This article was written and researched as part of the second cohort of 38 North’s Emerging Scholars Fellowship Program, under the mentorship of senior experts on North Korean affairs. The program and series were made possible through generous support by the Henry Luce Foundation. For more papers in this series, click here.
The landscape of modern warfare contains only one constant variable: change. This modernity has brought forth a necessity to evolve at an increased speed than previous generations of warfighting have required. The rapid emergence of dual-use technological applications and the increased lethality of existing tactical concepts and defense industry advancements have emphasized the need for modern militaries to effectively handle change management.
Often, the best way to gauge the functionality of a military and its ability to adapt occurs in wartime as opposed to times of peace. North Korea’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has provided a profound opportunity to observe the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) adaptability to emerging, critical-use technologies on the battlefield.
Since April 2025, an estimated 11,000-15,000 DPRK troops have been deployed to Russia with varying reports showing higher estimated numbers. With this large-scale engagement, it could be assumed that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has been exposed to a variety of modern warfare techniques and technologies, especially drone warfare.
North Korea’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrates a sophisticated capacity for tactical and institutional flexibility. Within its traditional military doctrinal framework, the KPA has gleaned innovative operational and tactical lessons, particularly with unmanned systems, from this conflict. Ultimately, Pyongyang’s ability to bridge the gap between these technological advancements and legacy doctrine displays a serious commitment to modernization and the integration of emerging technologies on the battlefield.
North Korea’s Military Framework
While North Korea’s recent warfighting experience has likely informed how it thinks about preparation for future wars, the ability to innovate in the pursuit of asymmetric advantages on the battlefield is not a recent occurrence. This ability stems back to the “Four Military Guidelines” set forth by Kim Il Sung in 1962. These guidelines consisted of: arming the population for defense, fortifying for structural defense, training the army as a “cadre” army, and modernizing for self-reliance in defense. Kim Jong Il continued to adhere to these guiding principles, passing them down to the current leader Kim Jong Un as well. While these principles may appear dated, they still have operational relevance, as displayed by the eagerness to recalibrate to the rapidly changing defense landscape in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
It could be assumed that North Korea’s approach to implementing dual-use technologies has been shaped by the guiding principle of juche—broadly defined as self-reliance—which prioritizes regime survival, political control, and asymmetric deterrence. The DPRK’s experience with unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in this conflict potentially represents a way to cultivate asymmetric advantages through deliberate technical adaptation. The seemingly unlimited potential uses of drones, ranging from intelligence gathering to offensive and defensive operations—all at a low financial cost—provide the North Korean military with an opportunity to enhance operational capabilities within its existing military doctrine. This emerging technology enhances its ability to fight, without overturning or overhauling the existing warfighting concepts.
Drones as a Force Multiplier
The proliferation and operationalization of UAS have changed the tactical landscape of modern warfare. The use of drones, which was once reserved for simply niche reconnaissance purposes, has evolved into a versatile multiplier that can be utilized to enhance virtually every aspect of military operations. The conflict between the Russia and Ukraine has proven to be prime ground for evaluating Western and Eastern weapon systems within the context of conventional warfare. The battlefield experience of having to evade enemy attacks while observing friendly forces’ usage of these technologies has alerted the North Korean forces to the utility of these systems.[1] Exposure to drone warfare capabilities in Ukraine has highlighted opportunities to multiply forces across the battlefield in a low-cost, highly effective manner that creates asymmetric warfare capabilities, an integral part of North Korean military doctrine.
Drones can be employed for a variety of methods that are now commonplace on the contemporary battlefield. For reconnaissance purposes, UAS are used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) that supports decision-making for collecting and processing information. This function has fundamentally changed real-time artillery spotting, allowing for both offensive and defensive applications with accuracies that would previously have required guided munitions. Drones can also be used for swarm attacks to overwhelm enemies in a low-cost method that can be used to overburden defensive systems with sheer numbers. These attacks can contain lethal munitions that make kamikaze-style operations highly effective.
The North Korean military has taken an interest in this capability as a potential means to diversify the ways in which their forces can operate and achieve effects on the battlefield. In the face of international sanctions and constrained reserves, the low-cost and asymmetric nature of drone warfare could provide the DPRK with a battlefield equalizing force that can be mass produced. These dual-use systems can support both offensive and defensive operations, allowing them to create effects similar to those of a larger conventional force. Additionally, the ISR application of UAS provides North Korea with an enhanced ability to observe enemy activity. This could aid them with early notification to potential incursions or revealing critical adversarial vulnerabilities, which is considered key to the DPRK for success in the event of a conflict. Investment in this technology, and the experience necessary to master such systems, could increase self-reliance and self-sufficiency to withstand defense against larger adversaries and conduct offensive attacks to create asymmetric advantages.[2]
Adaptation Under Constraint: Battlefield Learning
North Korea’s experience in support of Russian forces in Ukraine has provided a dynamic environment ripe with educational value for operational enrichment. North Koreans have had the unique experience of exposure to both Russian and Western combat tactics and warfighting capability applications. The North Korean infantry and special operations units that have been deployed in the conflict have fought alongside Russian allies, gaining a deeper, first-hand knowledge of how to apply modern warfare techniques. On the other hand, they have been able to face Ukrainian adversaries employing Western warfighting techniques and equipment. This simultaneous educational experience has created a prime environment for battlefield learning.
