Why did David’s Sling fail to protect Israel's South from Iranian missiles? - analysis

Although Israel claims its interception accuracy is 90%, there have been a couple of dozen or so incidents where Israelis have been killed or seriously wounded by Iranian or Hezbollah aerial threats during the current war.

Special attention has been given to the separate hits at Dimona and Arad on Saturday night because, in both cases, it was eventually reported that the failure was with the David’s Sling air defense system.

Several questions arise from these incidents. Part of the scrutiny on David’s Sling stems from the fact that there have been multiple major failures, leaving large numbers of Israelis wounded, not just a single event.

First, why was David’s Sling even used?

For those readers who have tried to keep track of the general differences between the most famous defense systems, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and the Arrow, only the Arrow was originally designed for shooting down long-range ballistic missiles of the kind that Iran fires.

The US has also deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) defense system, which is also designed to shoot down ballistic missiles.

But Iron Dome was supposed to shoot down short-range threats, like simple rockets and drones, and David’s Sling was supposed to shoot down mid-range threats, such as medium-range rockets, cruise missiles, and more complex drones.

All of that changed when the David’s Sling aerial defense system shot down an Iranian ballistic missile in June 2025.

This came in addition to what sources have told The Jerusalem Post are dozens of other kinds of successful shoot-downs during the wars of recent years.

After that success, Israel moved toward integrating David’s Sling into its apparatus for shooting down long-range ballistic missile threats to provide additional options besides the Arrow.

There were multiple reasons to do this.

While the defense establishment has said it has enough interceptors to shoot down Iranian and Hezbollah threats, other sources have indicated concerns about potential eventual shortages.

In addition, the Arrow costs two to three million shekels per interceptor, while David’s Sling reportedly costs only one million per interceptor.

So availability/inventory and costs are two separate reasons; it could make sense to sometimes use David’s Sling in place of the Arrow to defend against Iranian missile threats.

Then, on February 11, the Defense Ministry announced new successful shoot-down drills, with sources telling the Post that the scenarios David’s Sling addressed during the drill were more diverse than in past drills.

Part of what was remarkable about David’s Sling’s shoot-down of an Iranian ballistic missile in June 2025 was that, traditionally, its range has been framed as focused on threats from 40 to 300 kilometers out, not on threats from 1,500 kilometers out like Iranian ballistic missiles.

The drill took place in the shadow of a possible American attack on Iran, which could lead to the Islamic Republic lashing out with its ballistic missiles at Israel.

According to Rafael’s website, David’s Sling combines “innovative steering control, multi- propulsion, and an advanced seeker, it defeats high-volume asymmetric threats including tactical ballistic missiles and large-caliber rockets.”

David’s Sling has now been in operational use for years and used throughout the 2023-2025 Middle East War, including to defend against threats from Iran and Hezbollah.

Director of the Israel Missile Defense Organization, Moshe Patel, stated in February, “During the war, and particularly during Operation Rising Lion, IMDO personnel implemented real-time modifications and adaptations that dramatically enhanced the capabilities of the IAF air & missile defense systems, with David’s Sling in particular.

And yet after all of its past achievements, David’s Sling fell short multiple times this past weekend.

Ran Kochav, former Air and Missile Defense Commander and IDF spokesperson, told the Post on Wednesday that there were several reasons that might explain the missed interceptions.

“The first reason has to do with the policy requiring Israeli commanders to decide in real-time which interceptor matches a specific threat. This involves a strategic choice between systems like Arrow, THAAD, or Iron Dome, including to ‘avoid ‘over-killing a simple rocket with an expensive missile or wasting an interceptor which was not relevant against a threat that another defense system could handle,” said Kochav.

The former air defense chief stated, “We have to calculate our interception inventory, and we have to decide in real time.”

Kochav said that David’s Sling – a tier below the Arrow – has successfully been used to intercept ballistic missiles in the past. But he noted that such decisions can also lead to failure.

Secondly, Kochav said that “technical or engineering malfunctions can occur within systems of radar tracking the aerial threat, the interceptors themselves, or due to the connectivity between the various defense systems.”

This means that it is not only one problem that can go wrong – many issues can go wrong individually, and if any one of them does, a missed shootdown can result.

Third, it is a matter of “statistics,” Kochav said, “It’s a very sophisticated system, but it’s not a hermetic system.”

In other words, even when everything works the way it is supposed to, sometimes an unforeseeable event or some bad luck can lead to a miss.

For example, the Arrow has also missed Iranian missiles, given that it has a high, but not perfect, shoot-down rate.

BESIDES THESE REASONS, it is important to note that David’s Sling intercepts aerial threats at a much lower altitude than the Arrow 3, which intercepts missiles in space.

With David Sling’s interceptions occurring closer to the ground, the chances are higher of wider shrapnel dispersal and more frequent sirens across Israel.

All of this comes against the background where Iran is using 50-70% cluster munitions in its missiles, which have dozens of sub-bomblets that spread over a much broader area, even with a reduced payload as compared to standard missiles.

Two related questions which have been raised with the recent incidents are: 1) Given the Iranian attacks on Israel in April 2024, October 2024, and June 2025, why didn’t Israel go into overdrive to produce more Arrow interceptors so that it would not need to rely on a certain amount of improvising with David’s Sling; and 2) Why didn’t Israel prepare more specifically for the cluster munitions threat?

Part of the answer is that it can take two to three years to produce new interceptors, so even if Israel had tried to sprint to develop many more Arrow interceptors, it might not have been ready in time for this war.

This answer raises questions about whether the war should have been initiated now or in 6-12 months, when there might have been more Arrows ready.

Despite claims by some Israeli officials that Jerusalem was running out of time, many would admit that there was likely around 6-12 months left before Iran would have crossed a ballistic missile red line in terms of quantity.

Some Israeli officials specifically leaked that their calendar had been June 2026 until the Trump administration became more interested in the issue because of Iranian protests in January.

In other words, Israel might have decided to go into this war less prepared defensively to take advantage of the opportunity of having the US involved in the war.

There seems to be little in terms of explanation as to why the IDF did not spend more time preparing for the cluster munitions threat, which caught Israel somewhat blindsided in June 2025.

Likely, the main reason is that Israel has been focused on improving its defenses against classical ballistic missiles and against drones, given that drones caused much more damage over a longer period during the recent wars than cluster munitions.

Put differently, the IDF sometimes has trouble planning for more than one new threat at a time.

Ultimately, it is not clear that Israel could be doing that much better in air defense during this war, but each mass injury incident raises questions, and whether it is David Sling’s recent failure or a failure to fully prepare for cluster munitions, those who are harmed will not be comforted by the general, more positive picture.