The US and Israel have cooperated to achieve impressive operational successes against Iran, but a mutually shared definition of victory remains elusive. This inconsistency and lack of clarity could undermine the partners’ ability to achieve durable strategic objectives.
The militaries of both countries have targeted Iranian air defense and missile launch assets, with Israel also eliminating many regime officials, and the US specializing in targeting hardened facilities and naval vessels. These differences in target selection may be influenced by differing goals between the two countries, especially when viewed alongside disparate articulations of the operation’s desired end state made by members of the Trump administration.
In the current conflict, Washington and Jerusalem are coordinating and cooperating extensively in planning, intelligence sharing, and combat operations. US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper stated that “the two most powerful air forces in the world are dominating the skies.”
That cooperation has enabled a remarkable pace of operations, evidenced by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir’s announcement on March 5 that the IDF had employed more than 6,000 munitions as part of Operation Roaring Lion, with Israeli Air Force total sorties surpassing 1,600 by March 3.
Meanwhile, the first 24 hours of the US campaign featured nearly twice as much firepower as 2003’s “shock and awe” campaign against Iraq, according to Admiral Cooper. He also noted that in just the first 100 hours, US forces had already struck nearly 2,000 targets with more than 2,000 munitions.
Both militaries have extensively targeted Iran’s integrated air defense system to enable follow-on strikes. They are also both prioritizing going after Tehran’s missile and drone capabilities in an increasingly successful effort to reduce retaliatory fire. As of March 5, the IDF claimed that it had “neutralized” more than 300 Iranian ballistic missile launchers. A CENTCOM operational update on March 3 referenced degrading Iran’s air defenses and the destruction of “hundreds of Iran’s ballistic missiles, launchers, and drones,” focusing on “shooting all the things that can shoot at us.” That effort resulted in a 90 percent drop in Iranian ballistic missile launches and an 83 percent drop in drone launches by March 5.
However, Israel and the US are not always aiming their weapons at the same set of targets. Israel has prioritized hitting regime officials and military leaders, while the US has taken responsibility for degrading the Iranian Navy and is striking hardened targets with Tehran’s bomber fleet.
Even after Israel eliminated Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and more than 40 other senior officials on the first day of the war, Jerusalem has continued targeting their replacements and other regime and military leaders. On March 4, Israel struck four Basij command centers in Tehran, and a regime compound containing the headquarters of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Intelligence Directorate, the Basij paramilitary force, the Quds Force, internal security forces, and cyber warfare units. Israeli media reported that an IDF source described the strike as involving more than 250 bombs.
Then, on March 5, the IDF targeted the headquarters of the special unit responsible for all internal security forces, along with other strikes on the IRGC, the Basij, and a central command center for internal security forces.
Meanwhile, the US is using bomber aircraft, which Israel does not operate, to drop huge quantities of larger munitions that can hit hardened targets deep underground. In particular, Cooper stated on March 5 that in the hour preceding the press conference at which he was speaking, B-2 stealth bombers dropped dozens of 2,000-pound bombs on underground Iranian missile sites. The Pentagon has also made it a point to strike Iranian naval assets, confirming as of March 5 that more than 30 regime vessels have been sunk. This total includes the sinking of an Iranian warship in the Indian Ocean by a submarine-launched torpedo. An Iranian drone carrier comparable in size to a World War II-era aircraft carrier was also struck.
While the US and Israeli operations have been closely integrated and share the goal of eliminating Iran’s air defenses and offensive capabilities, the differences in targeting choices and statements by leaders indicate that the two countries may diverge in their desired end states.
At the beginning of the current conflict, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel’s objective is to “put an end to the threat from the Ayatollah regime in Iran.” The elimination of senior Iranian leaders in Israel’s opening salvos underlined Jerusalem’s commitment to this goal. Meanwhile, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on the first day of the conflict that US objectives were the destruction of Iran’s missiles, missile production capability, navy, and ability to pursue a nuclear weapon. On March 2, US President Donald Trump largely echoed Hegseth’s stated goals. However, on March 6, Trump expressed a demand for Iran’s “unconditional surrender.”
Changing and unclear US goals may diverge from Israel’s, which could partially explain some differences in target selection. A similar phenomenon was evident in the 12-Day War when Washington pressured Jerusalem to end its combat operations. If the Trump administration cannot articulate a consistent set of goals—and the US and Israel cannot agree on them—this divergence could negatively impact both countries’ ability to obtain long-lasting strategic objectives.
Justin Leopold-Cohen is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP), where Ryan Brobst is the deputy director.
