Italy’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Turns Toward Defense Contracts

When Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto attended this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the visit attracted little attention in Europe. Yet Rome’s presence at Asia’s premier security forum was only one element of a broader pattern that has emerged over the past year. From expanding defense cooperation with Malaysia to Parliament’s approval of the transfer of the decommissioned aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi to Indonesia, Italy has quietly intensified its engagement with Southeast Asia through military and industrial partnerships rather than traditional diplomacy.

The trend reflects both changing regional dynamics and Italy’s own comparative advantages. As strategic competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asian countries are investing heavily in naval modernization, maritime surveillance, and defense industrial cooperation. While major powers dominate the region’s security architecture, middle powers have found opportunities by offering technology, training, and industrial partnerships instead of formal security guarantees. Italy appears to be embracing precisely this model.

This convergence of industrial and diplomatic objectives is telling. Italy’s defense diplomacy increasingly serves as an enabling framework for its defense industry, while commercial partnerships reinforce Rome’s political relationships throughout Southeast Asia. The result is a mutually reinforcing strategy in which ministerial visits, naval cooperation agreements, military exchanges, and industrial proposals advance broader foreign policy objectives.

Yet the growing coherence of Italy’s approach also exposes its limitations. Unlike France, which maintains permanent military assets and overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific, Italy possesses neither a sustained regional military presence nor the logistical infrastructure necessary to support an expansive security role. Its influence therefore depends on maintaining political engagement, naval deployments, industrial cooperation, and military exchanges over many years. Whether Rome possesses the financial, diplomatic, and military resources to sustain such a long-term commitment remains an open question.

An equally important challenge relates to Europe as a whole. The European Union has repeatedly emphasized the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and has steadily expanded its political engagement with ASEAN. However, defense cooperation in the region continues to be driven overwhelmingly by individual member states. Italy’s recent initiatives illustrate this dynamic. While fully compatible with the EU’s broader objectives, they remain largely national in conception and implementation, reflecting Rome’s own industrial priorities and bilateral partnerships rather than a coordinated European framework.

This creates an inherent strategic dilemma. If the European Union eventually develops a more integrated defense posture toward Southeast Asia, Italy may find itself needing to reconcile an extensive network of bilateral initiatives with common European priorities. Conversely, if European coordination remains limited, Rome risks assuming commitments that could prove difficult to sustain on its own.

Italy’s expanding defense diplomacy should therefore not be interpreted simply as a series of successful arms deals or isolated diplomatic initiatives. Rather, it represents an evolving attempt to redefine Italy’s role in one of the world’s most strategically significant regions through naval cooperation, industrial partnerships, and defense engagement.

Whether this strategy ultimately enhances Italy’s influence will depend less on the success of individual defense contracts than on Rome’s ability to transform growing industrial ties into a coherent regional policy. Unlike France, whose Indo-Pacific presence rests on overseas territories, permanent military assets, and decades of strategic engagement, Italy is attempting to build influence primarily through defense diplomacy and industrial partnerships. Whether this lighter and more commercially driven model proves sustainable – or eventually requires closer alignment with a broader European strategy – remains an open question.