Peter Slezkine: I’m Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests.
My guest today is Mat Burrows, Counselor in the Executive Office at the Stimson Center. During his 10 years at the National Intelligence Council, Mat served as principal drafter of three issues of the Global Trends Report. This is Mat’s second time on the podcast. Our first conversation focused on Mat’s career and the history and methodology of Global Trends. This time, we asked him to give us a glimpse of the future.
We recorded this episode before the American and Israeli attack on Iran, so don’t be surprised that it doesn’t come up. In our conversation, we discuss demographic trends, AI, energy, China, and the transatlantic relationship. I hope you enjoy the episode.
Mat, welcome back to the podcast.
Mathew Burrows: Well, glad to be here.
Peter Slezkine: So, last time, we went through your biography in chronological sequence. I think we made it up to the present day. So, now, we will look into the future. You are one of the world’s greatest prognosticators, so we are going to ask you to use that power and to peer into the future.
And we’ll begin by looking at, I think you called the megatrends last time, and then we will go region by region. So, can you give us a sense of what to expect on the energy front, the high tech AI front, and with demographic decline as the background reality as these changes take place?
Mathew Burrows: Well, let me begin with the last part – demographics – which was usually what I started with. When you’re looking out 20, 25 years, it’s highly certain, which, in most cases, with most trends is not quite up there in terms of the certainty. You know, this is one area we talk a lot about beginning a new era or bending the trend lines. This one, really, is because we’re heading into a world where there’s a lot more aged societies. South Korea and Japan are at the forefront of this, but a lot of European states from Germany and Italy are not that far behind. And the U.S., when I started to write the global trends, we thought we were exceptional that we wouldn’t actually get to the point of aging or decline, but now it’s quite certain with the drop in birth rates, which really began with the 2008 financial crisis, that, now, we will be declining by 2030 unless we keep up the immigration. And this is one thing with Trump and his policy, where we’re seeing a drastic reduction in immigration. I don’t know if that’s going to continue, particularly, another administration may not have the draconian idea of just throwing out everybody who is an undocumented immigrant.
Peter Slezkine: But controlling the border seems to be broadly popular. So, whether ICE is going to be beating down doors is a question, but it seems likely that tighter border control will probably continue past this current administration.
Mathew Burrows: I think so. But the issues will be Trump is not – is opposed to international students. So, that was one way we got skilled people who were building their skills and then would get find a job and stay in the U.S.
Peter Slezkine: Those aren’t huge numbers if we’re talking about big demographic trends, right?
Mathew Burrows: That’s a good segment of the immigration. But you’re right that their family reunification was the big element in U.S. immigration, you know, again, if they would allow that and also whether U.S. will accept refugees. Trump is reducing that to zero, basically, and another president may push it back up. But in essence, I think we will find, in closer to 2030s, unless you have an increasing population, it’s going to be harder to fund a lot of the spending programs that benefit seniors you already have. And just the baby boomers, which are a huge bulge moving into retirement, already started in retirement. So, that boosts the social security, the healthcare costs, et cetera. Do you want to have… before this, I mean, immigrants pay taxes, they help defray some of that. They tend to be younger. They tend to be first men, and then bring their families. Do you want the increase costs all to fall on a younger workforce? And I think that probably the answer is no. But, you know, if we do, then, then that’s another indication that we’re accepting decline.
Peter Slezkine: Well, in both China and the U.S., it seems like the big bet is on AI and robotization of the economy in order to make up for this inverted demographic pyramid.
Mathew Burrows: Yes. But if you look at it, maybe, some other organization put out a report. I know it was Davos put out a report of where the jobs will be in a decade. And obviously, there’s some question over the manufacturing sector, which will become highly automated, a lot more dark factories. But you still need people like landscapers, people harvesting, even though that has been more automated. You still need agricultural workers, service workers in restaurants, hospitals, other areas. Certainly, there’ll be, even in those cases, more automation, but it’s not clear that that can be fully automated. Americans aren’t interested in those agriculture jobs or those low-paying service jobs. So, there’s an issue there.
Peter Slezkine: Well, they couldn’t be just better compensated, I suppose, if immigration ceases to be the solution to all these problems.
Mathew Burrows: But then that raises consumer costs.
