What was at stake at the Chinese-Russian summit in Beijing?
Kyiv Post
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The Putin-Xi meeting this week has captured the headlines, coming so soon after the Trump visit to Beijing.
I think both leaders, Putin and Xi, were eager to signal a united front, and that the recent Trump meetings with both leaders (Trump prior in Anchorage) have not gotten in the way of their own relationship.
Putin, perhaps, is in a more uncomfortable position in that, prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow liked to think of the China-Russia relationship as a partnership of brothers, of equals. The harsh reality is that through Putin’s failed war in Ukraine, Russia has been weakened, and it is now increasingly the dependent partner in the Russia-China axis.
Indeed, as Western sanctions have impacted Russia, it has become more dependent on China as a market for its energy and commodities and as a conduit to secure scarce imports.
That said, for China it has not been charity, and, if anything, China has exploited Russian weakness by accepting cut-price Russian energy and commodities and charging Russia top dollar, or renminbi, for critical imports.
Notably, then, Putin’s calling card in Beijing this week was a fresh effort to breathe new life into the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline project. This has been the Russian pitch doing the rounds for years now to build another pipeline to take gas (50 BCM plus) extracted in Western Russia, and previously destined for markets in Europe, now to Asia.
Ukraine, frustrated by hesitant allies and shifting US priorities, has built a powerful, tech‑driven defense industry that strikes deep inside Russia and offsets Moscow’s manpower advantage. Kyiv’s ingenuity – from long‑range drones to sabotage operations – has crippled parts of Russia’s military and energy sectors while boosting Ukrainian morale. With Western support wavering, Ukraine is preparing for a prolonged war and asserting strategic independence.
China has played hard to get here, eager to secure the best low-priced long-term gas contracts and to link them to the financing of construction, again to China’s advantage. China is also nervous about becoming overly dependent on Russia’s energy supplies – arguably a strategic rival in the East.
And on the issue of the Power of Siberia 2 project, it does not appear as though Putin secured a breakthrough. Putin went back empty-handed –remarkable, really, that even despite all the uncertainty out of the Gulf, China still prefers Iran over Russia as a supplier.
The Financial Times hinted this week that in the Trump-Xi meeting, the Chinese side let it be known that Putin might live to regret his failed invasion of Ukraine. Trump later denied this, but in reality, Xi would only have been stating the obvious – how can Putin really see an invasion planned to last two weeks, now 4.5 years, as a success? And I think, given the broader global crisis provoked by the US/Israeli attack on Iran, Xi will have been quietly encouraging Putin to settle the war in Ukraine.
For China, given its continued reliance on commodity imports and developments in the Gulf, it would surely want a return to some kind of normality in Russia. An end to sanctions and an outlook in which Western investment could flow back into Russia to kick-start Russian oil and energy production would be preferable for China now.
As is, Russia’s ability to step up oil and energy production – even to meet existing OPEC production quotas is constrained by Western sanctions on technology exports to Russia, but also now constant and accelerating Ukrainian Deep Strike attacks on Russian energy and production infrastructure. With energy and commodity supplies from the Gulf disrupted, and the US capturing Venezuelan supply via the decapitation, China must be nervous.
I think that China might be additionally concerned by the direction of the war in Ukraine, as there is much to suggest that we might be at something of a turning point. Ukraine seems to have gained an important advantage in drone technology, which has helped overcome its manpower shortages, stabilize the front lines, and even led to net Ukrainian gains. Russian manpower losses are now approaching 30,000 per month, exceeding recruitment.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian deep strike drone attacks are finally bringing the war to Russia. The Russian economy, meanwhile, seems to be in a dire condition, despite the short-term respite in oil prices from the war in Iran. High inflation, recession, rising debts, and bankruptcies. No week goes by now without another conference in Moscow where business leaders, and even Putin, bemoan the state of the Russian economy.
I think that China might be additionally concerned by the direction of the war in Ukraine, as there is much to suggest that we might be at something of a turning point.
But China may well agree with my own prognosis that with the Iran war dragging out longer, or at least the closure of the Straits, eventually the result will be global demand destruction for oil, which, combined with a looming OPEC price war – signaled by UAE leaving OPEC – a year out oil prices could actually be lower than before the Iran war. That would be catastrophic for Russia – it would signal an economic meltdown in the making, and perhaps even the long-awaited collapse of the Putin regime.
As we saw during the Prigozhin affair, China certainly does not want that, as that could risk a switch back to a reform story in Russia and its move back out of the Chinese orbit towards the West. So I reckon Xi’s sage advice to Putin this week was to settle the war – and perhaps playing tough on Power of Siberia 2 was part of that message. Xi likely said, “Sort out your problems with Europe before it’s too late for you, and don’t expect any more bailouts from us.”
Just a parting note on Russia-China relations. First things first, this is not a partnership without limits, as the two sometimes have us believe. But there are tensions and rivalries between the two. Russia, for its part, is always nervous as to Chinese intentions in Siberia and mindful of its dearth of population there, compared to China, not helped by the kill rate in the war in Ukraine.
But as noted above, Russia has become increasingly dependent on China as its relations with the West have soured and as a result of sanctions. But that has come at the cost of China ripping Russia off. For China, it is important to remember that its number one foreign policy relationship is with the US, and that has shaped how it has played with Russia in recent years.
China has given Russia some support in the war in Ukraine – buying commodities and facilitating key imports – but it has limited the supply of military kit to avoid getting trapped in US secondary sanctions. It has also leveraged its relationship with Russia and the support it could provide to Russia in the war in Ukraine to secure tariff concessions from the US – at least that was the case under Biden, when the US cared about Ukraine. You could argue here that, as the US has drip-fed Ukraine enough support to keep it in the war but not win, so it has been the same with China to Russia. China has benefited from Russia’s being stuck in the war in Ukraine by making Moscow more dependent on China.
You could argue here that, as the US has drip-fed Ukraine enough support to keep it in the war but not win, so it has been the same with China to Russia.
China, perhaps, sees an advantage in both of its rivals, the West and Russia, being stuck in a resource-grinding war in Ukraine, but at the same time, China has no interest in a Russian defeat. That latter prospect appears more likely at this stage, which is perhaps why China might at least be encouraging Putin to settle while he can still influence terms before Russia suffers a catastrophic defeat.
Reprinted from the author’s @tashecon blog! See the originalhere.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
