Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Australia on July 8-10 has cemented the deepening geostrategic relationship between Canberra and New Delhi.
As part of his state visit, Modi was in Melbourne for the third Australia-India Annual Summit, where both sides finalized memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and agreements in the fields of maritime security, civil nuclear energy, skill development, emerging technologies, science and technology, and filmmaking.
In addition to a one-on-one discussion with his Australian counterpart, Anthony Albanese, Modi also met with Australia’s governor-general and the leader of the opposition. He also addressed the Australia-India CEOs Forum, the Economic Roadmap Business event, and a crowd of roughly 30,000 people, including members of the Indian diaspora, at the Marvel Stadium.
One of the key outcomes of the visit was the signing of the Administrative Arrangement to enable uranium exports to India for peaceful purposes under the 2015 Australia-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Although the agreement has been in place for over a decade now, the export of uranium to India was stalled due to the lack of agreement over reporting-related issues. The signing of this agreement puts in place a framework, which now allows private Australian and Indian companies to conclude the necessary commercial contracts to begin sales. In essence, it facilitates Australian uranium exports to India to help increase its share of non-fossil fuel power capacity and strengthens Australia’s export relationship with India. It is unclear at this point how much uranium Australia would export or when shipments would begin.
Economics alone does not explain Australia’s decision to expedite uranium sales to India. Due to mining restrictions, uranium exports have been a limited industry in Australia. Despite Australia’s claim to around 28 percent of the world’s uranium resources, its exports are just 6.7 percent of global uranium requirements.
India already has access to uranium from multiple countries. In February this year, Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s national operator and the world’s largest uranium producer, signed an agreement with India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to supply significant quantities of uranium to fuel India’s nuclear power plants. Then in March, Canada’s Cameco entered a long-term agreement to supply nearly 22 million pounds of uranium ore concentrate to the DAE between 2027 and 2035, with a contract value estimated at about US$1.9 billion.
So, what explains why Australia decided finally to sell uranium to India? History provides some insights here. Back in 2007, Australia decided to sell uranium to China and Russia in a bid to improve bilateral ties with these countries. With the ongoing power shifts in the Indo-Pacific, similar considerations possibly shaped Canberra’s decision, as there is greater realization of New Delhi’s value as a stable, reliable partner.
Slow but steady efforts to improve bilateral relations have already contributed to rapprochement between India and Australia, which were once in separate strategic spheres. The decision to export uranium to India carries important symbolic value, which must not be ignored. It removes what was seen as the final hurdle for bilateral ties to evolve into a truly comprehensive strategic partnership.
Back in 2007, former Australian Prime Minister John Howard announced that Canberra’s decision to export uranium to India would be contingent on the conclusion of a U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, then still under negotiation. The subsequent upswing in U.S.-India ties aided Australian efforts to improve ties with India.
However, India-Australia ties have now developed their independent dynamic, and stable U.S.-India relations are no longer a prerequisite for better Australia-India relations. Former diplomat Peter Varghese notes that a shifting U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific demands “deeper compensating relationships” in the region, positioning India and Australia as the ideal partners to fill the void. Both New Delhi and Canberra have had to navigate the challenges posed by abrupt shifts in U.S. policy under President Trump’s second administration. Consequently, their intensifying bilateral cooperation as Quad partners reflects a calculated, long-term commitment to bearing greater responsibility for regional stability.
Now more than ever, New Delhi and Canberra’s perceptions about their immediate strategic geography, especially regarding China’s role, are more closely aligned than ever before. Although the summit statement made no mention of the South China Sea, unlike the first annual summit statement in 2023, Beijing figured in the discussions between the two leaders.
In response to a question at the special media briefing on Modi’s visit to Australia, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri confirmed that Australia had expressed concern to India over China’s recent intercontinental ballistic missile launch into the South Pacific. Misri emphasized that India and Australia would “intensify cooperation” to guarantee that “peace, security and stability” are maintained across the Indo-Pacific.
Since India and Australia upgraded ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2020, defense has emerged as the strongest pillar of this relationship. Through regular high-level interactions via the 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue, India-Australia Defense Ministers’ Dialogue, and logistical agreements such as the Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement (MLSA) and air-to-air refueling arrangement, Canberra has achieved a degree of interoperability with New Delhi, which India shares with only a handful of nations. Institutional interoperability will only strengthen with the deployment of an Indian military instructor at the Australian Defense College in 2028-29 and an MoU between the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and Maritime Border Command (MBC) of Australia, which was announced during this visit. Furthermore, the Joint Declaration on Defense and Security Cooperation (JDDSC), which renews the 2009 Joint Declaration on Security, reaffirms the commitment from both sides to continue building interoperability between their forces.
Space is another area where India-Australia cooperation is expanding. Canberra is collaborating on India’s landmark Gaganyaan Human Spaceflight Program through essential space-tracking capability from its Cocos (Keeling) Islands. This reflects how bilateral ties are developing into truly multi-domain cooperation.
For observers of India-Australia relations, bilateral convergence over strategic interests was never in question. What was missing was a sense of urgency and a clear view of where the two countries stood in each other’s foreign policy priorities.
Back in 2012, an Australian commentator observed: “India is an important emerging power but not yet an important strategic player.” Today, that assessment seems obsolete. New Delhi is now recognized as a critical strategic player and a cornerstone of regional stability. Evidently, for New Delhi, Australia now occupies a prominent space in India’s strategic thinking and will continue to do so as it looks to expand engagements in the Indo-Pacific.
