U.S. President Donald Trump’s summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping on May 13-15 came to an end, surprisingly, without any new deals announced. At the same time, fears that Taiwan might be thrown under the bus to reach those deals did not come to pass – at least so far as is known.
Trump said before he left for China that arms sales to Taiwan would be a topic of discussion. This led to alarm that the weapons sales might be up for negotiations, in violation of longstanding U.S. policy on Taiwan. The Six Assurances – U.S. government policy since 1982 – state that Washington will not consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan, as well promising that the United States will continue to provide Taiwan with arms.
Ironically, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who accompanied Trump to Beijing, had proposed a Senate resolution in 2016, shortly before Tsai Ing-wen came to power in Taiwan, that reaffirmed the Six Assurances. A current bill introduced by the House would codify the Six Assurances into law.
Those concerned that Trump might be about to negotiate with Xi on arms sales to Taiwan pointed to previous comments. In February, Trump told journalists that he was “talking to” Xi about U.S. arms sale to Taiwan, adding that the Chinese leader had urged him not to move forward with the sale. “We’ll make a determination pretty soon,” Trump concluded.
Notably, the Trump administration has still yet to provide an official notification of $14 billion in arms sales. Reports in the Wall Street Journal and elsewhere suggested that the Trump administration was stalling because of the planned meetings with Xi. In response, a bipartisan group of U.S. senators issued a letter calling on Trump to move on the arms sales.
In addition to the arms sale issue, there were concerns in Taiwan that Trump might take a stance against Taiwanese independence. During the meeting between Xi and Kuomintang (KMT) chair Cheng Li-wun in Beijing last month, both Xi and Cheng emphasized the 1992 Consensus and the need to oppose Taiwanese independence. That Xi and Cheng echoed each other’s language has been interpreted by some analysts as a call for a United Front between the CCP and KMT against the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is framed by both Beijing and Taiwan’s Blue parties as a political force hellbent on pursuing Taiwanese independence.
Cheng plans to visit the United States in June and has stated that she hopes to meet with Trump during her trip. Fears in Taiwan, however, would be that Cheng would appeal to isolationist quarters of the Trump administration, who could scale down commitments to Taiwan on the pretext that the KMT could maintain relations with Beijing, and there was no further need to take actions that might provoke China.
In the end, none of these fears came to pass. In fact, what may be most notable regarding the meeting between Trump and Xi is that the U.S. and Chinese readouts differed on the issue of Taiwan.
Rubio had stated ahead of time that he expected Taiwan to come up in conversation between Trump and Xi, as it has in the past. China claims that Taiwan was indeed discussed between the two world leaders. The U.S. readout did not mention Taiwan, however.
Xi is on the record a number of times during the meeting emphasizing the importance of Taiwan to China, as well as warning of the dangers of “clashes and even conflict” between the two superpowers if the U.S. doesn’t handle the Taiwan issue “properly.” But when Trump was asked repeatedly by international correspondents about whether he discussed Taiwan with Xi, the U.S. leader ignored the questions.
It is not uncommon for meetings between Xi and other leaders to result in different claims about what was discussed. This also occurred during Cheng’s meeting with Xi – the KMT claimed that unification was not discussed while China’s readout says that it was. When asked about this fact, Cheng said that this was a mistake on Beijing’s part.
Even if Trump himself remained silent on Taiwan when questioned by the press, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent said afterward that Trump would comment more on Taiwan in the near future. Meanwhile, Rubio was interviewed by NBC News while in Beijing, where he emphasized that U.S. policy on Taiwan was unchanged.
Indeed, the composition of Trump’s delegation to China is notable. The presence of Rubio, traditionally a China hawk, was probably seen as reassuring to Taiwanese. So, too, was the inclusion of Nvidia founder Jensen Huang, who was born in Taiwan and raised in the United States. Huang is a popular figure in Taiwan due to the view that he stands up for his homeland on the world stage, with Nvidia announcing significant investment in Taiwan in recent years.
By contrast, the presence of Elon Musk – who, unusually, tweeted at prominent Chinese dissident Teacher Li in the midst of the summit to state that his son is learning Mandarin – was probably seen as less reassuring. Musk has in the past expressed support for China assuming control over Taiwan in a “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement reminiscent of Hong Kong.
In his first comments after the summit, Trump claims that he still hasn’t decided on whether to proceed with arms sales or not. Trump’s unpredictability on the matter will likely add to the contentious debate about defense spending in Taiwan. After months of blocking the passage of a supplementary defense budget, the opposition KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) have ratified part of the requested funds – much of which will go toward U.S. arms sales, assuming they eventually come through.
The ruling DPP has made it known that it intends to continue to press for the passage of further defense spending, while criticizing the KMT and TPP for leaning into political attacks on the reliability of the United States as an ally in wartime, but mostly cutting budget items for strengthening domestic defense capacity. For example, the version of the budget passed by the legislature cut Taiwan’s domestic drone program, while leaving intact spending on U.S. weapons systems. KMT leaders such as Cheng have suggested that the party will reevaluate its stance with a letter of agreement about procurement for specific defense items, but Trump’s comments make it uncertain if this will occur.
Either way, it has now become a recurring pattern in Taiwan that meetings between Trump and Xi are moments of tension, in which Taiwan is wary of being traded off by Trump in order to reach a deal with China. During the early stages of his first term, Trump was initially perceived in Taiwan as a politician who was tough on China. After all, while president-elect Trump proved willing to break with decades of diplomatic precedent in Taiwan’s favor by taking a phone call from then-President Tsai Ing-wen. But Trump has long since acquired a reputation for seeing Taiwan’s relationship to the United States in transactional terms.
As Trump has invited Xi to visit the United States in September, it is probable that Taiwan will see another wave of anxiety over Taiwan-U.S. relations later this year. Moreover, it is unclear if China will launch another set of military exercises directed at Taiwan in the near future, as often occurs in the spring.
The expansion of the annual Balikatan 2026 joint exercises between the United States and the Philippines, this year held in late April and early May, was interpreted by some media as a response to Chinese military exercises. A Taiwan contingency was among the scenarios practiced at Balikatan.
