Kim Jong Un’s ‘two hostile states’ declaration: legal implications for the Korean Peninsula

North Korea rewrote the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) charter at the ninth WPK Congress, held Feb. 19-25, 2026, formally enshrining the “two hostile states” framework in the party’s foundational document — a move analysts say institutionalizes a fundamental break from more than 70 years of North Korean inter-Korean policy. Kim Jong Un declared that North Korea “has absolutely nothing to discuss with South Korea, the most hostile entity,” and that it would “permanently exclude South Korea from the category of compatriots.” The WPK charter takes precedence over the North Korean constitution itself, meaning the revision gives the “two hostile states” line the force of supreme party law, not merely political rhetoric.

Analysts assess that the revision struck references to “peaceful reunification of the fatherland,” “grand national unity,” and “common prosperity of the nation” from the previous charter. Since late 2023, the Kim Jong Un regime has been systematically removing terms related to ethnicity and reunification from official documents and state media; the ninth party congress appears to have completed that process at the institutional level. The revised charter also codified Kim Jong Un’s “five-point party-building line for the new era,” further consolidating the monolithic leadership system.

These steps carry significant implications under international law that extend well beyond political rhetoric, raising urgent questions about the Korean Peninsula’s legal status, the validity of inter-Korean agreements, the sustainability of the armistice regime, and the path forward for the international community.

The Korean Peninsula’s dual legal status under international law

North Korea’s “two hostile states” line rests on the premise that two sovereign states coexist on the Korean Peninsula — a position that clashes directly with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 195 (1948) and Article 3 of the South Korean constitution. The U.N. recognized South Korea as “the only lawful government” with effective control and jurisdiction over the Korean Peninsula, while South Korea’s constitution defines the entire peninsula, including the North, as its territory.

Under international law, the criteria for statehood are established by the 1933 Montevideo Convention: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. North Korea meets these criteria and maintains diplomatic relations with more than 160 countries, functioning as a de facto state. Its de jure status, however, is recognized only in relation to those states that have extended recognition; from South Korea’s standpoint, it remains an anti-state organization illegally occupying unrecovered territory.

This legal duality reflects the unique character of the inter-Korean relationship. The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement defined the relationship as “not a state-to-state relationship, but a special relationship provisionally formed in the process of pursuing reunification” — a framework North Korea has now repudiated at the charter level. Under the prevailing view in international law that state recognition has declaratory rather than constitutive effect, Pyongyang’s unilateral declaration cannot alter the peninsula’s legal status. Yet the reality of effective control points to the de facto coexistence of two separate political entities.

Inter-Korean agreements and the collapse of the good-faith framework

With the “two hostile states” framework now embedded in the WPK charter, and Kim Jong Un declaring that North Korea “will not cling in the least to dialogue and cooperation with South Korea,” existing inter-Korean agreements appear to have lost their practical force. These include the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (1991), the June 15 Joint Declaration (2000), the October 4 Declaration (2007), the Panmunjom Declaration (2018), and the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration (2018).

On the legal character of inter-Korean agreements, some scholars argue they should be treated as treaties under international law, but South Korea’s Constitutional Court and Supreme Court have both held that they constitute “agreements of a special character, not treaties.” Even so, the international law principle of good faith (pacta sunt servanda) and the doctrine of estoppel oblige the parties to honor their commitments regardless of treaty status.

The Panmunjom Declaration explicitly called for “the realization of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula through complete denuclearization” and reaffirmed non-aggression commitments. The September Pyongyang Joint Declaration, through its military annex, established a halt to hostile acts on land, at sea, and in the air, along with the transformation of the DMZ into a peace zone and the creation of a maritime peace zone in the West Sea. North Korea’s unilateral repudiation could be assessed as a violation analogous to the grounds for termination or suspension under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties — though the convention does not apply directly, since inter-Korean agreements are not formally classified as treaties. That ambiguity points to the need for stronger institutional frameworks to give future inter-Korean agreements binding legal force.

