Syria Wants to Replace the Strait of Hormuz

The continuation of that trend amid the current war with Iran has amplified Syria’s central geopolitical and economic pitch—that it can be a potentially transformational corridor for energy flows, commercial trade, and technological connectivity that links Asia to Europe through the heart of the Middle East. With the Strait of Hormuz still effectively closed and insecurity still high in the Red Sea, Syria is proposing to serve as a more direct land-based alternative.

Based on the timeliness of Syria’s geopolitical pitch, its finance minister was asked to attend a G-7 summit in May and Sharaa has been invited to participate in a G-7 summit in mid-June. The sudden elevation of Syria’s engagement with the likes of the G-7 speaks to the perceived significance of what Syria is offering as potential long-term resolutions to the problems generated by the Iran war.

One such opportunity was rolled out at an emergency European Union summit in Cyprus in April, when Sharaa positioned Syria as a solution to European energy security concerns. “Syria, which was once an arena for others’ conflicts, has today chosen … to be a bridge to security and a fundamental pillar of the solution,” he said, calling his country an “alternative and secure artery connecting Central Asia and the Gulf to the heart of the European continent.”

In Cyprus, Sharaa proposed activating the old and never-realized “Four Seas” project, in which Syria would act as a point of commercial and logistics connectivity through railways, roadways, and pipelines that linked maritime channels in the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea, and the Gulf.

Such a transnational project would significantly reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz by establishing a network of overland routes through the Middle East and toward Europe. That public rollout came after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Damascus and Turkey announced an end to customs restrictions with Armenia—both openings necessary for access to and use of the Caspian and Black seas.

By any calculation, the vision conveyed by Sharaa will take many years to realize. The Syria of today lacks the money to pay its own public-sector employees and the country’s reconstruction bill is hundreds of billions of dollars.

Crucially, although much faster in speed, a land route cannot replace what maritime traffic is capable of moving in terms of volume. Until the current war with Iran, 27 percent of the world’s oil, 20 percent of liquefied natural gas, and 30 percent of the world’s fertilizer passed through the Strait of Hormuz. In terms of consumer goods, at least 26 million containers pass through the strait every year, making its closure a threat of global import. For the Gulf states, food security is a major concern, with approximately 85 percent of their collective food supply being imported via the strait.

But if Syria were to realize its ambitions and become a global logistics hub and commercial corridor, that would offset the world’s overreliance on the Strait of Hormuz. Syria could become one alternative overland artery in a network of new ones, spanning from the Gulf, to Egypt, to Jordan.

This would be of enormous global significance—to regional states and Gulf energy producers, to customers in Europe, and, of course, for Syria itself. Iran’s shuttering of the Strait of Hormuz has also surged maritime shipping insurance rates, which, even if peace returns, are not expected to return to pre-conflict levels, thereby making overland transit structurally competitive. More broadly, were it to become what many now hope, Syria’s recovery and prosperity would have significant positive ripple effects for its neighbors, fostering the kind of stability and regional integration that the Levant has rarely, if ever, seen.

It is no accident that Sharaa’s economic vision, which aims to attract international support for Syria’s recovery, aligns with the world’s current security and diplomatic challenges. Without a geopolitical cause, Syria’s calls for investment would likely fall on deaf ears. While cautionary assessments that note how degraded Syria’s infrastructure currently is are undeniably accurate, everything has to start somewhere. And rarely has the Middle East needed causes of hope that promise to facilitate interconnectivity and shared benefit as much as today.

Another opening for Syria comes in response to acute food security concerns in the Gulf, where 85 percent of food is imported via the Strait of Hormuz. While the region’s sizeable food reserves and short-term ability to finance more supplies from other sources have prevented any major shortages, the long-term uncertainty has triggered consideration of alternatives. For example, Saudi Arabia is assessing the feasibility of a high-speed railway line to transport food and other commercial goods from Syria through Jordan to the northern Saudi city of Arar.

Meanwhile, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey have formed a trilateral body aimed at establishing a regional trade corridor that utilizes roadways and, eventually, a revitalized Hejaz Railway line connecting the port of Aqaba with Turkish ports via Syria. Again, the development of regional corridors like these will simultaneously offset reliance on the Strait of Hormuz and position Syria at the heart of alternatives.

Regional energy connectivity also looks set to transform in the coming years, with at least four major transnational oil and gas pipeline projects undergoing technical assessments for rehabilitation and reactivation, or expansion into Syria and beyond—namely the Arab Gas Pipeline (from Egypt to Turkey, via Jordan and Syria), the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline between Iraq and Syria, the Qatar-Turkey pipeline (via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria), and a reactivation of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Syria and Lebanon (via Jordan).

Already, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline linking Azerbaijan into Turkey and north into Europe has been extended south into Aleppo, stabilizing Syria’s northern electricity grid. Such large-scale pipeline projects would redirect oil and gas flows from maritime routes passing through the Strait of Hormuz and ease heightening energy security concerns in Europe.

While these major projects will unquestionably take time to come to fruition, regional energy producers are already using Syria as an alternative route. Iraq is moving oil through Syria and onward to the Mediterranean and European buyers, and some reports suggest that the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf states are doing so, as well.

These strategic projects will require substantial investment from stakeholders seeking to benefit from new routes. In the region, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were the earliest backers, concluding investment deals in energy, air transportation, and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, establishing an East-to-Mediterranean Data Corridor. The UAE is now redoubling its engagement, too, including in its ownership and expansion of the port of Tartus. For now, most of the Middle East’s biggest energy players have already concluded agreements in the oil and gas sector, including QatarEnergy and Arabian Drilling.

Another champion has been the Trump administration, through swift sanctions relief, political backing, and the mediated entry of U.S. energy companies into the Syrian market, including signed deals with Chevron and ConocoPhillips. That support remains vital, as does U.S. President Donald Trump’s promise to remove the Assad-era designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Supporting Syria’s continued stabilization and integration into the international economic and commercial system will also require Syria’s two enemies to back off. One of them, Iran, has suffered great losses in recent months and will likely itself be preoccupied with reconstruction for the immediate future.

But the other adversary, Israel, continues to pursue a policy of weakening and dividing Syria. In fact, without any discernible cause, Israel has significantly escalated its military operations inside Syria over the past two weeks—more than doubling ground incursions into Syria and tripling artillery strikes. Such actions not only threaten to destabilize Syria’s fragile political transition, but they also risk destroying an invaluable opportunity for long-term economic security in an otherwise unstable and unpredictable region.