On July 6, China’s navy test-launched a long-range ballistic missile with a dummy warhead from a nuclear-powered submarine. It was the second time China had fired a ballistic missile into international waters in recent years, following a test in September 2024. While Beijing sent advance notices to a few countries, the action demonstrated both its increasing reach and capability as part of its nuclear deterrence strategy and willingness to assert its active militarism in the region.
However, much more than that, the timing of the act was crucial. In way, it appeared as a declaration of triumph in the Indo-Pacific for Beijing at a time when countries across the region are grappling with U.S. detachment and recalibrating strategies to protect their national interests through a combination of multilateralism, minilateralism, and bilateral understandings.
Washington’s condemnation of the test-launch as an incident of “great concern” and its reiteration of “steadfast defense commitments” to its “allies and partners” notwithstanding, U.S. disengagement from the region is no secret. Washington is less enthusiastic about the Quad and remains ambiguous about the “Indo-Pacific” nomenclature in its own strategy. Moreover, Trump’s idea of a G2, a transactional duopoly with China to manage global affairs, does not necessarily counter Beijing’s assertive foreign policy, especially in its widening arc of influence.
These are sources of huge strategic disruption to India, which was not only one of the first countries to adopt the concept of the Indo-Pacific but has also at the receiving end of Chinese territorial aggression in recent years. Added to this is the growing Sino-Pakistan axis, making real the possibility of a two-front war. New Delhi’s response so far points to preparation for a period of cautious strategic recalibration. India is defining for itself a more autonomous, multi-aligned approach that does not anchor entirely on Washington’s strategic bandwidth and is looking for more partnerships to maintain the balance.
Three days before the Chinese test-launch, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae returned from India, where she attended the 16th India-Japan Annual Summit. The summit, according to India’s External Affairs Ministry, produced 16 outcomes, including joint statements and MoUs in the fields of “semiconductors, critical minerals, information and communication technology including AI (Artificial Intelligence), clean energy, and pharmaceuticals.”
The visit drew ridicule from Chinese media, which reported on the apparent transportation of drinking water from Japan for the consumption of the visiting delegates due to concerns over the quality of tap water in India. Chinese media framed this as nothing less than pure contempt. The Indian media, however, appreciated the outcomes of the summit as both countries “did well to ring-fence their ties from multilateral accords.” Both countries also declared a joint intent to continue with an “updated” Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) posture.
Beijing’s July 6 test-launch also came on the same day Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi landed in Jakarta, the first stop of his three-nation tour to Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. Both Canberra and Wellington had condemned the Chinese test-launch. Modi’s tour could be an opportunity for India to take the lead in activating not just its strategic relations with key countries in the Indo-Pacific, but also in pushing the FOIP theme around which the arguably defunct Quad tried to build convergence in the region. Indian commentators have even overenthusiastically hoped that “Modi’s new arc of trust will hold the Indo-Pacific together in these disruptive times.”
That could be an exaggeration and overreading of Modi’s trip, which could be framed instead as a “search for options” tour. The Indian prime minister has made frequent trips to foreign countries, which has been a critical component of his government’s foreign policy optics. More importantly, India’s search for options may not be the same as a search for substitutes.
Whatever its frustrations with Washington’s inconsistency on the Indo-Pacific label, including the renaming of its Indo-Pacific Command, or its handling of the Quad, New Delhi has been careful not to let its outreach to Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington, and Jakarta be read as a pivot away from the United States. In fact, U.S. President Donald Trump’s informal security assurances to India during his bilateral meeting with Modi on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in Évian-les-Bains, France, last month were very well received in New Delhi.
Trade talks between the two countries have continued; so has defense and technology cooperation. Indian officials have been assiduous to avoid any language suggesting a downgrade of the relationship. If anything, the diversification underway appears more like hedging than a call for a divorce. New Delhi wants more capitals it can call on, not fewer. That distinction is important, as an India-U.S. rupture would hand Beijing a propaganda victory far larger than any single missile test.
The challenges, however, are not trivial in the rapidly changing world order. A foreign policy of multi-alignment built on multiple partnerships demands a level of diplomatic bandwidth, economic heft, and internal coordination that India has struggled to display in the past. Moreover, countries like Japan, Indonesia, and Australia have their own China-dependent economic interests that could limit how far they are willing to go in confronting Beijing militarily. The Quad’s drift toward irrelevance would strip India of one of its few genuinely multilateral platforms for balancing China. But reviving the Quad – minus the United States – could only be a reverie. In these circumstances, bilateral and minilateral arrangements will have to carry a disproportionate load, even at the cost of failure.
There is another important caveat to consider. The task of effectively sustaining a robust and multi-faceted Indo-Pacific strategy would demand significant resources and political focus, which could be an overstretch for New Delhi. Nevertheless, its proactive testing of these arrangements now, through Modi’s trips, rather than waiting for a crisis to explode may very well be the strategy’s greatest strength. An India adept at navigating multiple partnerships simultaneously could potentially stand on a stronger platform with friends and sympathizers than one that remains dependent on Washington’s whims and fancies.
