By Derek S. Reveron
Rethinking America’s Strategic Map
When Americans think about how the United States engages the world, we instinctively reach for maps. Our government bureaucracies are organized this way: regional bureaus at the State Department, unified commands at the Department of Defense, and component commands within the Navy. We have neatly drawn boundaries that shape policy debates, strategy, and force development decisions.1
But the world does not organize itself along U.S. bureaucratic seams. Commerce, data, and adversaries cut across regions. Revising the Unified Command Plan (the classified document that assigns missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas to U.S. combatant commands), empowering commands as global integrators, or giving commands global authorities does not change reality. Warships, commercial shipping, and fishing fleets operate across oceans. Yet, warships face different threats across different regions and are assigned different missions. The modern Caribbean is relatively benign with a focus on targeting small fast craft, the Indian Ocean can be non-permissive with a focus on major combat operations, and the Mediterranean is close to allies with ships focused on high-end ballistic missile defense and land attack.
For part of the twentieth century, the United States solved this problem by building what Franklin Roosevelt in 1940 called a “two-ocean Navy,” providing enough ships to operate within the Atlantic and the Pacific.2 Beginning in the 1930s and culminating in 1940, Congress passed the Two-Ocean Navy Act, which authorized an unprecedented expansion of shipyards that enabled the Navy to innovate and scale up to equip a fleet for each ocean.3 While it was a historically large naval expansion, it also provides a contemporary lens to inform fleet design.
Given the scope of national security today, the U.S. cannot afford to build enough warships, the industrial base could not build said warships even if resources were available, and a globe-oriented fleet would be inadequate. Multi-purpose ships ready to operate everywhere leads to overmatch when destroyers interdict dhows in the Gulf of Aden or drug boats in the Caribbean and undermatch when contemplating the defense of Taiwan. Simply, today’s approach to fleet design does not work. A globally dispersed Navy deprives the Pacific Ocean region of needed forces while increasing strain on ships and crews, reducing service life, and undermining needed investment in the Pacific theater that defines future high-end naval warfare.
History points toward a solution but reverting to a two-ocean fleet is not adequate. The Indian Ocean has emerged as a third, distinct ocean of operations and the Arctic Ocean is a growing fourth ocean.4 Further, the challenges in the Atlantic and the Pacific are not the same. It is time to expand our map and update our concept of the prevailing strategic framework for naval power. A four-ocean Navy organized around the Atlantic, Arctic, Indian, and Pacific oceans offers a clearer way to think about America’s role in the world, aligns missions with geography, takes advantage of the partner network that can contribute to U.S. national security, clarifies force design requirements, and buys the right kinds of ships optimized for each theater.
Why an Ocean Lens?
Oceans are the connective tissue of the international system. The global economy floats on tankers and moves by container, pulses through fiber optic cables laid on the seafloor, and depends on freedom of navigation across the oceans. Hydrocarbons, rare earths, and manufactured goods cross oceans daily. The coffee we drink, the shoes we wear, and the computers we use arrive by sea.
Oceans are also the medium through which rivals project power. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has an unmistakably maritime dimension with port access across the Indian Ocean to the Horn of Africa, creating a new maritime silk road.5 China and Russia seek access routes through the Arctic to link the Atlantic and Pacific. Iran and non-state actors routinely threaten shipping transiting critical maritime chokepoints affecting Indian Ocean commerce.
However, American bureaucracies and strategies often obscure these realities. The Indian Ocean, for example, is carved up among three different combatant commands and multiple State Department bureaus. No single U.S. commander or policymaker has full responsibility. Ships chop across theaters, but the planners inadvertently create blind spots and miss opportunities. By contrast, an oceanic lens forces planners to look at connectivity through maritime missions rather than administrative boundaries.
An oceanic lens provides clarity and simplicity since it reflects how the world works. It is also a way to optimize the fleet for the missions it conducts since equipping the Navy with enough high-end, multi-purpose ships has proven to be impossible. For example, using an Arleigh Burke–class destroyer for every mission, regardless of threat environment, creates costly inefficiencies. Deploying one of the Navy’s most advanced warships to conduct counter-drug patrols in the benign Caribbean, maritime security operations in the permissive Mediterranean, and air defense missions in the contested Indian Ocean misaligns capabilities and requirements.
The most sophisticated warships are not needed everywhere; using them for low-threat operations accelerates wear, drains resources, and reduces availability for missions where their advanced systems are essential. Unmanned systems and partnering with capable allies can perform many of the lower-end tasks more effectively and at a far lower cost. Reframing our force design through the lens of a four-ocean Navy clarifies where to concentrate high-end capabilities and sets priorities for industry that has not been able to adapt when futuristic warships do not align with an assumed future.
