Why didn’t China develop its own scientific and industrial revolutions when it made so many discoveries and advances over millennia? That is often called “Needham’s question”, named after the historian of Chinese science and tech Joseph Needham.
Why didn’t China develop capitalism during the Song dynasty when it was so close to achieving a breakthrough with trade, commerce, currency and semi-industrialisation, and an emerging merchant class? The Hungarian-French sinologist Etienne Balazs, among others, has famously asked this question.
Why didn’t China develop democracy, the rule of law and limited government when conditions during the Spring and Autumn, and Warring States periods so much resembled early modern Europe, out of which the modern Western state model emerged? Many scholars and newspaper hacks have asked this question.
Why didn’t China become a globe-trotting and seafaring colonial power when the Ming dynasty had ships that sailed halfway or even further around the world? For that, just read any number of silly or sensational books like Gavin Menzies’ 1421: The Year China Discovered the World.
Individually, each question may be interesting or profound, and indeed became programmatic for research in universities and think tanks over many decades. Together, though, they trace an unmistakable Eurocentric logic of looking at China’s millennial history.
There is a fundamental failure of the imagination to recognise that Chinese history, like the history of any society, has its own distinct rhyme and reason. The enduring captivation of all those questions is a testament to the power of Western discourse, which is really a subset of Western imperialist power. Colonialism is not only about stamping a boot on the face of subjugated humanity, it also dictates the categories, assumptions and modes of thinking of people long after outright domination ends.