Working alongside Russian forces, North Korean troops almost certainly have gained direct exposure to a wide range of UAS and drone applications in active combat. The DPRK likely views the current conflict as an opportunity to gain proficiency in the coordination of drone-artillery tactical integration. North Korean forces may have had the opportunity to observe and participate in this proven tactic when used in a complementary manner with infantry units. This application of drone warfighting in conjunction with artillery demonstrates the highly effective results attainable from low-cost UAS used in mass deployments. The nature of this warfighting tactic likely made a favorable impression on the DPRK, as it could potentially be modeled for future conflicts along its own borders. The low-cost nature of these tactics is particularly attractive to the resource-constrained DPRK that seeks to dedicate its resources toward battlefield solutions that feed its desire to create asymmetry and quick-strike forces.
The Ukrainian side of the battlefield has potentially offered additional value for operational and tactical education, potentially compelling DPRK forces to adjust to Western tactics. Exposure to combat appears useful in understanding how to counter UAS. In the initial phases of this deployment, North Korean troops were frequently labeled as inexperienced fighters—with many referring to them as “cannon fodder” resulting in high-casualty operations. However, recent assessments suggest a different picture and may indicate adaptation in real time, where North Korean troops appear to have identified gaps in their own counter-UAS capabilities. Particularly, a possible example of this learning comes from its own organic drone defense systems. The observed poor effectiveness of drone jamming tools may have given the North Koreans the ability to adapt, in real-time on the battlefield, to the usage of shotguns as a useful and easily accessible weapon for counter-UAS purposes. They also appear to have adopted advanced camouflaging methods and rapid redeployment strategies consistent with Ukrainian drone operations.
Another significant observable adjustment appears to be the North Korean units’ shift toward small, more agile formations, as opposed to larger, traditional formations. This evolution suggests the ability of DPRK forces to adapt to modern ISR capabilities that come as a result of advanced drone warfighting applications. Additionally, Ukrainian reports show a perceived trend toward advancing technical capabilities from the DPRK forces, which may represent an increase in effectiveness from the earlier stages of the conflict. While this operational experience appears valuable, it may be confined to infantry tactics and small-unit operations. It is important to note the reported absence of combat experience in this war from North Korean aviation, logistical, and artillery units, which do not appear to have been deployed to the region to gain combat experience; this potentially creates a gap in the learning of combined arms integration of this new technology that defines modern warfare. Despite this potential experience shortfall, this increase in operational exposure to advanced drone warfighting tactics provides another compelling example of how real-world feedback on the battlefield can lead to tactical changes.
Strategic Adaptation: Military Doctrine and Drone Integration
It appears that this conflict has displayed adaptability and resilience in the warfighting abilities of North Korean troops. Ultimately, the learning that is gained from this experience in combat alongside the Russians is a demonstration of the DPRK’s capacity for operational evolution from tactical experience while adhering to existing DPRK military doctrine. Within traditional North Korean military doctrine, as set forth by Kim Il Sung, military adaptation needs to primarily serve the interest of the political apparatus and its strategic objectives.
Modernization presents unique challenges within this historically-rooted doctrinal framework of North Korea. A key principle is the ability of North Korea to organically develop its forces. Drone technology and hardware can be adopted due to the low-cost, domestically available quadcopters, and the potential for easily importable hardware from allies producing the same capability. The use of shotguns and traditional weapon systems for counter-drone capabilities shows the ingenuity of DPRK warfighters and their ability to integrate existing technologies for functions in modern warfare. The integration of drones in doctrinal practice could be interpreted as a reflection of a deep understanding from the North Korean military of the need to seek out alternative ways to create asymmetric warfare in the 21st century. Drone warfare also offers a strategic opportunity to leverage accessible technologies. It appears to be no coincidence that Kim Jong Un has emphasized drone development since 2024, a period that aligns with the deepening of the DPRK-Russia relations.
Operationally, the implementation of unmanned aerial systems provides a key link between increasing tactical capabilities and national security objectives of North Korea. Logistically, the ease of acquisition of drone related materials, mass development of this technology, and battlefield experience positions the North Koreans to integrate these systems with formidable lethality. The potential for overwhelming offensive operations, using swarm attacks and ISR capabilities create conditions for maximally effective rocket force deployment to deliver crippling losses for adversaries. Further, ISR employment could provide real-time targeting that could lay the groundwork for opportune artillery strikes or special operations infiltration. The ability of UAS to compound the effects of North Korean operational strengths make it a prime example of how the DPRK can increase asymmetrical warfare advantages whilst remaining in the framework of their supremely valued military doctrines.
Conclusion
Fundamentally, the ability to evolve with UAS technologies and drone warfare demonstrates that military innovation does not occur despite doctrinal restraints, but rather it happens because of them. The operational ability and willingness displayed by DPRK troops actively fighting alongside its Russian allies and the military-political structure of North Korea serve as significant examples of its commitment to modernization. By implementing these emerging technologies through the lens of creating an even more self-reliant national defense, Pyongyang has displayed an openness to learning and adaptation in ways that will create asymmetric advantages on the battlefield.
The exposure to combat in Ukraine and initiative to deploy troops to the region show the seriousness that the DPRK places on this modernization and adaptation. This selective engagement with dual-use technology serves as an example of a likely similar trajectory and implementation approach from the DPRK that will be applied to future emerging technologies to continue to create asymmetric warfighting advantages that serve the strategic political objectives of North Korea.
- [1]
Hyun‑Ho Choi, Kyeong Woon Jeong, and Il‑Soo Bae, “A Study on the Establishment of Counter‑Drone System and the Concept of Integrated Multi‑Domain Defense,” The International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2024), pp. 323–334. https://doi.org/10.17703/IJACT.2024.12.4.323.
- [2]
Hinata‑Yamaguchi, Ryo, Defense Planning and Readiness of North Korea: Armed to Rule, 1st ed. (Abingdon, Oxon, and New York: Routledge, 2021), ISBN 9780367771102.