Warship acquisition is a wager on the character of future operations, and when strategic assumptions shift, production plans fail. The Seawolf-class submarine was designed for sustained Cold War undersea competition, but the Soviet collapse reduced the program to three hulls. The Zumwalt-class destroyer, built around expectations of land-attack dominance and technological overmatch, fell from thirty-two planned ships to three amid cost growth and changing operational priorities. The Littoral Combat Ship reflected post-9/11 assumptions about modularity and irregular warfare in littoral environments, yet survivability concerns led to truncated procurement and decommissioning. The Constellation-class frigate was also cancelled in favor of “more readily producible ships.”6
The Missions of a Four-Ocean Navy
A four-ocean Navy begins with understanding missions the President expects the Navy to conduct. Each ocean represents a distinct strategic environment with its own geography, chokepoints, threats, and partner networks. The Atlantic and Arctic Oceans are primarily anti-submarine warfare (ASW), missile defense, and maritime security theaters to protect the homeland. The Indian Ocean is primarily a sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection and maritime interdiction theater to secure global trade, and land attack in support of U.S. Central Command. The Pacific Ocean is primarily a combined operations and power projection theater to deter or defeat Chinese and North Korean aggression.
Defending the Homeland
The Atlantic Ocean links the United States to its European allies. During the Cold War, U.S. naval strategy emphasized transatlantic reinforcement through convoys. Anti-submarine warfare was a critical Navy mission to protect convoys and to check Soviet submarines. ASW capabilities atrophied in the wake of Soviet collapse, but Russia’s submarine fleet is back and represents a formidable challenge in the North Atlantic.7 The Arctic also opens new avenues for Russia to pressure North America, which helps explain the administration’s interest in stronger links with allies Denmark and Canada.
However, the Atlantic is not just about Europe and Russia. To the south, the Caribbean and South Atlantic generate unique missions. The Navy and Coast Guard patrol the Caribbean to disrupt illicit trafficking networks that move drugs, weapons, and people. These missions support partner governments in Central America and the Caribbean who have a shared interest in reducing illicit trafficking. In the South Atlantic, the Navy works with its Brazilian, Argentine, and other partners to build maritime capacity, deter illegal fishing and trafficking, and reinforce hemispheric stability.
With these missions in mind, the Atlantic Fleet requires ships specialized for ASW and escort missions as well as smaller ships for maritime interdiction operations. Frigates, destroyers, and attack submarines matter most in the North Atlantic and can take advantage of American and Canadian ports for logistics. Maritime patrol aircraft complement these surface and subsurface forces. The Arctic requires persistent presence, cold-weather hardening, and under-ice capabilities.
For the Caribbean and South Atlantic, small surface combatants and unmanned systems provide affordable and effective presence that can interface with partners who operate similar platforms. Given the friendly logistics environment, cheaper diesel submarines can also operate in the Western Hemisphere, freeing up more expensive nuclear submarines for the Pacific, and can be sourced from U.S. allies who excel in building modern diesel-electric submarines.8
Securing the Arteries of Global Trade
The Indian Ocean is busy maritime space.9 It carries energy from the Arabian Gulf to Asia and manufactured goods from Asia to Europe. It is also the ocean where China’s maritime presence is expanding most rapidly, with port agreements stretching from Sri Lanka to East Africa.10 China’s state-owned enterprises have been building commercial connections in the Middle East and Africa with its Navy following its trade.
The Indian Ocean is also a frequent site of natural disasters and humanitarian crises. Amphibious ships and logistics vessels are uniquely capable of delivering rapid aid, supporting stability, and showcasing American goodwill. The demise of the Agency of International Development portends increased calls for Navy assistance as these missions reinforce alliances and prevent adversaries from filling vacuums when governments teeter.
The Indian Ocean Fleet requires ships optimized for endurance, presence, and rapid response. Logistics ships, replenishment oilers, and mobile bases are essential to support power projection in the Middle East. Amphibious ships, destroyers, and patrol craft support diverse missions from humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) to counter-piracy. Coalition operations with India, Australia, France, and Gulf states amplify presence.
Deterring a Peer Competitor with Allied Multipliers
The Pacific Ocean remains the most likely theater for high-end naval warfare. For the last eighty years, the Navy has deterred major war in this region. While tensions subsided in the 1990s, China’s navy is now the largest in the world and supports an aggressive national security policy. Beijing is expanding its reach into the South China Sea and pressing its claims against U.S. allies. Taiwan remains the most acute flashpoint, but Chinese harassment of Japan and the Philippines also create demands on the Navy. North Korea adds volatility to the region, and Russia maintains a Pacific fleet presence able to reinforce the PLA Navy.