Peter Slezkine: Well, and then we become like Japan and age comfortably and quietly.
Mathew Burrows: The other thing with AI is we don’t know just how successful it will be, automation. I assume it will be successful, but I think it may take longer than anybody understands.
Peter Slezkine: Well, before we turn to the deus ex machina, let’s dwell on the human elements a little bit longer. The trend toward demographic decline seems to be global. There are certain parts of the world, perhaps Sub-Saharan Africa, that haven’t yet taken that turn, although it seems like they’re on that trajectory long term.
Mathew Burrows: Only one part of Africa. The Sahel doesn’t seem to have made that turn.
Peter Slezkine: So, it seems like we’re basically all…
Mathew Burrows: They still have elevated birth rates; but nevertheless, we’re seeing what has happened in other regions that coming down.
Peter Slezkine: So, there are limits to immigration, both politically and demographically, because there’s going to be less excess population elsewhere probably to attract. But just generally, is there any policy that could reverse this megatrend? There aren’t any number of countries that are seeking to incentivize more childbirth. Is there anything that looks promising on this count? Or is this a trajectory of global diminishment of population that is unavoidable for the foreseeable future?
Mathew Burrows: Well, I don’t think you can reverse it completely, but some countries have been somewhat successful — not fully successful — on helping women with childcare. Also, what you want to do is actually have couples start families earlier. Then, you can have more children, actually. So, there’s some, in some European countries, some incentives for one thing — having more children. I mean, France is one where they give higher subsidies to families.
The other thing is to ensure not just to have childcare so women can work, but when they take some parental leave, which I think in the Scandinavian countries can be as long as two years, that can get back in the workforce at the place that they left it. So, there’s not this in, I would say, U.S. case, women tend to want to get on the career ladder and fairly well up there before they have children in the professional classes anyway.
Peter Slezkine: But it seems that even the Scandinavian or Japanese models where the government subsidizes childcare, where employers give tons of time off, it still hasn’t made a measurable impact.
Mathew Burrows: I’m not as familiar with Japan, but I think, in the Scandinavian case, nothing reverses it. But you could say that there has been measurable changes in birth rate. At least, it keeps it from falling probably is what you’d say, falling completely. But immigration is still, if you look at Britain France have had, not like the U.S. but as a significant immigration and they are the ones that tend, or their birth rate is still higher.
Peter Slezkine: Do you think that China will resort to some form of immigration as the population begins to substantially contract or they will avoid that and focus entirely on robots?
Mathew Burrows: I think they will, but I think it will be very focused on, like, Southeast Asia, places where there’s a familiarity with the kind of culture in China. I think, too, that they would be very, very leery of bringing in huge numbers of Westerners because they always fear a rise of individualism. They’re, kind of, paranoid about that, so you would have limited numbers. There are Westerners, you know, in the big cities already working, usually, for Western companies.
Peter Slezkine: Far fewer after COVID.
Mathew Burrows: Yeah. But, I think you’re talking about they would be bringing in them for Chinese companies. And I think that they will, but I think it will be more Asians and those who are familiar with Chinese culture.
Japan has tried, but the language is a real impediment, because to get any stability, I mean, you have the ability to stay, you have to learn Japanese, and that’s extremely difficult. Germany has also opened the door more, but the last I saw, I mean, there’s still a problem on citizenship, because, you know, when people, I think, particularly, those with skills and something to that is immediately in demand, they want some stability, some sort of measure ofconfidence that they can stay for not just a couple years but for much longer.
Peter Slezkine: So, let’s say the population contracts globally — I mean, that seems to be obviously, sort of, the case, at least for this next generation — what effect will that have on different societies and on the globe as a whole? Do you think that aging societies will go to war with one another less? Will the economic model change, not just become more expensive, but that we will be less focused on growth because it won’t be as possible? What other sort of broad changes might we expect from [crosstalk 00:13:12]?
Mathew Burrows: Well, you know, there’s lots of statistical studies that show that aging countries don’t go to war with one another. I wouldn’t say that that bars completely the possibility of major war, but, you know, that may be a positive aspect of it.
Peter Slezkine: Instead of the democratic peace theory, we have the old people peace theory.