North Korea’s nuclear threats and the armistice regime

At the ninth WPK Congress, North Korea threatened that “should South Korea’s disruptive conduct at the doorstep of a nuclear-armed state be deemed to harm our security environment, we may initiate arbitrary action, and within that continuum the complete collapse of South Korea cannot be excluded.” Pyongyang also declared it would “increase the number of nuclear weapons, expand nuclear delivery means and the space for their employment,” and “annually augment and deploy the main strike assets for deterring the South Korean theater.”

These statements directly contradict the spirit of Article 13 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which calls for “a complete cessation of hostilities,” and Article 15, which recommends a political conference for a peaceful settlement. The armistice remains a valid international agreement binding on North and South Korea, the U.N. Command, and China.

North Korea’s nuclear buildup declaration and threats of preemptive attack violate the prohibition on the threat or use of force under Article 2(4) of the U.N Charter. Multiple UN Security Council resolutions, beginning with Resolution 1718 (2006), prohibit North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Kim Jong Un’s assertion that his country has “permanently and irreversibly consolidated its status as a nuclear state” constitutes a direct challenge to the nonproliferation regime and to Security Council authority.

Under international law, the parties to the armistice bear an obligation to transition to a peace treaty. In a situation where North Korea has foreclosed dialogue with South Korea, peace regime negotiations appear practically impossible — raising the prospect of a prolonged, unstable armistice and heightening the risk of accidental military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea’s dual strategy: engaging Washington, isolating Seoul

While enshrining hostility toward South Korea in the WPK charter, North Korea signaled conditional engagement toward the United States, saying there is “no reason we cannot get along well” if Washington “respects our nuclear state status and abandons its hostile policy.” This reflects a strategy of engaging Washington while blocking Seoul — a deliberate attempt to drive a wedge into the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

This dual posture is inconsistent with the international law principles of sovereign equality and good neighborliness enshrined in Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter and UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970), the Declaration on Friendly Relations, which calls for mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.

Even under the “hostile state” designation, North Korea remains bound by its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 require the protection of civilians, humane treatment of prisoners of war, and permission of humanitarian assistance even in armed conflict. The U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea classified Pyongyang’s human rights violations as “crimes against humanity” and recommended referral to the International Criminal Court.

North Korea’s enshrinement of the “two hostile states” framework and the measures flowing from it can be assessed as internationally wrongful acts under the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001. North Korea’s continued nuclear development, its threats of preemptive attack, and its repudiation of inter-Korean agreements may constitute violations of multiple layers of international obligation, including U.N. Security Council resolutions, the armistice agreement, and the principle of good faith. The absence of a robust enforcement mechanism, however, exposes the structural limits of international law when confronting a state determined to defy it.

The international community has deployed U.N. Security Council sanctions, unilateral measures by individual states, and diplomatic pressure in response to North Korea’s violations, but there is considerable consensus that sanctions alone are insufficient to change Pyongyang’s behavior. A comprehensive strategy is needed, one that balances dialogue and pressure, strengthens cooperation among relevant states including China and Russia, and addresses the humanitarian situation of the North Korean people.

Balancing legal principle with Korean Peninsula realities

North Korea’s enshrinement of the “two hostile states” doctrine in the WPK charter may signal an intent to make the division of the Korean Peninsula permanent, but it cannot unilaterally alter the peninsula’s legal status under international law. South Korea must uphold its constitutional territorial clause and the principle of peaceful reunification while adopting a pragmatic approach that acknowledges the reality of two political entities each exercising effective control over their respective territories.

Kim Jong Un’s declaration that South Korea has been “permanently excluded from the category of compatriots” and his invocation of its “complete collapse” are extraordinarily dangerous statements. Yet refusing to be destabilized by such rhetoric and pressing forward toward the long-term goals of peace and shared prosperity on the Korean Peninsula is the approach most consistent with international law and constitutional values.

North Korea’s suggestion to the United States that relations could improve on the condition that Washington recognize its nuclear status amounts to an effective declaration that denuclearization is off the table. The international community cannot recognize North Korea as a nuclear state and must hold firm to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and U.N. Security Council resolutions. At the same time, strategic patience and a phased, simultaneous approach to drawing North Korea back into compliance with international norms remain essential.

Sanctions alone cannot achieve denuclearization or the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Creative diplomacy — one that addresses North Korea’s security concerns while holding the line on international norms — is the challenge that international law places squarely before the international community.

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