“Poland cannot impose its own interpretation of history on Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine must take into account the reactions of Polish society.”
We can clearly see an emotional backlash in both Poland and Ukraine.
Exactly. That is why this is not simply a matter for historians, who can discuss facts. Historians, including Ukrainian historians, have no doubts that the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) killed Polish civilians. The dispute concerns context, moral judgment, values, and methodology. One of the questions is whether retaliatory actions by the [Polish] Home Army (AK) can be judged in the same way as the actions of the UPA.
Every crime should be condemned, but under the law a planned operation is different from an act committed under other circumstances.
Of course. Criminal law distinguishes between premeditated murder, direct intent, conditional intent, and acts committed in the heat of the moment. Historians can make similar distinctions. Coordinated actions carried out under orders should be assessed differently, such as those ordered by Roman Shukhevych in eastern Galicia.
The reconstruction of events that began in Volhynia in February 1943 points to a coordinated campaign. If it was coordinated, there must have been orders. Many Ukrainian historians argue that no such orders existed because no documents have survived. Yet direct German orders to murder Jews during the Holocaust have not survived either, and nobody questions the fact that the Holocaust happened.
The historical debate continues, but historians cannot manage collective social emotions. That is the task of politicians, the state, and its institutions. The problem is that politicians often become hostages of the media and public opinion, which can easily be shaped through social media algorithms, troll farms, and Russian disinformation. The emotions are genuine, and mutual resentment is growing.
So we are dealing with a serious political and social problem that affects both interstate relations and domestic politics. What consequences could this conflict have?
It has another dimension as well. It will affect perceptions of Poles in Ukraine, and even more significantly, perceptions of Ukrainians in Poland – including refugees who bear no responsibility for this dispute and have lived here since the beginning of the [full-scale] war.
It will also affect cooperation between the two states. That cooperation will continue, but it will be burdened by this conflict. In turn, that may have consequences for security.
Ukraine remains at the center of international attention because of a war that affects Europe and the wider world. This is also about the international order: a nuclear power that holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council has invaded another country. That is why so many states support Ukraine.
Yet effective support for Ukraine also requires Poland. Not only because of military assistance, which was especially important during the first phase of the full-scale invasion. Poland played the role of a political engine that helped launch the broader international support effort for Ukraine – both military assistance and support for its European aspirations. Poland was not the only country involved, but it played a key role. It remains important today in terms of logistics and the economy.
Poland is now Ukraine’s second-largest supplier of goods after China.
That benefits both the Polish economy and Ukraine itself. Fuel and other strategic resources are transported through Poland. Poland also remains the main transit hub for millions of Ukrainians.
Could that change?
Imagine a situation in which people begin blocking roads as part of a protest. Transport would be paralyzed. In a democracy, you cannot simply declare a state of emergency and prohibit protests.
Of course, there are alternative routes through Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, but geographically they are less convenient. Likewise, it would be difficult to secure Ukraine’s accession to the European Union if Polish society were strongly opposed to it. EU enlargement requires unanimous approval from all member states.
Ukrainian political elites should have an interest in ensuring that Ukraine evokes positive feelings among Poles. Yet this is also a problem for Poland. Any blockades or tensions would trigger significant pressure from other countries, many of which do not fully understand the role that history and memory play in this part of Europe. For many politicians, pragmatism comes first. Yet both countries have a great deal to lose.
How can this dispute be eased so that it does not negatively affect other areas of bilateral relations?
Experts, journalists, and politicians on both sides are trying to answer that question. We are dealing with a conflict rooted in competing national myths. Escalation and inflammatory rhetoric are not the answer.
We must also accept that a complete resolution may be impossible. What could help are gestures showing that Ukraine understands the emotions of Polish society. For example, acknowledging that the UPA was not only a force fighting against Russia, but also an organization responsible for crimes.
It would also help to stop equating atrocities with retaliatory actions and to clearly acknowledge that the UPA was responsible for the murders of civilians. Such a signal could help calm emotions.
“It is a vicious circle that we will probably have to live with for a long time.”
I often hear claims that Poland wants to write Ukraine’s history and dictate its memory policy.
Poland does not want to write Ukraine’s history textbooks. It simply wants a correction in how the actions of the UPA are assessed and does not want people responsible for crimes to be placed on a pedestal.
Poland also does not want certain narratives to become examples to emulate. International law concerning the prevention of atrocities speaks to this issue as well. Experts understand the nuances, but the broader public often does not.
I do not know whether President Zelensky could be persuaded to take such a step today. However, the upcoming anniversaries [July 11] related to Volhynia could create an opportunity for symbolic gestures.
Ukrainian politics can be highly pragmatic. President Volodymyr Zelensky himself paid very little attention to the UPA during the early years of his presidency.
That is true. But he also did not reverse the decisions of his predecessors. Today he needs to maintain broad political support, including among more nationalist circles. A gesture toward Poland could be portrayed as weakness and expose him to criticism. In that way, Poland could become a factor in Ukraine’s domestic political struggles.
Ukraine has recently issued additional permits for Polish exhumation work.
I am very pleased about that. A real breakthrough, however, would be simplifying the procedures so that permits become a straightforward administrative decision. At present, separate approvals are required for searches and exhumations, and each process involves numerous formalities.
I understand the realities of war and security concerns. I also see goodwill on the Ukrainian side. But for a long time, Poland’s friends of Ukraine struggled to explain to the public why exhumations of Polish victims were impossible while exhumations of German Wehrmacht soldiers were taking place.
That is also grist for the mill of Russian propaganda.
And Putin is already exploiting it. Both the Volhynia issue and, for example, the funeral of Andriy Melnyk, which is not directly connected to the Polish-Ukrainian historical dispute.
Today, issues related to the UPA and Volhynia seem difficult for much of Western public opinion to understand. But I have the impression that this may change over time.
Once the war ends, and if relations with Belarus and perhaps even Russia become somewhat less tense, Ukraine may once again face more critical scrutiny. That is why drawing lessons from the current dispute is important.
Both sides have expectations. Poland expects recognition that a planned ethnic cleansing campaign against Poles took place. Ukraine expects understanding that the cult of the UPA is primarily anti-Russian in character and is not intended to justify murder.
Poland cannot impose its own interpretation of history on Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine must take into account the reactions of Polish society. It is a vicious circle that we will probably have to live with for a long time.
Further dialogue is essential. Some argue that dialogue has produced no results, but it has. Just imagine how much more intense this conflict would be if there had been no dialogue at all. The absence of dialogue could easily lead to outright hostility.
At the same time, a correction of certain elements of Ukraine’s memory policy could bring significant benefits and provide Ukraine’s friends with much stronger arguments in defense of good relations between our two countries.