Mathew Burrows: Yeah. But I think one worry I would have is that, internally, there could be real tensions between younger and older generations.
Peter Slezkine: Well, we’re already seeing that now in the U.S. and elsewhere, where it’s, kind of, the boomers versus everyone else is the way politics are framed in many cases.
Mathew Burrows: Yeah. But, you know, the younger people have to get out and vote. The seniors vote at a higher rate than younger ones. And so, Brexit could have been averted if there were more younger voters in the city of London that went out on that rainy evening and voted to stay in the EU.
So, I think housing is a big issue and the affordability of housing. And I think those kinds of issues will become increasingly salient in the political discussion. And I think parties are going to have to find ways if they want to keep that and keep the trust of that younger cohort, actually find some solutions.
You know, I don’t think the older generation is, deaf to, I mean, because these are their sons and daughters and grandsons and granddaughters that are being affected by this. I mean, if the polls are to believe in the New York race, I mean, it’s just not the young that are affected by the housing crisis but also broad spectrum of the population as well that feels some sympathy, maybe, even though they may be ensconced in their own apartment, don’t have any worries. And I think the UN has looked at this. I mean, the intergenerational fairness, I think, that is creeping in to some of the policymaking. I know in the UK and in some other European countries, I wouldn’t be a bit surprised. It becomes more of a factor here.
Peter Slezkine: So, what about energy?
Mathew Burrows: Well, I think Trump is on the wrong track, you know, renewables. And I think the Chinese are showing this.
Peter Slezkine: The Chinese are checking all boxes, right? Coal, gas, nuclear, wind, sun.
Mathew Burrows: Well, they can’t immediately go onto renewables, but they’re making huge efforts in that direction. And they recently came out with a new vow to end coal. And they actually have ended the funding of projects involving coal elsewhere. But I think it’s going to come down to not a climate issue, although obviously it benefits. It’s cheaper. And that’s how the European Union position is, you know, that, okay, it’s great for the climate, but the other thing is, for a continent that doesn’t have much energy supplies or adequate ones, this is the cheaper solution than importing the fossil fuels.
Peter Slezkine: Well, not in the short term, right? Because their entire energy grid.
Mathew Burrows: Not in the short term, but I’d say in the medium term. It’s not the long term anymore, because one thing, renewable costs have come down. So, over 10, 15 years, I think it will be much farther along.
Peter Slezkine: And by renewable, you imagine what as the primary sources of energy — solar and wind or some other technology?
Mathew Burrows: Nuclear, you have to also include there.
Peter Slezkine: Well, Germany just got rid of nuclear. Do you think they will change their minds or they’ll be left out as everybody else makes progress in that area?
Mathew Burrows: It’ll be a hard sell on them. But I mean, France for decades is nuclear. But I think a lot of other countries, including in the Gulf where they have more than ample supplies. One thing is these many reactors, Russians and others have developed are very attractive. Hopefully, they have adequate safety with them, but that is also I think another source.
Peter Slezkine: But if there is now an energy crunch, why not exploit all forms of energy in order to avoid the short-term cost while developing the renewables with an eye to the future, basically the Chinese motto?
Mathew Burrows: Well, I don’t see any problem. I mean, I think…
Peter Slezkine: Because the European alternative is to be very abrupt in this transition, which seems to create [crosstalk 00:18:13].
Mathew Burrows: They have, now – they realize they can’t fulfill some of these goals. But they still have that in mind, as well as, I think, increasingly, other countries.
Peter Slezkine: How long do you think the big oil and gas companies or states will remain profitable? At what point does selling gas or oil as a national economic strategy stop paying off?
Mathew Burrows: Well, it depends first on, you know, like Saudi, as I remember, the cost of pulling up oil from, where they have a great huge deposit underneath is very small. So long as the price they’re selling at is, I don’t know, $20, $30, they’re going to make a profit, probably even less. I mean, their concern is they want to increase the possible timeline and get as much profit as possible.
But I think, by the 2040s, it’s going to be very clear that renewables is basically the way we’re going to provide for energy. And an array of different solars, you can’t provide the needed energy in some countries or some regions. So, add wind, you have nuclear reactors.
