In response to hypothetical remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae about possibly recognizing a Taiwan contingency as a “survival-threatening situation” – a circumstance that would allow the Japanese government to dispatch troops into harm’s way – China has embarked on a wholesale diplomatic and economic campaign to admonish the prime minister. In doing so, China wants to make abundantly clear the consequences that Japan would face for meddling in what Beijing regards as its internal affairs, namely Taiwan.
The first salvo of the campaign was a provocative online post by the Chinese consul general in Osaka, which implied that Takaichi’s head should be “cut off” because of what he perceived to be her insensitive remarks. Then came restrictions on seafood imports from Japan. Even more concerning was the reported strengthening of export controls on rare earth materials, which Takaichi described as “economic coercion aimed at forcing other countries to submit to its claims.”
However, China’s strong-arm tactics against Japan have not borne fruit; in fact, they may have backfired. They strengthened Takaichi’s resolve to consolidate power by calling a snap election, which her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won in a landslide. The public – including many who did not vote for her, according to polling – has approved of her government’s approach toward China. Moreover, structural changes that have taken place in Japanese politics this year make it even more likely that a firm approach toward China will endure.
First, the ruling party’s coalition reshuffle has set in motion a far-reaching transformation in Japanese security policy. While the LDP’s former coalition partner, Komeito, prided itself on acting as a brake on its partner’s more activist foreign policy instincts, Nippon Ishin no Kai, which has replaced it, seeks to unleash such inclinations. The new coalition has already embarked on policy reforms agreed upon in its coalition agreement. It has submitted a joint proposal to the government to loosen restrictions on arms exports, and the government has recently established an “International Peace Mediation Unit” focused on engaging in conflict resolution efforts – both policy initiatives outlined in the agreement.
Nippon Ishin no Kai goes beyond the LDP’s consensus position on security matters in other areas as well. Regarding self-defense, the party argues that Japan should lift geographical limitations and enable the Self-Defense Forces to assist its allies when they are in dire need. It also advocates making the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty a truly equal alliance and expanding the existing framework to include Australia and the Philippines. To this end, Nippon Ishin proposes the establishment of a “Four Seas Alliance” aimed at deterring China.
With regard to China, some of the more vocal figures calling for the expulsion of the Chinese consul general in Osaka were members of Nippon Ishin, suggesting that the party seeks to adopt a tougher China policy rather than a more conciliatory one.
While Nippon Ishin currently has no Cabinet members in the Takaichi government, it is likely to gain representation in the next Cabinet reshuffle, which would signal further integration between the two parties. This, in turn, would likely generate greater momentum within the executive branch to pursue a more robust security architecture – one that could continue for at least the next few years, if not until the next general election – providing a significant window for advancing its policy agenda.
Second, the composition of the Diet is likely to further accelerate the security reforms that the executive branch is eager to pursue. The so-called “realist” faction – parties that are open to increasing defense spending and assuming a more influential role in international affairs – gained a significant number of seats in the 2024 lower house election. Then the upper house election last year further consolidated their influence in the legislature.
Moreover, the largest opposition party in the lower house, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), appears to be rebranding itself from a resistance-oriented party into a more “loyal opposition” in the realm of foreign policy. In response to the recent summit between Takaichi and U.S. President Donald Trump, CRA leadership has praised the government’s performance.
Taken together, a legislative majority that broadly supports the government’s initiatives for a more secure Japan, combined with a CRA seeking to regain relevance by minimizing policy divergence with the government on security issues – or by toning down its overall criticism – may add momentum to Japan’s efforts to strengthen its own deterrent capability. That may be concerning from the perspective of the Chinese.
Finally, public opinion in Japan may blunt the impact of China’s pressure campaign, which aims to undermine Japan’s resolve to strengthen its resilience against external influence. In recent years – particularly since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – public tolerance for measures aimed at strengthening Japan’s defense has increased.
According to a poll conducted by the Cabinet Office in January, 45 percent stated that the Self-Defense Forces should be strengthened, while threat perceptions of China’s military activities have also intensified, with 68 percent expressing concern – both figures representing all-time highs for the survey. The polls align with the recent trend that the public is generally on board with efforts that would lead to deterrence. That said, it remains unclear to what extent the public will tolerate defense efforts when deterrence fails – meaning war.
The relative lack of significant resistance to the deployment of long-range missiles in parts of Japan is striking, especially considering that a land-based missile defense system – clearly defensive in nature – previously faced substantial opposition. By contrast, the current deployments possess a more offensive character, as they are intended to strike enemy bases. The ongoing introduction of these missiles forms part of a broader strategy to shift forces to southern Japan in preparation for a potential conflict over Taiwan.
The relative silence – or acquiescence – of most residents amid these missile deployments suggests a growing public tolerance for measures aimed at strengthening national defense. Many Japanese appear to perceive these moves as defensive in purpose. Although resistance may emerge as more missiles are deployed, the current level of acceptance is noteworthy, particularly given China’s warnings that it could impose significant economic costs in response to perceived provocations, including off-script remarks by the prime minister.
The current trajectory of Japan’s security policy – centered on strengthening defense capabilities and enhancing supply chain resilience – underscores the limits of China’s use of economic coercion. Although Takaichi herself is a defense hawk, she has called for open dialogue with China, particularly as diplomatic frictions intensified following her remarks in the Diet. Moreover, her electoral mandate and her alignment with conservative constituencies – many of whom favor a hardline stance toward China – afford her greater political space to maneuver and pursue compromise with Beijing.
The irony of international politics is that the application of overwhelming force does not always yield the intended results. Indeed, Japan’s own history – most notably the case of Pearl Harbor – suggests that the prospect of capitulation can instead embolden a nation that perceives itself as a victim. China’s use of economic coercion against Japan is therefore likely to backfire.
