U.S. President Donald Trump has been a sharp critic of NATO for years, but his rhetorical attacks on the alliance have accelerated amid the Iran war. Trump has ripped into NATO allies for not participating in the war and threatened to withdraw the United States from the alliance.
Trump’s presidency has proved to be a major test for the trans-Atlantic alliance and has led Europe to take steps to be more self-reliant when it comes to defense. The tensions he’s generated between Washington and NATO have raised serious questions as to whether it will survive him.
But while some NATO leaders have ripped into Trump for his leadership style and decision-making, not everyone in the alliance views him as a problem.
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys actually believes that NATO will be better off in the long run because of Trump. “At the end of the day, when we look back to this period, I’m convinced that the conclusion will be that President Trump made this alliance stronger, not weaker,” Budrys told Foreign Policy on Saturday during an interview at the GLOBSEC Forum in Prague, Czech Republic.
What’s more, Budrys appeared to agree with some of Trump’s criticisms of NATO in relation to the Iran war, arguing that European countries should have been more willing to help the United States solve the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. “That’s our ally that needs our participation,” Budrys said. “NATO allies should take their part and also take on our own solution to this situation.”
Budrys also spoke about the escalating drone crisis in the Baltics, his lack of optimism for a Ukraine peace agreement, and what needs to be prioritized at the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, in July.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Foreign Policy: You were just in Sweden for the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting. What were your biggest takeaways?
Kestutis Budrys: We have to prepare for the Ankara summit, that was the goal of our meeting—and to bring attention to at least three or four priorities. First of all, that NATO and its security is indivisible. What is happening right now at the frontier with the drone incidents, with Russia’s ridiculous accusations of Baltic countries assisting Ukraine or providing it airspace for attacks against Russia, we should take it seriously. This is an attempt to escalate the situation. It indicates the weakness of Russia, but it also shows their interest to expand the tension with us. That is for us not only rhetorically to respond, but also with complete deployments at the front line, strengthening Eastern Sentry, Baltic Sentry operations, and also to consider making the integrated air missile defense faster and [increasing] counter-drone capabilities.
The second thing is for Europe to step up and increase defense spending. Before our summit [in Ankara], we have to show and to prove to each other that we are implementing The Hague pledge [for members to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035]. And for Europe, it’s also important to approach Russia from 360 degrees because they’re everywhere, from the Arctic down to the Mediterranean and also in all domains, from cyber to space. For Europe, that’s a lot of homework to do.
Third is Ukraine. We have to agree on a very predictable, long-term mechanism on how we will support Ukraine and how we will share this burden. We know what their demand is, we know what they need, and we understand that a support loan doesn’t cover everything.
And fourth is the defense industry. We believe in a trans-Atlantic defense industry that’s open, without restrictions. We have to build one and cut the red tape and all the protectionism and the economic nationalism and build a market that would out-produce Russia.
FP: Drone incursions are top of mind for Baltic states right now, and leaders in the region have called for a comprehensive air defense mission to respond. What would that look like, and what else needs to be done to address this escalating problem?
KB: The EU also needs to invest in capabilities at the border. That’s why we are calling for Eastern Flank Watch to also include counter-drone capabilities. We are calling for increased spending in the new MFF [Multiannual Financial Framework] for building resilience on the front line, and also for special attention from the European Commission to this specific problem. It’s not only about drones, but a variety of countermeasures against Russia’s and Belarus’s activities against us. And also countering different hybrid activities.
And it’s not only about the Baltics. We should talk about reinforcing the entire front line from Finland going back down south to the Mediterranean. There is a lot to do, and we have to include Ukraine’s expertise and lessons learned from there. Lithuania’s and Ukraine’s presidents just signed an agreement on defense cooperation and counter-drone capabilities. This is an important step bilaterally, but we have to make it European-wide.
FP: Both Ukraine and Russia seem to be souring on the U.S. leading peace negotiations. The talks are stalled. There’s been no progress. Europe is reportedly considering appointing an envoy to handle these talks on its behalf with Russia. Are you at all hopeful that we’ll see any progress on this front in the near future?
