Kazakhstan’s military modernization efforts reflect an adaptive response to growing great power competition.
When Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev issued a strict, two-year deadline for the comprehensive modernization of his country’s armed forces, it raised eyebrows across Eurasia. To some Russian defense analysts, an accelerated military overhaul seems unnecessary for a country with no active border disputes or immediate, external kinetic threats. Conversely, Western observers interpreted these reforms as an attempt to safeguard the state against internal instability and potential Russian revisionism following the war in Ukraine. Others frame it as a step toward consolidating Kazakhstan’s status as a middle power, portraying the modernization effort as a balancing strategy vis-à-vis Russia and China.
Although such explanations may function as partial explanations, two key factors are particularly important for understanding Kazakhstan’s broader strategic rationale: the changing character of modern warfare and the transition of the international system toward multipolarity, both of which are generating increasing strategic unpredictability. In this regard, a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific could generate unprecedented security challenges for Kazakhstan, making such military reforms not only rational but increasingly necessary.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought dramatic technological changes to the conduct of modern warfare. A wide range of emerging technologies, including unmanned systems, precision-guided munitions, and AI-enabled surveillance, can now compensate for demographic and geographic constraints. Despite Russia’s superior air force and conventional military capabilities, Ukraine has managed to conduct long-range drone strikes that have inflicted significant damage on Russian airbases deep inside Russian territory. According to some estimates, these attacks contributed to roughly a 25 percent reduction in the pre-invasion operational strength of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). In 2025 alone, an estimated four out of every five Russian casualties were reportedly caused by Ukrainian drone operations, underscoring the growing centrality of unmanned systems in modern warfare.
Thus, Kazakhstan appears to be adopting a layered approach, integrating unmanned systems into a broader framework of airspace control, mobility, and strategic autonomy. Given its vast territory, air mobility and rapid response remain equally critical, enabling swift deployment in both internal and external contingencies. More fundamentally, Kazakhstan’s modernization points to a shift from platform-centric to system-centric warfare. The emphasis on drones, artificial intelligence, and domestic satellite capabilities suggests a move toward an integrated ISR architecture, where data becomes the central strategic asset. Kazakhstan’s decision to establish a specialized military AI unit shows its adaptation to the evolving character of warfare, in which artificial intelligence is increasingly used to enhance operational efficiency, battlefield awareness, and national security capabilities.
Military modernization efforts and technological upgrading have become an integral part of Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy. On May 15, 2026, the Informal Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was convened in Turkistan, Kazakhstan, under the theme “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” Notably, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited the Alem.AI Artificial Intelligence Center in Astana, signaling enhanced cooperation that may ultimately support Kazakhstan’s drive for military digitalization.
While Tokayev downplayed suggestions about the creation of a Turkic military alliance, the recent defense industry deal with Turkiye on the establishment of a facility for the production of ANKA unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Kazakhstan signals Astana’s deepening defense partnership with Ankara, as well as its strong push to diversify military imports. For 2026, Kazakhstan is ranked 58th in the Global Firepower Index, with over $6 billion allocated to security and defense in 2026, an increase of over $700 million from 2025. Moreover, a recent study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute listed Kazakhstan as the 26th-largest arms importer, accounting for 0.9 percent of global arms imports, with Russia accounting for 88 percent of Kazakhstan’s arms imports.
China has become an integral supplier of dual-use goods, military equipment, and high-tech products in the region, as reflected by recent record levels of trade following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. According to China’s General Administration of Customs, exports to Kazakhstan of unmanned aircraft weighing 25 kg to 150 kg increased from $100,000 in 2023 to $1.31 million in 2024, and unmanned aircraft from 250 g to 7 kg increased from $3.7 million in 2022 to $9.7 million in 2024. In 2025, the Chinese company Yesil Technology Company, with support from JSC NC Kazakh Invest, pledged to invest $12 million to establish a drone production facility in Kazakhstan, highlighting the influence of China’s private sector in Kazakhstan’s indigenous technological development. Furthermore, other intermediary goods, including radio navigational aid apparatuses, increased from $12.93 million in 2022 to $48.18 million in 2025; semiconductor-based transducers increased from $370,000 in 2023 to $20.5 million in 2025; and electronic integrated circuits (amplifiers) increased from $188,000 in 2023 to $11.6 million in 2025.