Peter Slezkine: So, what about AI? That is the most speculative subject, but perhaps the most transformational technology. Do you believe that it really will change the world, society, the economy, fundamentally, or is this an incremental technology, something like the internet, which changes everything that we do in life, but hasn’t completely, I don’t know, altered what it means to be human?
Mathew Burrows: I’m not an expert on AI, but from what I’ve seen, I think the ambitions to build super intelligence are probably overblown. And I think you’re beginning to see some of the tech people admit that they don’t think they can get from here to there. It may happen, but it will be a longer process and it may not be… they have a, kind of, a vision of a linear progression, more data centers that they build and so on. And there are a lot that they’re now calling that into question.
I do think it will be like internet and like a lot of other technological innovations over the century. It will change our lives and change our societies, how we produce wealth. The big issues, I think, and those are the ones that really haven’t been discussed as much, is, how do we ensure some sort of fairness? We don’t necessarily want to repeat the mistakes of globalization where you had the whole middle class feel like they’re losers. I think that would be politically and socially disruptive if that happens. Those questions, people talk about taxing robots, for example, because as it stands now, they’re not paying any social security taxes.
Peter Slezkine: How can you tax a robot?
Mathew Burrows: You could tax a robot just the way you tax profits, incomes. You could find a way.
Peter Slezkine: So, whoever owns the robot pays for the robot’s labor, some portion to the government?
Mathew Burrows: Yeah. But I think there needs to be, at some point, a discussion of that. And now, most of what we hear is about all the great things that will happen. But it’s great for some people. And when you have a very unequal society in America now just having a super rich class is not necessarily the greatest result from this technological innovation.
I think there are also issues in education. If students can just pull off the internet, some chatbot summary of a book that they’re supposed to have read and done a book report on, how much learning will they really get? And we’re finding, there are studies showing now that those who don’t master reading are less likely to succeed in math or science. So, before this, there were some thoughts that they would be different, not linked in terms together. So, I think we’ll have to look at that. And then we’ll have to look at a lot of people aren’t going to have the skills to… you know, they don’t want to be agricultural workers. Where are they going to go? You know, there’s talk about basic universal income. Hasn’t that been successful in Finland? So, all of these questions which get worked out, and this is a normal process. If you go back to the industrialization in Britain, you know, when industrialization started in Britain, they’re using children 10 years old, sometimes younger, because they have smaller fingers and you have these big looms, and they’re working 10, 12-hour days. And then you have child labor laws. You begin setting health standards. There are a whole bunch of things that follow on from that industrialization, which produced huge wealth in Britain and in other countries. It followed along.
But you have a lot of other societal adjustments. You have to make sure that this doesn’t just exploit a certain part of your population, or that they are unfairly left behind in order to have the benefits. And actually, what a lot of historians that look at this, I mean, things that Britain underinvested in education, for example, and that that’s one thing that stalled them in the next technological revolution.
So, we need to have a bigger conversation, which you ordinarily, when they describe AGI or AI as huge productivity for society, fewer entry jobs, no entry jobs in the case of some. And this kind of idea that those that own those or have an interest or have stock in will do very well but everybody else will be left behind.
Peter Slezkine: So, the technological invention and disruption leading to creator inequality seems like an analogy with the industrial revolution, but there are also important differences. The industrial revolution made men into cogs of the machines in many ways and dehumanized them. But nonetheless, the human element within this new machine-driven economy was essential, as much labor as possible from the young to the old, and then society adapted by limiting that exploitation. Now, it seems like the machines are going to do everything and make human labor superfluous. So, the policy adjustment won’t be to limit human exploitation but to find something for them to do.
Mathew Burrows: Well, I’m not quite convinced that, you know, the human element is going to be completely taken out. I say this because, you know, I, like you, do lots of research and writing. Whenever I do a search, a chatbot app gives me all these things. They come up sometimes with sources I haven’t heard of, which is great. I go to it. But then there are a lot of sources that they come up with that they say are authoritative, and I find that they’re written in 2016. And there are a lot of sources they don’t mention that are ones that you should be consulting. So, I actually think, for a long time, the human element has to be there. And I am not convinced that, yes, in certain very routine tasks, I think that they can automate the human out of the picture.
