Mellower European populists have killed some Republicans’ dreams of a far-right alliance.
Foreign Policy
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Former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s spectacular landslide defeat last month has been interpreted as a setback for the European right. It is not. Rather, it is the most recent signal of a deeper trend in the democratic West: the transformation of the far right into a populist-inflected conservatism.
Sworn in as Orban’s successor on May 9, Peter Magyar is neither a liberal nor a centrist. He waged an election campaign from the moderate right, retaining a populist emphasis on national sovereignty, national identity, and strict control over immigration. Rather than challenge populist and conservative themes, he focused his attacks on Orban’s centralization of power, rigging of the electoral system, and growing cronyism and corruption.
In a sharp challenge to Orban’s authoritarian rule, Magyar made the case for checks and balances and the rule of law, called for an end to government dominance over the media, and rejected Orban’s role as Europe’s spoiler. Instead of anti-Brussels rhetoric, Magyar argued for the constructive defense of Hungary’s sovereignty and national interests inside European Union and NATO institutions. Above all, he repudiated Orban’s dalliance with and reliance on Moscow, soberly seeing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime as a threat to European peace and security.
Magyar’s electoral approach was not a one-off: It reflects an evolving populist conservatism that is taking root in Britain, France, Italy, to some extent Poland, and elsewhere. This new conservatism reflects the mellowing of far-right populist parties and echoes Magyar’s more moderate but electorally popular nationalism.
A large crowd of people gathers on a grassy lawn in front of a massive, ornate building with multiple spires. In the foreground, a woman with a high bun and heavily tattooed arms holds up a small tricolor flag featuring a man's portrait. Other members of the crowd wave similar national flags, and several massive vertical banners hang from the building's facade.
A crowd gathers to watch the first session of parliament on the day Magyar is sworn in in Budapest on May 9.John Moore/Getty Images
A little over a decade ago, right-wing populists such as Britain’s Nigel Farage, France’s Marine Le Pen, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, and Hungary’s Orban were viewed in many liberal precincts as the second coming of 1930s-style fascism. There were ample reasons for concern, especially because the European populist right attracted a core of identitarian activists who admired fascist and other radical right thinkers from the 1920s and 1930s. Far-right rhetoric was suffused with racism, antisemitism, and contempt for democracy.
Many leading right-wing European parties, moreover, admired Putin and sometimes established close relationships with the Kremlin. Le Pen’s party received a loan from a Czech-Russian bank in 2014. That same year, Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini—then a member of the European Parliament—was photographed in Red Square wearing a Putin T-shirt. And Farage’s successful Brexit campaign attracted agents and admirers of Putin’s regime, one of whom was recently sentenced for accepting Russian bribes when he was an MEP.
As these parties gained force in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and amid increased migration from North Africa and the Middle East in the 2010s, Western analysts and media began to feature dire warnings of an authoritarian threat to democracy and a potential unraveling of the EU and NATO.
Yet unlike the Great Depression, neither the 2008 crisis nor the more recent economic shock induced by the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a catastrophic decline in living standards. Though public sentiment soured on mass migration and economic malaise, voters were not looking to ditch their democratic freedoms. Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 drew more attention than usual to the nature of Putin’s dictatorship, creating widespread public disapproval across the political spectrum.
In more recent years, polls have made clear that many European voters were drawn to defending their distinct national identities and placing tight limits on immigration. But majorities also reject the cults of racism and chauvinism espoused by parts of the far right. The mellowing of formerly hard-right parties is a direct result of their political success: With rising popularity comes not only the need to better reflect the electoral base but also the desire to win the support of more moderate voters. As far-right parties seek to expand their base in a bid for power, they have been policing overt expression of racist rhetoric in their ranks.
