Has China Really Entered the Three-Carrier Era?

At first glance, the transit may appear to be part of routine training for China’s newest aircraft carrier. Yet its strategic significance should not be underestimated. The Fujian’s passage through one of Asia’s most sensitive waterways comes amid a broader pattern of Chinese military and maritime law-enforcement activity around Taiwan. Beijing’s Ministry of National Defense described the operation as routine training and indicated that similar activities would continue in the future. 

Foreign media have largely interpreted the transit in the context of Taiwan’s recent rapid combat-readiness drills and China’s growing use of coast guard and maritime safety vessels east of Taiwan. Taken together, these developments suggest that Beijing is experimenting with a layered pressure campaign, combining naval and air power, coast guard enforcement, and aircraft carrier training to test Taiwan’s responses across multiple domains.

However, the transit should also be assessed in light of the current state of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) three-carrier force. The Liaoning recently returned to its home port in Qingdao after more than 40 days of operations in the Western Pacific. The Fujian’s southward movement at this moment suggests that its next phase of training may focus on the South China Sea, potentially involving coordination with the Shandong’s carrier aviation units or operating within the broader framework of China’s southern maritime strategy. 

Yet the current size and maturity of China’s carrier aviation force remain insufficient to fully support three operational carriers at the same time. Although China now possesses three aircraft carriers, its available carrier-based aircraft, pilots, deck crews, and maintenance capacity do not yet appear adequate to meet the full operational demands of a three-carrier navy.

This limitation is closely related to the different launch and recovery systems used by China’s carriers. The PLA has long emphasized a “small steps, fast running” approach to naval modernization, using successive platforms to test and incorporate new technologies. This approach has enabled rapid technological progress, but it has also produced two distinct carrier aviation systems. The Liaoning and Shandong rely on ski-jump launch systems, while the Fujian is equipped with an electromagnetic aircraft launch system. As a result, China’s three-carrier fleet is not simply a matter of having three hulls. It requires the development and management of two different carrier aviation ecosystems.

China’s industrial capacity is unlikely to be the main bottleneck; the Chinese navy can almost certainly build additional aircraft. The more difficult question is whether it has enough qualified carrier pilots and flight deck personnel capable of operating under two different launch-and-recovery systems. 

Carrier aviation is not merely an extension of land-based air force operations. Pilots must master night operations, poor-weather recoveries, high-tempo launch and recovery cycles, complex electromagnetic environments, and the unique demands of operating from a moving deck at sea. The transition from ski-jump operations to electromagnetic catapult operations adds another layer of complexity. Although the commissioning and testing of the Fujian marks a new stage in Chinese carrier aviation, it does not mean that the PLAN has immediately acquired a mature carrier combat capability.

If the PLAN were to attempt simultaneous full-deck deployments of all three carriers, the strain would be considerable. If the Fujian were to embark around 40 fixed-wing aircraft, the Liaoning and Shandong would each also require their own air wings. In addition, the navy would need backup aircraft, training aircraft, maintenance reserves, replacements for operational losses, and shore-based training units. In practical terms, China would require roughly 100 carrier-capable aircraft, along with a corresponding pool of pilots, deck crews, maintainers, and logistics personnel. 

Under these conditions, the Fujian may actually intensify the developmental pressure created by the coexistence of old and new systems. The Liaoning and the Shandong remain centered on the J-15 system, while the Fujian is expected to integrate aircraft such as the J-15T, J-35, KJ-600, and J-15D. This will complicate training, maintenance, munitions support, avionics integration, flight deck procedures, and pilot conversion.

The Fujian’s southward movement also highlights the continuing importance of the South China Sea in China’s maritime strategy. For Beijing, the South China Sea is not merely a sovereignty dispute; it is also a training ground for blue-water naval operations. By moving the Fujian southward, the PLAN appears to be shifting the carrier’s training environment from near-shore waters toward the semi-operational environment of the South China Sea. There, the carrier can take advantage of the support infrastructure at Sanya on Hainan Island while also exerting pressure on the Philippines and U.S. military activities in the region. 

The timing is also significant: the Fujian’s movement came as the Liaoning returned to port, suggesting that China may gradually seek to establish a training and deployment circuit linking the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Western Pacific.

At the same time, China still lacks the ability to sustain full three-carrier operations. The Shandong has reportedly been in a carrier-capable dry dock at the Yulin naval base in Sanya since late January 2026. Media reports in February indicated that China was conducting its first carrier maintenance operation at Yulin, using dry dock facilities developed after 2022 to support aircraft carrier repairs and maintenance. This suggests that the Shandong is undergoing a substantial maintenance period rather than a short port call. Open-source satellite observers also noted in early May that imagery from April 26 still showed the Shandong in dry dock, more than three months after it reportedly entered the facility on January 20.

This pattern points to a likely division of labor among China’s three carriers. The Liaoning is being used for long-range power projection and operational signaling; the Fujian remains in a testing and training phase as China’s first electromagnetic-catapult carrier; and the Shandong is undergoing major maintenance. In other words, China may have entered the three-carrier era, but it has not yet entered the era of three fully mature carrier air wings and three complete maintenance and logistics systems operating simultaneously.

The strategic implication of the Fujian’s Taiwan Strait transit is therefore twofold. On the one hand, it demonstrates China’s continued determination to normalize carrier operations in politically sensitive waters and to integrate aircraft carriers into its broader pressure campaign against Taiwan. On the other hand, it also reveals the constraints behind China’s carrier expansion. 

The PLAN is moving rapidly, but it is still learning how to sustain carrier aviation at scale. The key question is not simply whether the Fujian can sail through the Taiwan Strait, but whether China can generate enough aircraft, pilots, deck crews, and maintenance capacity to support two or more carrier strike groups in continuous and credible operations.

For Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific region, this means that the Fujian should not be dismissed as a symbolic platform. Its transit reflects the direction of China’s naval modernization and its desire to link the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Western Pacific into a single operational theater. Yet the event should also be interpreted with caution. China’s carrier force is growing more capable, but it remains in transition. Beijing has entered the age of three carriers, but not yet the age of fully mature three-carrier operations.