Wisdom in foreign policy begins with the ability to distinguish problems that can be resolved from problems that can be managed but not fixed.
A host of U.S. presidents had to learn this lesson the hard way. George W. Bush thought overthrowing Saddam Hussein would transform the broader Middle East. Barack Obama thought terminating the reign of Muammar al-Qaddafi would stabilize Libya and accelerate the Arab Spring.
Neither proved correct. Managing and containing these threats would have been far preferable to the damaging knock-on effects that flowed from the failed attempts to eliminate them—effects that continue to plague Europe and the Middle East today.
Now, President Donald Trump has fallen into the same trap, believing that he can end rather than manage and mitigate the challenges posed by Iran. It is already evident, more than three weeks into the joint U.S.-Israeli military operation, that airpower alone will not produce regime change in Iran, despite its effectiveness in eliminating specific Iranian leaders.
Similarly, while airstrikes are undoubtedly reducing the number of Iranian ships and missile launchers, they cannot erase Iran’s nuclear know-how. Nor can they eliminate Iran’s elusive drone force or its readily concealable arsenal of mines, fast-attack patrol ships, torpedoes, and other means of attacking the transportation routes and critical infrastructure on which the Persian Gulf states and the world economy depend.
Ground troops cannot fix this problem either. Small-scale special operations are almost certainly incapable of securing the well-defended coastline along the Strait of Hormuz or destroying Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, let alone preventing Iran from attacking vulnerable Gulf state energy facilities or vital desalination plants.
Even a cursory examination of Iran’s topography—a vast mountainous expanse tailor-made for thwarting invasions—makes clear that a full-scale ground operation would require a force at least as large as the entire U.S. Army and would almost certainly entail both conscription and casualties far beyond those suffered in Iraq, Vietnam, and Korea. It would take months for the U.S. military to prepare for such an operation, and the American people are highly unlikely to support one.
If eliminating Iranian threats is proving to be well-nigh impossible, what can Trump do to manage them? One possibility—a strategy of “mowing the lawn”—would be modeled on Israel’s periodic attacks on its enemies’ arsenals each time they are replenished. Trump would effectively declare victory and end bombing operations while preserving the ability to resume attacks if and when Iran rebuilds its damaged military infrastructure.
This face-saving option is superficially attractive, but in the case of Iran, it would be deeply problematic. Among other complications, it assumes that Iran would cease its current attacks if the United States called a temporary halt to its own. In fact, the Iranians would have little reason to reciprocate any unilateral U.S. cease-fire absent guarantees that they would not face another round of attacks down the road. Intensifying the economic pressure on Trump—who is surely aware of the perils that await him in midterm elections if gas and food prices are skyrocketing and recession is looming—is Iran’s best means of getting such assurances.
Given that the war cannot end without Iran’s consent, how can Trump find a way to address Tehran’s core concerns while still mitigating the challenges that it poses, and what might such a deal look like?
Any successful deal would have to secure an enduring cease-fire between the United States and Iran while also encompassing Israel. Ideally, Iran would commit to stopping all attacks on Israel, either direct or by proxy, while the United States would ensure that Israel ceases all attacks on Iran or allied organizations such as Hezbollah. Moreover, Tehran would renew its stated commitment to never pursue nuclear weapons, fully open the Strait of Hormuz, and commit to denominating at least half of its oil sales in U.S. dollars rather than the Chinese yuan.
In exchange, Washington would grant sanctions exemptions to countries prepared to finance Iran’s reconstruction. It would also permit a specified group of states—such as China, India, South Korea, Japan, Turkey, Iraq, and others in the Gulf—to resume trade with Tehran and the purchase of Iranian oil, thereby easing global energy prices.
For Tehran, however, reconstruction-linked sanctions relief is vital: Absent relief, Iran faces sustained economic erosion—conditions that the clerical leadership fears would signal vulnerability and invite further attacks by Israel or the United States, much as perceived weakness did before.
Crucially, this agreement would just be a first step. Ideally, it would be swiftly followed by renewed nuclear negotiations aimed at eliminating Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium and, in keeping with Trump’s red line, ending any possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
Here, Russia’s role as a potential mediator might prove useful. Moscow has offered to store Iranian highly enriched uranium on its own territory as a key part of a nuclear deal. The Iranians no longer trust Trump’s own envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and the White House’s apparent disregard for the advice of the Omani foreign minister makes his continued mediation role insufficient. In this context, Washington should consider Russia’s offer to help broker a compromise deal.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has numerous incentives to play peacemaker. Doing so would bolster Russia’s prestige and influence on the world stage. What’s more, Moscow has long opposed Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, which would pose a threat to Russia as well as to stability on its southern periphery.
And while Moscow is currently benefiting from the short-term windfall of higher energy prices, those benefits will diminish if the world slides into a prolonged recession and global demand for oil and gas declines for an extended period. Forging a deal that defangs Iran’s nuclear capabilities while creating an enduring end to the war is very much in Russia’s self-interest.
Not only is Putin friendly with Trump, but he is also unusually well-positioned to talk with all sides in this deepening crisis. Russia has long had a robust diplomatic presence in Tehran and extensive contacts in Iran’s military and security circles. As a major energy producer, Russia has deep relationships with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf energy powers. Moreover, Putin has met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dozens of times over the past decade—far more often than he has met with U.S. and European leaders.
This is a deal based on compromises that are certain to face stiff resistance in both Washington and Tehran. Many of these concessions will strike critics as unrealistic, even untenable. Under ordinary circumstances, such steps would be inconceivable. But these are not ordinary circumstances, and neither country has the luxury of treating them as such.
For instance, offering sanctions relief to the Islamic Republic is politically sensitive in Washington, although Trump has already opened the door to this by lifting sanctions on Iranian that was already oil at sea. Tehran, for its part, will likely balk at the idea of giving up its stockpile of enriched uranium, as it has historically constituted the crown jewel of its nuclear leverage. But the alternative to these compromises is a prolonged war that will destroy Trump’s presidency and impoverish Iran.
The United States and Iran are trapped in a conflict in which each new escalation only deepens a shared, losing predicament. Neither can compel the other’s surrender. Sooner rather than later, both will confront the urgency of finding an off-ramp—one that does not hinge on the other’s humiliation.
Any viable exit will require each side to claim a measure of victory. Like it or not, they are in the same boat: They will either sink or make it to shore together.