Peter Slezkine: Oh, the question is whether it’s routine. Because if AI and robots are taking care of the agriculture and industry and the rest of us are only necessary in so far as we can do original research and produce texts, that might already be a sign that we’re just making ourselves busy somehow.
Mathew Burrows: Going back to AI, I mean, I don’t think they can take the policy decisions. But they can, yes, in routine tasks, they do an excellent job, a better job. One example here. So, for some time, they have programs to read x-rays and they’ve been shown that they can pick out cancer cells faster and be more successful in catching more indications of cancer. But radiologists, the profession has grown. And that is because they’re now investigating more uses for radiation. And that requires the human element to investigate that.
Peter Slezkine: Well, that’s heartening. So, humanity will not be totally replaced or left to drift to laze around doing nothing in particular.
Mathew Burrows: Well, I think very skilled people, yes. I mean, those are doctors. I mean, they have six, eight years of training. I mean, I do think that there are job categories that could be eliminated. And that has been the case for every technological revolution.
Peter Slezkine: All right. So, now, let’s tackle the world’s regions separately and in specific. What will become of what was once called the West and then was reorganized as the transatlantic relationship in NATO?
Mathew Burrows: I am not sure that there is a future. I think there will always be a certain closeness because a lot of Americans can trace their roots back to Europe, somewhere in Europe. And we’re pretty integrated in terms of, you know, the media, how we organized, I think, universities, other cultural facets. But I don’t think the transatlantic relationship will be the most important relationship geopolitically in the world. I think the U.S. is going in a different direction. And I think, for Europe, they’re trying to find a way. And it’s not quite clear how they reshaped themselves. But it’s not going to be the West that I knew growing up in the Cold War. And in some ways, that period when the West really was seen as the most civilized place on earth and the one that was attacking the dark forces of communism and so on. That may be an aberration, because we have before the second World War. I mean, the U.S. and Europe very close, English dukes married American heiresses, also FDR’s mother spent the winter in Paris.
Peter Slezkine: Winston Churchill was half American.
Mathew Burrows: Yeah. So, I mean, there’s going to be still, I think, that closeness.
Peter Slezkine: In the sense that Trump might go to a golf course that he owns in Scotland, but it won’t have a huge impact on the geopolitical relationship.
Mathew Burrows: No. And in the 1920s and ‘30s, we wanted to stay out, the brief intervention in the first world war, I mean, was enough that we wanted to completely stay out. And there was a huge party, America First. And it was probably, the fact that the Japanese attacked us, that FDR was allowed then to get into the… felt he could get into the second world war.
Peter Slezkine: Well, I think Roosevelt had committed us to the war before then. But it certainly is true that the Charles Lindbergh’s and William Borah were reflecting the popular position, that they were many more in the United States who wanted to stay out than go in.
Mathew Burrows: Yeah. And they forced FDR to use the lend lease and so on to help. But they couldn’t send troops right at that point. So, I do think that what we have known and what we’re get used to, I think, has not necessarily been the history of relations between us and Europe. A lot of immigrant Americans left because they didn’t want anything to do with Europe.
And I think the other thing that is happening, and this is something that doesn’t get enough press, is Trump’s decision to end foreign assistance, is thumbing your nose at the rest of the world. And that caused very little, but it shows contempt. And I don’t think Europe is quite in that place. I mean, they still see themselves connected. And I think those divisions, there are obviously some shared issues — Ukraine, Russia would be one — but it’s less of an issue here than it is in Europe. And equally on China. They don’t have the same sense of antagonism that we do.
Peter Slezkine: They have greater antagonism toward Russia and less toward China.
Mathew Burrows: Yeah.
Peter Slezkine: So, you’re saying that the U.S. is going to pull back, presumably, from the world, but certainly from Europe. And that the period since the middle of the 20th century may seem a bit anomalous. Do you think that Europe will continue to cohere absent the American umbrella? So, there was a United Europe under the Roman Empire. There has been a united Europe under the American Empire. Will it remain united if the U.S. withdraws?
Mathew Burrows: Yeah, I don’t see it breaking up. I think, more, the question is, you know, how united, in what areas. I don’t ever see it getting, at least in the foreseeable future, to a United States of Europe. I think there’s still too many divisions, but it will stay together. It was a remarkable opposition to Brexit. The fear in Brussels at the time was that you’d have others who would follow.
