Lessons from the wars in Russia-Ukraine and the Middle East have led Southeast Asian countries to rapidly accelerate efforts to invest in and adopt counter-drone systems.
Malaysia recently unveiled a locally developed interceptor drone, known as “The Ghost.”
Last year, Singapore announced that every recruit entering basic military training will learn how to operate drones and counter drone threats. It also established the Singapore Armed Forces Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Development and Operations group.
Indonesia is pursuing defense collaborations with China Aerospace Long-March International Trade Co Ltd (ALIT), and this potential partnership could focus on drones.
Cambodia used fiber-optic drones against Thailand in the border clashes last year. Following that conflict, Thailand set up an unmanned aerial system (UAS) warfare center and a UAS battalion, tasked with the responsibility to direct, plan, control, oversee and integrate the army’s drone operations.
This increased interest in counter-drone technology was also reflected at the Defense Services Asia (DSA) and Milipol TechX (MTX) exhibitions, which concluded in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, respectively, in April.
While training personnel and investing in hardware, such as sensors and jammers, are important, lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, the Middle East, and the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia highlight a more critical need: a multilayered approach to counter drone threats.
Multilayered Defense
To effectively counter drones or drone swarms, Southeast Asian countries should consider adopting a defense framework operating across multiple layers.
The first layer of defense involves drone detection. This can be achieved by deploying a combination of systems, including sensors (radio frequency [RF], acoustics, and radar) and cameras (electro-optical and infrared).
Once a drone is detected, the focus shifts to identification. Artificial intelligence (AI) systems, such as AI-based decision-support systems (AI DSS), can be used to distinguish between friendly and hostile drones. AI DSS, such as Lavender and Maven Smart System, are primarily known for their reported use in target identification during armed conflict like those in Gaza and Iran. However, these systems can also be employed to distinguish drones, specifically by integrating and fusing data from sensors and cameras, and analyzing RF signals and other data points, and thereby assisting militaries in identifying drones. These systems may also help to track and prioritize which drones ought to be neutralized first, based on factors such as distance and flight time.
The next layer of defense concerns mitigating drone threats via non-kinetic measures. A primary non-kinetic measure is jamming, such as Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming. GNSS jamming entails broadcasting powerful radio signals on the same frequency bands used by GNSS satellites, which causes signal loss and results in drones losing the ability to calculate accurate positions or time.
Another non-kinetic approach is spoofing, which involves sending fake GPS signals, thereby misleading drones into computing incorrect positions. Notably, some spoofed Russian drones were reportedly “redirected” either to their points of origin or into Belarusian territory.
However, both jamming and spoofing can cause significant civilian impacts, such as increasing aviation risks and disrupting shipping and telecommunications. To mitigate these impacts, cyber takeover of drones may also be considered. This can be achieved through multiple methods, including hijacking a drone’s control signals and forcing the drone to fly to a controlled landing zone.
The next non-kinetic measure involves using high-energy weapons, such as lasers and high-power microwaves (HPM). Laser weapons burn or disable drone components with focused light, while HPM weapons work by emitting directed bursts of electromagnetic energy to disrupt a drone’s electronics. HPM weapons function similarly to a domestic microwave oven but operate over much greater distances. For example, the Hurricane 3000 – developed by the Chinese state-owned enterprise Norinco – can disable drones at ranges exceeding 3 kilometers. This system is already being deployed in the field. The operational costs of an HPM weapon can be as low as a few yuan per shot. Such low operational costs provide an advantage in the context of drone warfare, which is increasingly being characterized as a war of attrition.
The final layer of defense involves kinetic effects, using both conventional and unconventional projectiles. Regarding unconventional projectiles, two trends have emerged. The first concerns interceptor drones, which are designed to crash into enemy drones. In footage released by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Ukraine recently launched an interceptor drone from an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to engage a Russian Shahed aerial drone. This combination of maritime and aerial drones marks the first engagement of its kind, in order to strengthen Ukrainian air defense.
Another trend that has emerged relates to the use of nets attached to drones to trap enemy drones. This has also been observed in Ukraine, where the fully autonomous DroneHunter F700 systems, developed by Fortem Technologies, have been deployed to intercept Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. These systems are also utilized within the Gulf region.
In terms of conventional projectiles, small arms as well as missiles launched from aircraft or ground-based air defense systems can be used to counter drones. However, these missiles often cost significantly more than the drones they target. For example, a Patriot missile costs approximately $4 million, while a Shahed drone may cost only between$20,000 and $50,000. Consequently, relying on such expensive missiles to target drones is simply unsustainable. Experts have advocated for the development of low-cost, smart missiles, following reports that Russian drones are being equipped with turbojet engines. These engines allow the drones to fly two or three times faster and at higher altitudes than interceptor drones, thereby rendering them obsolete.
Looking into the Future
While the abovementioned multilayered defense network is critical for countering drone threats, it is merely part of the solution for Southeast Asian countries.
Ultimately, the successful operationalization of a multilayered defense network depends on the ability of Southeast Asian countries to adapt faster.
A case in point is the ineffectiveness of Thailand’s signal jammers against Cambodian drones equipped with fiber-optics. Similarly, the emergence of drones fitted with turbojet engines highlights how quickly existing countermeasures can be outpaced. Southeast Asian countries must, therefore, engage with technology companies and start-ups, in order to ensure the early adoption of emerging technologies, including those driving drone and counter-drone systems.
The task for Southeast Asian countries is to understand the trajectory of drone and counter-drone technologies and to keep adapting faster. In this way, these nations can ensure that they are prepared for the next generation of drone warfare.