In recent months, Britain’s Reform Party has expelled antisemitic and racist officials and activists, while opening its doors to mainstream conservatives. In January, Robert Jenrick and Suella Braverman left the Conservative Party and joined Reform, immediately assuming party leadership roles. Jenrick, now Reform’s spokesperson on treasury affairs, served as a minister under Prime Ministers Rishi Sunak and Boris Johnson. Braverman, now responsible for Reform’s education policies, was home secretary under Sunak.
A close-up shot focuses on a person wearing a grey suit jacket holding a bright blue rectangular sign with both hands. The sign features large white text that reads "BRITAIN VOTED REFORM," with a small right-facing arrow stylized inside the letter "O" of the word "REFORM." Small, faint promotional text is visible along the bottom edge of the sign.
A member of the Reform UK party holds a placard reading “BRITAIN VOTED REFORM” outside the Havering Town Hall in London on May 8. Toby Shepheard/AFP via Getty Images)
Reform’s leadership is also becoming more diverse. Braverman is of Indian descent, and Zia Yusuf, Reform’s spokesman for home affairs, is the son of Sri Lankan Muslim immigrants. A former investment banker, Yusuf recently described Putin as a “marauding dictator” and asserted the party’s support for Ukraine. The party’s sharp new anti-Putin tone is underscored by the fact that its foreign-policy positions are coordinated by Alan Mendoza, an Atlanticist who also heads the Henry Jackson Society, a think tank named after a hawkish U.S. senator.
Though Reform maintains its emphasis on restricting immigration and expelling illegal immigrants—a stance that remains popular with a broad spectrum of voters—on other issues, it reflects more traditional conservative nostrums. Its economic program has adopted conservative tropes from the Margaret Thatcher era, emphasizing supply-side economics, deregulation, and tax cuts. Reform also aims to boost growth by scrapping the “net zero” climate law and various employment regulations, a longtime objective of hard-core conservatives.
Meloni—whose ascent was accompanied by sensationalist media claims that she was a stalking horse for fascism—has also embraced a moderate, patriotic conservatism focused on strict immigration controls. On foreign policy, she has jettisoned Euroskepticism, become a constructive advocate of European cooperation, and is a leading voice for a strengthened NATO.
Moreover, Meloni has articulated a socially conservative, nationalist, Christian worldview. Her trademark formulation—“Yes to the natural family; no to the LGBT lobbies, yes to sexual identity, no to gender ideology”—may appear divisive to some, but it reflects a familiar conservative approach to social issues. Notwithstanding her emphasis on conservative family values, her ruling coalition has preserved same-sex civil unions and abortion access.
In the words of the Economist, despite fears that Meloni’s election might “turn her country into an illiberal democracy,” her government “has pursued an agenda scarcely more radical than that of other democratic conservatives.”
In France, Le Pen and Jordan Bardella’s National Rally has similarly turned away from explicit calls for withdrawal from the EU, has removed overtly antisemitic and racist officialsfrom its ranks, and now projects itself as a protector of French Jews. Though there are elements of populism in the party’s economic platform, its approach now focuses on targeted tax cuts. For example, the party supports eliminating the income tax on all workers under 30, reducing the value-added tax on energy from 20 percent to 5.5 percent, and making the first 300,000 euros of an inheritance tax-free. National Rally has also sought to engage business in a dialogue over economic policy.
In Poland, the trends are more complex. The former ruling party, Law and Justice (PiS), faces challenges on the far right from Konfederacja Korony, an ultranationalist party that verges on fascist, and Konfederacja, a libertarian nationalist party. A debate over how to win back voters that defected to these challengers has led to disagreements over PiS’s political direction.
The party leadership’s attempt to push PiS further to the right on social issues triggered the emergence of an internal countermovement calling itself Growth+. Consisting of moderately conservative technocrats and led by former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Growth+ already has the support of nearly one-quarter of PiS parliamentarians. The emergence of this moderate conservative faction has launched a debate about the party’s future. One thing is clear: PiS is unlikely to win back power without the popular Morawiecki, and his participation in any future PiS-led government is likely to result in more moderate policies.