Peter Slezkine: But isn’t that fear, in some sense, proof that this construction is not so solid? That there was great paranoia that, if Britain left, so would Greece, Spain, Italy, and so on? And Greece almost did. It would’ve if it could have.
Mathew Burrows: But, you know, I think the fact that you didn’t have them has, kind of reassured those in Brussels and elsewhere, that it’s going to stay together. And I think the other thing is, with the U.S. basically gradually taking away the defense umbrella. It’s a question really whether NATO will, you know, I think that is more likely. Although, you know, somebody said these multilateral institutions rarely die. They may become ineffective. But, you know, I think there’s a greater likelihood of NATO being a shell than the EU. But I think, as they have to develop their own defenses, I think that’s going to actually bring them together.
Peter Slezkine: But it could go in two different ways. So, one possibility is, when they realize, and they already seem to understand the trajectory from the American side. So, the United States is withdrawing. They need to take responsibility of the Europeans. That is for their own security. And they could do it collectively, which is the path that they are pursuing at the moment. Or they could do it nationally, which might be easier to execute. And you see some countries like Poland already going down that path. And if Poland re-arms, it’s a way to deal with the potential Russian threat. But it also may cause concern in Germany. And then Germany re-arms and France starts wondering about the fate of Alsace and so on. And then you get, sort of, a cascading effect. So, you don’t think that that is likely that national re-armament will fracture Europe along the lines that have existed for centuries.
Mathew Burrows: No, because they have an understanding that, you know, they would be weaker that way. You know, I think they will all have national armies. But I think the effort will be to increasingly coordinate. That’s going to be hard because militaries tend to be very traditional. And they have traditions that are grounded in their national history. But, you know, one thing NATO has been beneficial in that way, they had to cooperate there. And I think the fact that the commission is facilitating the defense buildup in facilitating the national governments to reinflate and spend more on defense where that — that added defense spending won’t be held against them as raising their deficit. That is the indication that the Brussels institutions are also going to be involved in this.
Peter Slezkine: But NATO is still an American institution. And it’s one matter for everybody in Europe to cooperate within NATO when they’re all on the same plane beneath the United States, or at least several different levels within Europe. But all of them significantly subordinate to the United States. And if the United States element is withdrawn more or less completely, then you have France, Poland, Britain in NATO, not EU, Germany, and so forth, all more or less equal sized, which makes cooperation considerably more difficult.
Mathew Burrows: I don’t see that. I mean, you could say that economically, but they have managed to pool their powers, particularly on issues like trade. And there’s a huge difference. Germany is an export economy. The others aren’t necessarily, or not to that same degree. And Germany has tended to keep down spending. The others are mostly on the other side of spending way above what they should be. There are huge differences economically, but that still meant that they can get together and they have a unified trade policy. I think the bigger question with Europe is, if they actually do what is in the Draghi report and put in a lot more, I’d say, economic reforms where they’re unified through unified capital market and some of these to really give a shot to their economies, where they have been lagging behind the U.S., and obviously China. And they need to step up, particularly on the innovation side where there are a lot of scientists from Europe who are in Silicon Valley, but they need… actually, Europe should be finding a way of keeping them at home, making sure that the startups and they have plenty of them that are started in Europe aren’t gobbled up by U.S. companies and that innovation stifled. There are big question marks whether Europe can make the leap. I would say the demographic issues are one of the complications there. But I don’t really see them falling back to some situation like the 1930s when they’re all on their own.
Peter Slezkine: Although it doesn’t have to be the 1930s. Basically, any moment between 1945 and the collapse of the Roman Empire Europe has been split with various bids at continental hegemony all ultimately failed.
Mathew Burrows: Well, what I meant is on their own. But that would mean that they undo all the economic regulations and cooperation and et cetera. And it looks to me as if, on the defense side, they’re even drawing in Britain. Having worked in Brussels, and it was two years at the U.S. mission to the EU and seeing them, crisis is the best thing for… it’s a catalytic force for European cohesion. It looks always like they’re falling apart. And that was the case after German unification. Thatcher not wanting it, the French not wanting it, Germans going to have to go their own way. And then suddenly what comes out after Maastricht, the greatest step forward yet.