Notably, these intermediary components have been identified by the United States and other Western actors as vital for supporting the Russian war machine as part of the Common High Priority List (CHPL). While exports from China to Kazakhstan of CHPL items have increased from $610 million in 2022 to $931 million in 2025, Kazakhstan has demonstrated a growing appetite for these components, which China has increasingly been willing to fill in the absence of Russian goods.
Such modernization efforts have the potential to enhance Astana’s ability to respond to both traditional and non-traditional security challenges, deter external threats, and monitor border regions while maintaining a high level of operational readiness.
Apart from maintaining internal stability and addressing other non-traditional security challenges, the current military reforms would also help Astana strengthen credible deterrence capabilities and defend its sovereignty in the event of a future conflict in the Indo-Pacific, particularly around the South China Sea, East China Sea, or the Taiwan Strait. Given the current security dynamics in Central Asia, Beijing has generally supported the territorial integrity of Central Asian states, in part to counterbalance Russian influence and protect its extensive investments and infrastructure projects in the region. However, any major conflict in East Asia could force China to redirect significant financial, military, and diplomatic resources eastward, increasing uncertainty with respect to non-traditional security threats, including transnational militant groups, and potentially undermining regional stability.
In addition, a major conflict in East Asia, particularly over Taiwan, could transform Kazakhstan’s transport corridors and energy infrastructure into critical strategic assets. Disruptions to the Strait of Malacca and other maritime chokepoints would force China to reroute high-value cargo and seek alternative energy supplies, sharply increasing demand for the Middle Corridor and other overland networks through Central Asia. As of now, trade capacity through the route is increasing significantly, reaching 2.65 million tons, with projections estimating that it could reach 10 million tons annually by 2027. In the event of future conflict, trade flows through the Middle Corridor could potentially triple or increase even further.
Notably, Kazakhstan’s new military doctrine already reflects this reality, explicitly acknowledging intensifying great power rivalry and the heightened risk of regional conflicts. In Beijing’s grand strategy, the Central Asian states hold significance beyond economics. Although the region’s countries often view their relationship with China primarily through a trade and investment lens, for Beijing, the region carries substantial strategic value. Chinese policymakers are well aware that a potential conflict over Taiwan could severely disrupt maritime trade routes and supply chains, increasing China’s reliance on overland energy corridors and transit networks through Central Asia. This explains why Xi Jinping has praised Kazakhstan for making “important contributions to ensuring the stability of the global supply chain.”
However, in a conflict scenario, Western secondary sanctions could pressure Kazakhstan to restrict Chinese transit volumes to avoid financial isolation, creating a dangerous dilemma for Astana. In such an environment, possessing a technologically advanced, mobile, and credible military would be crucial for Kazakhstan to secure its borders, protect critical infrastructure, and safeguard its own economic sovereignty amid competing security interests.
Kazakhstan’s military modernization efforts reflect an adaptive response to growing great power competition, notably through the establishment of increasingly defense and tech-oriented partnerships with Turkiye, Israel, Azerbaijan, the United States, and the European Union. While joint military exercises conducted under the CSTO and the SCO may be perceived by the West as ideological coherence with Beijing and Moscow – thus putting Kazakhstan at risk for direct or secondary sanctions – Astana should not reject cooperation with the largest regional partners to avoid economic and security isolation.
Consequentially, Kazakhstan can continue to position itself as a crucial transit hub for regional trade, justifying its military modernization and technological upgrading, including partnerships and investments from Western actors, for the protection of infrastructure critical to BRI projects, Russian oil pipelines, ensuring regional stability, and safeguarding against terrorist threats. Astana must carefully balance its engagement to avoid isolation while benefiting from foreign knowledge, investment, and capacity-building efforts.
Evolving technological trends in modern warfare necessitate Kazakhstan, including other Central Asian states, to develop more robust military education and training programs. In the context of non-traditional security threats, the role of rapid-response forces should be further enhanced through regional joint exercises and intelligence sharing. While Kazakh Defense Minister Dauren Kosanov recently issued a directive on modernizing military training and establishing multi-tier training centers, particular attention should be placed on digitalization and AI. In this regard, expanding air mobility through investment in automation and drone systems will enable a more effective response to security threats across Kazakhstan and the region at large.
