Hungary election: What’s at stake for Ukraine, Russia, and the EU?
A pivotal moment for Europe, Ukraine, and others, as Viktor Orbán faces his biggest challenge in years in a vote that has implications beyond Hungary.
Kyiv Post
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As Hungarians head to the polls this Sunday, April 12, the outcome of the parliamentary elections – widely billed as one of the most consequential in the country’s post-communist era – will be watched anxiously in Kyiv, Brussels, and other European capitals.
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has ruled as a self-styled illiberal democrat since 2010, has repeatedly acted as a spoiler of Western unity.
Despite Hungary’s membership in the European Union and NATO, he has often broken ranks with allies on key foreign-policy issues and maintained unusually warm ties with the Kremlin, even after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – earning a reputation as the EU’s most pro-Russian leader.
But for the first time in 16 years, Orbán’s grip on power faces a credible challenge from Péter Magyar, a former senior figure in his governing Fidesz party. Magyar resigned from the right-wing grouping in 2024 and has since emerged as the leader of the center-right opposition Tisza party, seeking to unseat the nationalist leader.
As the high-stakes election nears, we take a closer look at how Orbán and Magyar have positioned themselves on crucial foreign policy issues – and whether a potential Tisza victory would mark a shift in Budapest’s strained relations with Kyiv and the EU.
War next door
At the heart of those debates is Russia’s war in Ukraine, now in its fifth year. After Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion in 2022, the EU moved swiftly to support Kyiv, but its efforts have repeatedly been obstructed by Orbán.
Opinion polls suggest the party of pro-European conservative Peter Magyar -- who has promised a “system change” -- is running well ahead of that of Orban.
The Hungarian leader has held up several of the bloc’s support packages for Ukraine, most recently a €90 billion loan, and has been a vocal critic of sanctions on Moscow.
He has also opposed Ukraine’s accession to the EU – a step requiring unanimous approval from all 27 member states – claiming it would “ruin the Hungarian economy.”
Orbán has made anti-Ukrainian rhetoric a central pillar of his campaign, regularly portraying Magyar and Tisza as pawns of Kyiv and the Western alliance intent on dragging Hungary into Russia’s war.
Cautious continuity on Ukraine
Magyar, however, has struck a more measured tone. While he has condemned Moscow’s full-scale invasion and identified Russia as the aggressor, he has not offered a radical break with Orbán’s core policies on the war.
Tisza’s manifesto, unveiled in February, explicitly rules out sending weapons or troops to Kyiv under a future Tisza-led government.
Magyar has also rejected Ukraine’s fast-track accession to the EU and has said he would put the question of Kyiv joining the bloc to a national referendum.
At the same time, he has emphasized the need to protect the rights of ethnic Hungarians in western Ukraine – an issue that has long been a source of friction between the two neighbors.
While Fidesz and pro-government media have stoked fears that a Tisza-led government would introduce mandatory conscription, Magyar has firmly ruled it out.
“There will be no war under the Tisza government, and there will be no conscription. Anyone who claims otherwise is lying,” he said in January.
Pragmatic but wary of Moscow
Magyar has likewise dismissed any abrupt severing of ties with Moscow, acknowledging Hungary’s heavy dependence on Russian energy imports. Tisza aims to phase out Russian energy sources by 2035—considerably slower than the European Commission’s 2027 target.
Anita Orbán, who oversees Tisza’s foreign policy and has no family relation to the prime minister, has signaled that dialogue with Moscow will remain necessary to protect Hungary’s national interests.
Yet Magyar has accused Moscow of meddling in the election to prop up the Kremlin-friendly Orbán. Last month, he claimed that operatives from Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, had arrived in Budapest to help tilt the vote in the government’s favor.
The Washington Post also reported in March that Russian intelligence had proposed staging an assassination attempt on Orbán in a bid to boost his popularity.
Conciliatory yet nationalist
On relations with the EU, Magyar has signaled a more conciliatory approach than Orbán, though without embracing deeper political integration.
The top priority for him remains unlocking billions of euros in EU funds currently frozen over rule-of-law disputes. The objective, he has suggested, is financial stabilization and restored credibility rather than ideological alignment with a more federal Europe.
“I’m not a big fan of this federal European superstate, so I believe in strong member states and a strong EU,” he has stated.
Magyar has said he would join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the EU body tasked with investigating fraud against the bloc’s budget.
The move is widely seen as key to unlocking roughly €20 billion in frozen funds and signaling a break with what critics describe as years of procurement corruption under Fidesz rule.
Tisza’s election manifesto states that the party will “set a foreseeable and achievable target date” for introducing the euro.
Absorbing Orbánism
However, Magyar has also signaled clear limits to any pro-European shift, particularly on issues tied to national sovereignty. Tisza has expressed opposition to the EU’s Migration Pact, which requires member states to either accept relocated asylum seekers or make financial contributions to countries under migratory pressure.
The proposal has been fiercely opposed by nationalist parties across the bloc, which argue it undermines national control over migration policy.
As TVP World’s political editor Stuart Dowell wrote: “To defeat Orbán, Magyar has had to absorb him.”
Rather than challenging the nationalist framework that has long defined Hungarian politics, the opposition leader has largely operated within it.
Will Magyar drop the veto weapon?
Even so, while policy differences may be limited, a Tisza victory could see Budapest emerge as a more cooperative partner for Brussels.
The party, which is leading Fidesz in most independent polls, has said it would abandon what it describes as the current government’s “inflated” use of veto power within the EU, favoring alliances and negotiations over Orbán-era confrontation.
That could help ease Hungary’s long-running tensions with EU institutions should the party win the election.
See this Explainer for TVP World by Ammar Anwerhere.