Peter Slezkine: Yeah, that’s what the Europeans always tell me, is that they get coherence through crisis. But that seems like an uncertain model and unless you have a detailed strategy for where you’re going to go, just relying on past successes in surviving crises doesn’t inspire the most confidence. But I think that the status quo cannot endure it. So, Europe either has to integrate further or will fragment that there’s this fork in the road. And you bet on further integration and I bet on fragmentation and we will reconvene in five years and see who’s won the bet.
Very quick yes-or-no question: China, will it become a regional hegemon? Will it dominate the globe in some way that might be different from the Anglo-American model, but nonetheless is felt from North to South Pole? Or will they take a different trajectory?
Mathew Burrows: Well, it’s already a regional hegemon in an economic sense. I mean, even, you say South Korea, Japan, Australia, I mean, they still depend economically on China.
I think there is a misconception in Washington that a fear that China would want to establish a global power like the U.S. had. First, I don’t see that as possible. But secondly, I don’t see that the Chinese necessarily want that. If you’re thinking of the second war is kind of musical chairs, U.S. was the only one.
Peter Slezkine: There was only left one chair left at the end.
Mathew Burrows: I mean, you know, almost 50% of world GDP was U.S. I mean, U.S. suffered casualties, obviously. But what did happen was it really ramped up its factories. It showed that it was an industrial superpower, as well as on military and other ways.
Peter Slezkine: All of its potential rivals totally devastated.
Mathew Burrows: And everybody else was, yeah, completely devastated. And it was able to set rules. And, you know, these things, once they’re set, they have a life of their own. And you don’t get rid of currencies even when there’s another bigger economic power, necessarily. I mean, the pound was a dominant currency up till the end of the second world war.
So, I don’t see that happening. What I do see happening is what I’ve always said what happened, is a multipolar world. And there are people that believe that multipolar world, it would be a lot more unstable. And I would say, yes. I mean, there’s a potential for that. And I think that’s somewhat what we’re seeing now, is part of this is the U.S. really doesn’t want to be a part of that multipolar world in which China has a big slice and doesn’t even want to recognize that China is a great power. But, you know, you could get to a point where there would be some sort of stability. But I don’t think, in a sense, the world was very centralized. I mean, between the communist block and a free world that we still talk about, even though most of it is departed.
Peter Slezkine: Well, that’s the subject of my own personal research, the free world.
Mathew Burrows: But, you know, it was very, kind of, centralized. You knew who was in this block. I remember as a kid, you get these out of newspapers, and they would be red or shaded red and some sort of sense. And then the others would be blue. And they’d have a chart who’s… Well, now, you have a good portion of the world that doesn’t want to be in either middle powers. A lot of them are economically very tied to China, but they would really rather have a kind of balance, those ties with others to [crosstalk 00:45:09].
Peter Slezkine: I mean, we had that before India didn’t want to pick a side from the very beginning. And as decolonization progressed, non-alignment became more popular. And of course, they were squeezed between these two behemoths. But if we ultimately imagine that China and the U.S. will be, by far, more powerful than any other entity, then the various non-aligned will still be in an uncomfortable position. Or do you think that there will be more than two poles and that they will be, kind of, fungible, that middle power, smaller powers will be able to adhere to one or the other depending on circumstance?
Mathew Burrows: Well, I think there will be poles of varying sides. To an extent, you have seen it with the Ukraine war. I mean, China helps Russia but doesn’t want to get actively involved, sending troops or anything.
Peter Slezkine: But it seems like a very asymmetrical division, because the West marches in lockstep on this issue; whereas, the rest of the world isn’t in a different block. It’s just this isn’t the driving concern. And they do business when they want to and don’t when it’s not in their interest. So, it’s not as if there’s two blocks. There’s one block and then an assortment of actors each tend to its own business.
Mathew Burrows: Well, I mean, there’s China, there’s U.S. Europe wants climate. US doesn’t. I mean, I think there are beginning to be more variations. And I’m not sure a degree to which the U.S. can count on even South Korea and Japan if there’s a war over Taiwan. It depends on what the Chinese do, too.