KB: The quick answer is no. I’m not optimistic. What we’ve seen is how [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has avoided any result in the U.S. attempt to reach a peace deal, after over one year-plus of really genuine diplomatic efforts. Putin was deceiving everyone and delaying, and we see the result.
We collectively have to take measures to punish him for this behavior. He was just wasting our time. And he’s wasting the lives of Ukrainians, destroying their infrastructure, and just continuing to do what he was doing. So we understand that it’s about him, it’s not about our creativity. This is not a talk show. This is about strength of will. And we have to have a clear understanding of what we are demanding and what’s the goal of these negotiations. That’s how we will decide if we are successful or not. I don’t think it’s the right time right now.
We have to also project the different scenarios and how we’ll manage to change his mind. And I don’t know the answer. Frozen assets. Let’s use them. Additional sanctions packages. Put Rosatom on it. Put Lukoil. Lithuania was proposing it all the time. Bring some pain to Russia. This is how it should work. Otherwise it’s preprogrammed to [yield] bad results.
FP: In recent days, there’s been mixed messaging from the Trump administration regarding U.S. troop deployments to Poland. Did [U.S.] Secretary of State Marco Rubio offer any further clarity on this when the ministers met in Sweden?
KB: It was announced by President Trump [that 5,000 U.S. troops would be sent to Poland], and we expect that it will be implemented soon.
We have all the arguments on why U.S. troops have to be at the front line. In Lithuania, we have the very best conditions as a host nation—support and also training areas—so we can increase the number of troops that are currently there. We think that it’s economically, financially, militarily, and strategically in U.S. interests, and not to mention in our interests, for them to be there. And I believe that this set of arguments was the one that led to the decision and this announcement.
FP: Trump has been railing against NATO allies for not participating in the Iran war. Do you think there’s any fair case to make that NATO should be involved in this war?
KB: NATO allies should take their part and also take on our own solution to this situation, first of all starting with freedom of navigation in [the Strait of] Hormuz. Just go outside and check the gas prices. It affects us. It’s in our interest to solve it. That’s our ally that needs our participation. We have to do it, at least to consider it.
From the very beginning, the reaction was bad. From Lithuania, we are open for any type of assistance that we can provide. We made a decision in Lithuania that we will contribute with our capabilities in demining and also in operations that will be implemented there in the region. Be it the U.S.-led Maritime Freedom Construct or the U.K.- and French-led Multinational Military Mission, we will be part of it. We are interested in solving this.
Instead of discussing how it was started, and what’s the legal and political grounding on it, we should discuss more whether it is in Europe’s interest. And if it is an interest, and I’m convinced that it is, and also the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, we should act in defending it. We should stop expecting and believing that someone else will do our job.
FP: It’s not just the Iran war that Trump has criticized NATO allies over. He’s also caused tensions over issues ranging from Greenland to his ahistorical comments on NATO troops not being on the front lines in Afghanistan. A lot of countries were understandably upset. Are you concerned that the Trump administration is doing long-term damage to the trans-Atlantic alliance?
KB: We have an effective trans-Atlantic alliance. All these situations that you listed—we solved them in an allied spirit and manner without extra, unneeded tensions created. And we are still committed to each other. We shouldn’t expect that it will be easy all the way in front of us. There are some issues that we have to discuss and solve. Economic matters, the tariffs and some other regulations, for example. But if we act as we did, calmly and understanding that we have to think about a larger picture and larger interest, we can do this—be it a situation in the Gulf or any other situation.
What we have to also project very clearly is that we have unity among us. I remember those concerns before the Hague summit or even now before the ministerial meeting. All of them were a success. So, now looking to the Ankara summit, to make it a success, we have to send a strong message that we are united. Because if we now question trust in the trans-Atlantic relationship or Article 5, how can we manage to make our adversaries believe in it? This is the essence of the collective defense: whether your ally will come or not.
And at the end of the day, when we look back to this period, I’m convinced that the conclusion will be that President Trump made this alliance stronger, not weaker. And the Hague defense investment pledge is one of those elements to prove it. So, if there is a wish for the European side to do more, to deliver more, OK, let’s do it. But not instead of NATO. Complementary with NATO.