Even within the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, where hard-line pro-Kremlin views predominate among the leadership and older members of its mainly East German electoral base, there are signs of an emerging contrary trend. Lev Polyakov, a U.S. podcaster who often features representatives of the contemporary right, told me about his discussions with young AfD activists. “They chafe at the pro-Putin line of their elders,” he said. “Many of them see their party elders and some of the party base as out of touch with their generation and the broader electorate.”
These internal differences suggest that the AfD leadership may face challenges to its pro-Kremlin posture if it wishes to retain voter support or further expand its base. A recent public opinion survey shows that nearly half of AfD voters are worried about the military threat posed by Russia.
More broadly across Europe, Putin’s transformation of Russia into a militaristic tyranny, his government’s stream of threats against Europe, and his prosecution of a brutal war against Ukraine have awakened fears across the political spectrum. Even among the populist right, Russia’s actions have deepened pro-NATO sentiment and dampened support for a break with Brussels.
A large crowd gathers at night in a public square, holding a massive blue and yellow flag that stretches through the center of the gathering. In the background, a neoclassical monument with large columns is illuminated in the same blue and yellow colors. Several people in the crowd hold up smartphones or smaller flags, looking toward the monument.
Demonstrators carrying a giant Ukrainian flag gather at the Brandenburg Gate to commemorate the third anniversary of Russia’s ongoing military invasion of Ukraine in Berlin on Feb. 24, 2025.Sean Gallup/Getty Images
Given these shifts, a large part of the MAGA movement aligned with U.S. President Donald Trump appears increasingly out of step with the European right’s moderating trends. U.S. Vice President JD Vance, an early proponent of a MAGA-European far right alliance, continues to beat his drum with anti-EU and anti-Ukraine rhetoric, with dwindling resonance among the major European populist parties. Organizations such as Turning Point USA platform pro-Russian and Euroskeptic politicians with fringe identitarian views, while prominent far-right voices such as Steve Bannon and Tucker Carlson promote Russia as a model of a supposedly successful Christian society.
Meanwhile, much of the European right now expresses solidarity with Ukraine and recognizes the need for a collectively strong Europe to face the Russian threat. The foreign-policy attitudes of key MAGA thought leaders, on the other hand, were heavily influenced by the former Orban government, which paid for a massive influence campaign targeting conservative U.S. and European writers, policymakers, and podcasters. The money for this campaign came from the Hungarian state energy company, MOL, which had profits to spare thanks to favorable contracts with Russian energy companies.
MAGA’s dalliance with Europe’s far right may now be coming to an end. First, the Magyar government will soon strip the Orban influence machine of its access to state funds. Second, some of the most pro-Russian MAGA voices—including Bannon and Carlson—are estranged from Trump, not least because of their disapproval of his war on Iran. Polls show that a majority of MAGA voters supports Ukraine and is hostile to Putin. Debates over racism and antisemitism have exposed elements of the far right to sharp criticism.
There is also reason to believe that debates over the future of the Republican Party and the Trump coalition may gain serious momentum after the U.S. midterms this November. Polls point to a massive shift of voter sentiment, which is likely to open the door to leaders eager to right a ship that is now drifting unstably. An entire generation of conservative Republican loyalists, many associated with the first Trump administration and supportive of his immigration and reindustrialization policies, remains on the sidelines but is increasingly aware that the party will need to moderate some of its approaches.
In this sense, Magyar may be a harbinger not only for the European right, but for MAGA as well. He has demonstrated that a moderate, populism-inflected, conservative nationalism has a political future. Orban held fast to his illiberal policies, friendship with Russia, and condoning of—if not participation in—massive enrichment within his inner circle. Republicans who want a vigorous and popular party will need to carefully avoid repeating Orban’s mistakes and pay closer attention to the changes occurring among their ideological brethren in Europe.