Peter Slezkine: So, do you imagine ultimately that there will be clusters that are held together by common trade deals or technology standards or military alliances, or that different actors will associate according to different interests at different moments but they will all be, sort of, free floating?
Mathew Burrows: I see more free floating. I mean, they will get clustered together on issues where they have a big common interest.
Peter Slezkine: But for as long as that interest lasts, like, no blocks that are then kept together through the creation of these institutions and common ideologies.
Mathew Burrows: Well, they may have institutions that help to further those goals that they share. But on other issues, they have other partners, they have other views. And, you know, other members in that group may have different views. So, it is a more free floating.
I think the big question, to my mind, in that system is not just how do you maintain peace between, I mean, obviously, two big poles, which are the U.S. and China, where, hostility, I mean. And it goes right through society against the other. But how do you care for certain common interests, such as, I mean, I put climate change up there. I put poverty in the world. Disease. Some of these issues like that. Because if they’re… I think it is a lot more difficult in the free floating and you get a phenomenon of free riders who don’t necessarily want, who like the idea but won’t invest in any way in it.
And that, I think, is a problem. You have a problem today. U.S. is a big player in the World Bank, and it wants the World Bank to get out of climate-related projects. Whereas, the rest of the world wants, you know, or most of the rest of the world wants. And particularly, the developing world wants help on that. How can you build this world or you’d say institutionalize this world? So, some of the common interests are protected.
And there’s a historic factor. I mean, the U.S. mentality, a policymaking mentality, is still that “We own this.”
Peter Slezkine: And by “this” you mean the whole world?
Mathew Burrows: “And that we should be able to decide.” Even, you know, when we’re getting out of things on climate change, we still want everybody to get out of it, too. And we use our power to make that happen.
Peter Slezkine: Well, as this power recedes, do you think that the most important principle of coherence will be the national interest? So, different states working together depending on issues at hand. Will it be regions, the geography will be determinative and regions will, more or less, clustered together? Or will it be civilizations, which also will be region-based, but be tied to some sort of common culture and history.
Mathew Burrows: All of the above.
Peter Slezkine: All of the above.
Mathew Burrows: I think they all play a factor, but I’m not sure that they determine in every case how a country, what partners a country chooses or what particular issues it sees as important.
Peter Slezkine: Well, then, one last question. I’ve been asking some of my recent guests to make a bet on some region or country in the world. So, given that it seems like all areas face substantial headwinds at the moment, who do you think, relatively speaking, is best positioned for success in the next half century?
Mathew Burrows: I think it’s Greater Eurasia. So, with that, I include India, China, Russia, much of Southeast Asia.
Peter Slezkine: Together or each independently within an interconnected continent?
Mathew Burrows: Well, I’m thinking together. You talked a little bit about poles. I don’t think this would be a completely integrated pole. But I think that, getting back to some theories that had been around, I suppose, from the 19th century.
Peter Slezkine: Mackinder and so forth?
Mathew Burrows: Yeah. That, basically, this could be the engine for the world. And it requires some changes, certainly, in Chinese-Indian relations. They’ve improved, but it’s not clear that they’ve completely resolved there and that they wouldn’t be super competitive with one another.
But, you know, when you’re thinking about, I’m thinking too about infrastructure links. So, if you would have, like, this is basically grid, electric grid fueled by renewables that are coming from Russia, I mean, parts of China, India as well, and I think the northern sea route is another thing that’s going to benefit them. And I think climate changes, because of agriculture. And then the big issue, if you talk to a lot of these climate science, is a migration from South Asia because temperatures are soaring so much in Pakistan and India.
Peter Slezkine: But wouldn’t that be a problem for greater Eurasia? If you have South Asia migrating north, that would create all sorts of conflicts and [crosstalk 00:52:24].
Mathew Burrows: It could be a problem, but also there are benefits.
Peter Slezkine: Because it would spread the population more evenly throughout this massive territory.
Mathew Burrows: Yeah.
Peter Slezkine: Which would then be interconnected at a larger scale than is possible elsewhere in the world.
Mathew Burrows: Yeah.
Peter Slezkine: Okay. So, bet on Eurasia, greater Eurasia.
Mathew Burrows: Thank you very much.
Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don’t miss out on any episode. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