To be sure, the Pacific Ocean Fleet requires the Navy’s most advanced and combat-ready platforms. Aircraft carriers remain indispensable for forward strike and achieving air superiority when needed. Nuclear attack submarines provide unique capabilities, and as William Toti emphasized, “you can’t win without (more) submarines.”11 Amphibious assault ships also enable Marine operations, which are fielding missile systems to hold PLAN assets at risk. This forward posture maximizes combat power where it matters most—maintaining balance against China’s growing maritime capabilities.
Crucially, the United States is not alone in this mission. Japan and South Korea field their own Aegis-equipped destroyers, which are interoperable with U.S. platforms. This creates a force multiplier of shared sensors, integrated missile defense networks, and combined fleet operations. Together, the allies can pool capabilities to defend against North Korean and Chinese missiles, share intelligence to track and engage China’s surface ships, and coordinate operations across the region. This allied integration makes the Pacific Ocean Fleet stronger than the sum of its parts.
A central virtue of the four-ocean Navy is that it saves money while improving readiness by considering operating environments that vary from the relatively benign Caribbean to the potentially hostile Pacific. This conceptual lens aligns missions and force structure, allocates resources efficiently, and takes advantage of allies’ support and technology. Not every mission requires a $13-billion aircraft carrier and not every region needs a $4.5 billion nuclear submarine. By tailoring fleets to ocean missions, we can prioritize platforms and crews for deployment to one of four oceans. In short, the four-ocean Navy avoids the trap of being everywhere with everything while preserving global reach.
Congress and the Four-Ocean Navy Act of 2026
Congress is an essential partner in Navy force development through appropriations and promotes continuity across administrations through members’ longevity and their staffs. In 1940, Congress passed the Two-Ocean Navy Act with remarkable strategic foresight that delivered the Navy that won World War II. Today, we face a similar inflection point. Just as 1940 demanded a new framework, the 250th anniversary of independence in 2026 offers an opportunity to legislate a Four-Ocean Navy Act. Congress can reaffirm America’s global maritime leadership by anchoring naval strategy in all four oceans. By disaggregating the global Navy concept to four oceans, it also offers a fair chance to build fleets that can meet mission requirements.
Such an act would:
In short, a Four-Ocean Navy Act would demonstrate that America’s 250th birthday is not only about reflecting on history, but about charting a confident course for the next century. As BJ Armstrong wrote, “U.S. naval power—and its strength relative to other nations or navies—is instead a choice to be made by the American people through the actions of their elected representatives.”12 This is a maritime century, but to thrive in it, America must choose to participate.
America’s strategic map must change. The two-ocean Navy of the past secured victory in World War II and sustained deterrence preventing great power conflict throughout the Cold War. With the inability to field high-end, multipurpose warships globally, we need a four-ocean Navy that recognizes the Atlantic, Arctic, Indian, and Pacific as distinct theaters with unique requirements. This is a call for clarity: matching missions to oceans and tailoring warships with crews to oceans.
Derek S. Reveron is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College and Faculty Affiliate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or its components, to include the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.
References
1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. and Derek S. Reveron, “Geography, Bureaucracy, and National Security: The New Map,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 20, 2023.
2. Curzon, Daniel, Eric Perinovic, Tyler Pitrof, and Shawn Woodford, Navy Force Planning and Design, 1933-2019, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2025.
3. Symonds, Craig L., American Naval History: A Very Short Introduction, Very Short Introductions (New York, 2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 24 May 2018).
4. Baruah, Darshana M. The Contest for the Indian Ocean: And the Making of a New World Order. Yale University Press, 2024.
5. Funaiole, Michael P. and Jonathan E. Hillman, “China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Economic Drivers and Challenges,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 2, 2018
6. Sam LaGrone,” Navy Cancels Constellation-class Frigate Program, Considering New Small Surface Combatants,” November 25, 2025. https://news.usni.org/2025/11/25/navy-cancels-constellation-class-frigate-program-considering-new-small-surface-combatants
7. Foggo III, James, and Alarik Fritz. 2016. “The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.” United States Naval Institute. Proceedings 142 (6): 18.
8. Spector, Jordan A. “The Path to a Bigger Submarine Fleet Includes Diesels.” Proceedings 151, no. 10, October 2025.
9. Shrikhande, Sudarshan. 2025. “Another Turbulent Year in the Indian Ocean.” United States Naval Institute. Proceedings 151 (5): 1.
10. Kardon, Isaac (2021) “Research & Debate—Pier Competitor: Testimony on China’s Global Ports,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 74: No. 1, Article 11.
11. Toti, William. 2023. “You Can’t Win Without (More) Submarines.” United States Naval Institute. Proceedings 149 (12).
12. Armstrong, Benjamin. 2021. “American Naval Dominance Is Not a Birthright.” United States Naval Institute. Proceedings 147 (9).
Featured Image: USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) transits the Atlantic Ocean in its final rounds of exercises prior to deployment, Feb. 15, 2026. (source: U.S. Navy)
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