either a regiment or a brigade, although now everyone wants to become a brigade or a regiment.
How many people are there in Lasar's Group now?
We currently have around 1,900 people. And I always ask: why would we need more? We have enough people for the functions we perform. I don't want five or six thousand people. People are a resource, but they're also a problem: they need to be provided for, they have families, illnesses, emotional needs.
Right from the start, we built the structure differently – we set up three teams, and that's enough for us. Each has its own administrative unit, an accounting department, and all the necessary infrastructure. They work efficiently and well, and carry out combat missions.
We could have been greedy and said: let's become a fully-fledged brigade. We were offered that opportunity back in 2023. But why? So that an additional layer appears, with about 40% of the people just servicing the system?
We already have proper support within the existing structure. And frankly, this situation is not unique to us – but many have chosen the path of expansion: brigades, regiments, corps. I'm against this. Given that human resources are in short supply, they should be optimised and even partially freed up instead.
I understand that a new concept for the use of human capital from Defence Minister Fedorov is going to be presented soon. In your view, is demobilisation justified now – something many servicemen are asking for? At least partially?
From the point of view of fairness, yes. But from the point of view of a commander, it's difficult. Everyone has key people on whom everything depends. If they leave, the system could simply collapse. This is a very delicate issue, and it needs to be worked through in detail at the level of the commander-in-chief and the minister.
"Andrii Yermak and I haven't spoken once during the full-scale war"
I can't not ask you this. Lasar's Group proved its effectiveness almost immediately in 2022-2023, but for a long time, you remained in the shadows. I understand there were reasons for that, including misunderstandings with Andrii Yermak, former head of the President's Office. Did he, in a way, want you to stay out of the spotlight?
The fact that we stayed in the shadows wasn't to do with that. The fact that Andrii Yermak and I have our own history is a separate thing. Overall, our relationship was always on an even keel.
As for publicity, I was fundamentally opposed to showing footage of bomb drops, FPV strikes, or the process of getting drones ready. In 2022-2023, I believed that was wrong. If it had been possible, we would have published with no names – or better still, not published anything at all.
But in 2025, we went public for the first time – there was an article inForbes. And that was more of a forced decision. Funding was beginning to go to those who talked about themselves the loudest. When budgets were being allocated, public-facing units were getting more, and we were being pushed into the background.
And that was despite the fact that in terms of effectiveness and the quality of our work, we certainly weren't among the weakest. I realised that without visibility, we'd be left with no funding and the unit would simply fall apart.
Not only that – a lot of the high-profile units tried topoachour people. Everything held together thanks to the authority of the unit and our internal relationships.
In 2022-2023 we were working directly with the command, and not everyone understood the importance of our work for those on the line of contact. In the end, we weren't allowed to be torn apart, and we remained a team. But unfortunately we had to step out of the shadows to secure resources and continue working.
But your relationship with Andrii Yermak was tense, particularly because the Savik Shuster Studio once covered the so-calledWagnergate?
Andrii and I have not spoken even once during the full-scale war. So unfortunately I can't comment on the reasons why he might have a negative attitude.
You and I were at the YES Conference, remember – we were standing there, he walked past, we greeted each other perfectly normally, and that was it. We haven't had any contact since.
Although he seemed to say he was ready to speak with you.
He was, but the meeting never happened. There was no reason. I'm focused on my work, and objectively speaking, no one interferes with it.
Maybe we haven't advanced in status – not everyone's been awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine. We have two Heroes in our unit, and they truly are the best. But there are others no less deserving.
I once even joked: let's allocate some quota for every billion [that the equipment destroyed is worth], because some people work for years and truly deserve recognition. But these are often political decisions – whether to award it or not.
And to be honest, it has no impact on the quality of our work.
Do you think your appointment would have been possible if Andrii Yermak had still been head of the President's Office? It happened after thereshuffle.
It's hard for me to say. That decision was made by the president. Whether he was listening to Mykhailo Fedorov, Andrii Yermak or [current Head of Zelenskyy's Office] Kyrylo Budanov at the time, there are many people around him who shape the agenda in different ways.
Did you personally have a conversation with the president about this?
Yes. When Mykhailo Fedorov called me, I said I still had ten days of leave left and didn't really want to come back early. But he replied: "You need to be here by Wednesday at the latest, because the president wants to speak with you."
I couldn't say no. He's the supreme commander-in-chief, and I'm a serviceman. So I bought a ticket and flew back the same day.
Mykhailo introduced me, and we had a normal conversation. The president gave us time to refine the concept – to look at how we envisioned it.
Within three weeks, we'd prepared a model together with the General Staff and Oleksandr Syrskyi. We coordinated everything, worked through the details. Anatolii Kryvonozhko [Commander of the Air Force] said the model aligned with the Air Force.
After that, we went to see the president together and presented how it should work. Kyrylo Budanov was there. The president approved the model, and now we are effectively moving forward according to that plan.
"I tell Shuster he should take a drone course and go to the UAE to shoot down Shaheds"
You've said more than once today that you'd like to go back to civilian life. But personally, have you closed the chapter with the Savik Shuster Studio, or could it still come back?
If Savik Shuster learns Ukrainian, then we'll think about it (laughs). If I'm still forgiven for not mastering the language perfectly… I can speak it in everyday life, but not at the level of an interview like this – I start losing my train of thought.
