The summit meeting between the leaders of the United States and China in May 2026 introduced a “new positioning” of bilateral ties. Described as “very successful” by U.S. President Donald Trump and equally praised by his counterpart President Xi Jinping of China as a “historic and landmark,” the summit appeared to have stabilized a bilateral relationship that has grown increasingly competitive. The summit saw Trump and Xi agreeing to manage economic tensions through measures to “enhance stability and build confidence.”
Xi announced the year 2026 might “open up a new chapter in China-U.S. relations.” Sure enough, the summit concluded by introducing a new framework to govern relations between the two superpowers: Constructive Strategic Stability. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, this concept entails pursuing stability and peace “with cooperation as the mainstay,” where differences are managed effectively and competition kept “within proper limits.”
During the Shangri-la Dialogue, when asked about how the U.S. views this framing, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth elaborated that the framework rests upon “mutual respect,” “a recognition of capabilities and power,” and communication.
Yet, despite the diplomatic significance of this framework, the concept of “constructive strategic stability” remains – perhaps intentionally – vague. While analysts have broadly interpreted it as a managed strategic competition within limits, it’s unclear how both sides can operationalize and advance such a relationship in practice. Given that the term coincides with the traditional concept of “strategic stability” in nuclear studies – commonly understood as stability in both a nuclear crisis and an arms race – the question remains as to how both Washington and Beijing can advance a strategic relationship that is stable and constructive.
One possible starting point that might initialize “constructive strategic stability” relations in the nuclear domain would be the recognition of mutual vulnerability. Working from the baseline of a mutually vulnerable relationship would establish the strategic foundation necessary to widen the aperture for subsequent dialogues on risk reduction, crisis management, and arms control. Most importantly, such a move would advance Hegseth’s listed factors of respect, recognition, and communication such that it would be politically palatable for the United States to consider.
First, acknowledging mutual vulnerability fulfills the pillar of recognizing capabilities and power. By professing that neither party can reliably escape catastrophic retaliation in a nuclear exchange, both sides irrevocably recognize the capabilities, survivability, and destructive potential of the other’s nuclear arsenal.
Chinese quantitative and qualitative modernization of its nuclear arsenal, along with its “shell game” strategy and road-mobile launchers, has vastly increased the survivability of its nuclear forces. As China’s nuclear arsenal becomes more sophisticated and survivable, its second strike capability has become increasingly credible; there are serious doubts surrounding U.S. capability to fully neutralize China’s nuclear threat with a first strike.
As a result, a growing number of experts have thus argued for the United States to forgo its damage limitation strategy. Instead, Washington should recognize the strategic reality that improvements in China’s second strike capability has engendered a relationship of mutual vulnerability.
Second, the recognition of vulnerability can also serve the purpose of respect. Given that Washington has long denied recognizing a mutually vulnerable relationship, such a shift would signal to Beijing that the U.S. is now viewing China’s nuclear arsenal and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a serious and credible strategic competitor. Such a recognition is imperative, particularly given that China has long called for negotiations and dialogues to be conducted with the U.S. on the basis of mutual respect and equality. As such, establishing a relationship based on respect, including in the military domain, would be highly conducive for subsequent talks.
More importantly, recognition of mutual vulnerability could also address one of the drivers behind China’s nuclear proliferation and modernization. Analyst Tong Zhao has observed that a key impetus behind China’s nuclear expansion stems from its belief that possessing a stronger nuclear arsenal and deterrent would force the United States to treat China as a peer equivalent. By this logic, a U.S. recognition of China’s growing military prowess would grant China the standing and recognition that Beijing has consistently sought. While such recognition may not necessarily halt Chinese nuclear modernization, it may reduce the pressures for further expansion by providing the status and prestige that China seeks. In this sense, beyond establishing a strategic relationship based on respect, acknowledging mutual vulnerability may also carry the effect of reducing a nuclear arms race.
Lastly, affirming mutual vulnerability would provide a practical basis for both the United States and China to engage in further communication and dialogues. As the admission of mutual vulnerability creates an image of shared risks and vulnerability, this shared concern would provide a lowest common denominator for both states to work on. Consequently, both sides become incentivized to discuss meaningful crisis management, risk reduction, or even arms control dialogues.
Beijing has typically been recalcitrant on engaging with the U.S. on arms control dialogues, citing the numerical disparity in nuclear weapons. A U.S. acknowledgment of mutual vulnerability could motivate Chinese participation in such talks. Despite clear quantitative differences, if the White House admits that China’s nuclear capabilities does pose a genuine strategic threat to the U.S. due to its qualitative capabilities, the rationale for the necessity of arms control agreements is strengthened. In this sense, the admission of mutual vulnerability is not an endpoint but a basis for further communication.
Granted, critics may argue that a formal acknowledgement of mutual vulnerability would undermine the credibility of U.S. security commitments to its allies and partners, or even embolden Chinese conventional actions. These points are valid and should hold considerable weight during evaluations. However, as confessed by the former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, the United States is unable to “stop, slow down, disrupt, interdict or destroy” Chinese missiles nor can Washington stop Beijing’s continual development of its nuclear capability. The somber reality is that the U.S. can no longer credibly deny Chinese nuclear attacks.
Refusing to acknowledge the reality of vulnerability will not make it go away. The United States should accept its vulnerability and operate around this new strategic reality. Indeed, only by being frank in its assessment can the U.S. produce a credible plan to strengthen its extended deterrence commitments and respond to China.
Fundamentally, this recognition of mutual vulnerability should not be taken as a U.S. admission of China attaining nuclear parity in terms of arsenal size or capability, nor should it be regarded as the PLA achieving military parity with the U.S. military. Instead, acknowledging mutual vulnerability anchors China-U.S. relations in present strategic realities, which establishes a baseline from which “constructive strategic stability” can operate and build on. By grounding China-U.S. relations in respect, recognition of capabilities and power, and meaningful communication, the United States and China can begin actualizing the idea of constructive strategic stability. From this view, if Beijing and Washington are serious about furthering their relations based on constructive strategic stability, it should begin with a recognition of mutual vulnerability.