So for a TV presenter in Ukraine, not speaking Ukrainian is, of course, challenging.
I take it you're still in touch?
Of course, we talk regularly.
What is he doing now?
I tell him he should take a drone course and go to the UAE to earn some money – shooting down Shaheds (laughs).
And how does he react?
He says he's ready. Ready to learn.
Does he follow the war? What is his assessment of what's happening?
He's very interesting to talk to. I sometimes call him for advice on international politics. Right now, I physically don't have time to read everything – and even what I do read, I don't always have time to analyse.
But he still reads in different languages, from various sources, and has very strong critical thinking skills. I say to him: "Savik, explain where this is all heading," and he breaks it down for me. Essentially, I get bespoke lectures on international affairs.
How does he assess the situation in the Middle East?
He thinks it's an absurd situation that could have been avoided. I think a lot of people see it that way. There were other ways of doing it, but this one was chosen – and it's a mistake.
If he knows that many languages, I guess he could learn Ukrainian too.
Sometimes I deliberately speak to him in Ukrainian. At the moment, his level is lower than mine (laughs). That's why I say: "Savik, when your level is higher than mine, then you'll be ready for the spotlight."
So you haven't completely closed that chapter for yourself?
I don't think I could return to the role of producer I had before. Back then, I was very democratic – I allowed a lot of freedom.
Now, when I meet the team occasionally, I joke: "Guys, that chaos you had before, when you could do whatever you wanted – that won't fly anymore. I'm in the military now; meetings will be more disciplined: there are things we say and things we don't say" (laughs).
But seriously, the experience we've gained over this time is far more valuable. It's about something different now; it's about applying knowledge and solutions in a military context.
"Given the choice of a drone or a tank, I'd choose the drone"
Let's talk about where this war is heading. It's very difficult right now to predict how or when it will end, but still – is there a chance to defeat Russia, and what might that look like?
The first thing we need to understand is that we can't simply take this war and end it. That is not within our control. If it was up to us, we would have said long ago: that's it, stop. But it's up to the aggressor, and they're playing their own game.
Their goals aren't just [to take] Donbas or certain territories. Their goal is the political regime in Kyiv, the ability to impose their rules here and restore the influence they used to have.
Understanding this, we have to be strong. Can we turn the situation around? At this stage, yes. But to do that, we need to be as effective as possible.
What do you mean by effectiveness? Are you talking about specific personnel decisions or about approaches?
About the people who manage the processes. They need to build teams of people who make decisions fast and adapt fast. War is about adaptability.
This is not a call to replace the commander-in-chief, though?
No, absolutely not. I don't want this to be politicised. The commander-in-chief has experience, and the minister brings innovation. They need to work together – that's the right combination. This isn't about ambition – it's about results.
If we improve efficiency, we won't need to increase the number of people – we'll be able to implement decisions faster.
You often use the example of drones and tanks. What's the idea behind this comparison?
If I was asked to choose between a drone and a tank, I'd choose the drone. It's more mobile, cheaper, doesn't depend on terrain, doesn't get stuck in mud, and requires fewer people to maintain.
The problem is logistics, though. We still deliver drones according to tank logic.
I always give this simple example: what's the difference between delivering potatoes and delivering pizza? Potatoes can be dug up in the autumn, delivered in spring, and used with no issues. Whereas pizza needs to be delivered within 15 minutes of being made.
Drones are like pizza. But we're trying to deliver them like potatoes.
What does that mean in practice?
It means inefficiency. Every unit has its own R&D groups which are forced to remake what arrives.
For instance, there may be a situation where 100 drones and one UAV control centre are contracted, while somewhere else, there are 36 control centres and 3,500 drones sitting in storage. But they can't be used because there are no control centres that match.
The result is that some people are saying "We don't have enough drones," while others have them standing idle.
There are many such imbalances. This is a problem of poor planning and modelling. This is precisely where strong managerial decisions are needed.
Do we have time to fix this?
On the front line, the situation has, so to speak, stabilised. In modern warfare, major advances are very difficult for both sides.
There are technological solutions that could change the situation – both for us and for them. The question is who implements them faster and how the other side responds.
But large-scale breakthroughs like before – dozens of kilometres with moving convoys – are now practically impossible.
You often hear people saying the war could go on for another two years. Does Ukraine have the resources to endure for that long?
That depends largely on international support: how our partners see us and whether they are willing to continue supporting us.
Yes, if this support continues. We have all become military in a certain sense. Ukraine has very strong intellectual potential, and we are transforming these resources into new types of weapons.
For example, our interceptor drones are now reaching speeds of 700 km/h. We started at 100. That's a whole other level.
We have no choice. We'd all like to press a button and wake up in a peaceful country. But we are forced to defend ourselves.
How do you think this war could end?
Any war ends. The question is on what terms.
If we improve efficiency and increase enemy losses – of both equipment and manpower – that could lead to a decline in morale. Then, I wouldn't rule out a counteroffensive.
A Ukrainian one?
Yes. We could conduct a counteroffensive and secure favourable positions.
But there is another factor – the risk of tactical nuclear weapons being used. And that is a question for our international partners. They need to clearly define in advance how they would respond.
Because if they only start making decisions afterwards, it will be too late.
