After months of deadlock, a prisoner swap between Damascus and Suwayda opened a “new” negotiating channel, but is there a way forward amid internal divisions and struggles over representation? The post With rare movement in Suwayda-Damascus deadlock, can a solution emerge? appeared first on Syria D
After months of deadlock, a prisoner swap between Damascus and Suwayda opened a “new” negotiating channel, but is there a way forward amid internal divisions and struggles over representation?
17 March 2026
PARIS — Following months of stalemate, a prisoner exchange between the Syrian government and the National Guard in Suwayda at the end of February stirred stagnant waters in the Druze-majority southern province, which has been calling for self-determination and rejecting state authority since deadly clashes and killings last July.
On February 26, Damascus released 61 detainees from Suwayda who it had held since last July. The National Guard—an umbrella for Suwayda’s local military factions—released 25. The swap, mediated by the United States (US), was the first action of its kind after months of political and security rupture between the two sides.
The swap coincided with local shifts in Suwayda, including tensions between factions and the departure of some high-profile figures from the southern province—including Emir Hassan al-Atrash, a prominent social and traditional figure.
New local political initiatives have also emerged, including the “Third Current,” a civil initiative that includes figures from Suwayda’s various communities and aims to find a path out of the current deadlock to prevent a slide towards further chaos.
On the surface, last month’s prisoner swap was a humanitarian move. Still, could it signal motion towards a gradual negotiating path with Damascus? Or does it represent little more than a one-off event in one of Syria’s most intractable and complex arenas, where local calculations intertwine with regional and international pressures?
Last month’s exchange agreement was reached through United States (US) mediation between Syria’s transitional government and Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, the spiritual leader of Syria’s Druze and the dominant figure in Suwayda.
Under the deal, Suwayda’s National Guard was set to release 30 members of government forces it detained last July, but ultimately released 25. The others reportedly remained because of their kinship with prominent government figures, in order to pressure Damascus to free remaining detainees from Suwayda.
Still, the fact that any swap took place indicates the two sides have “moved beyond the trust-testing stage and entered a negotiating track,” one journalist based in the Suwayda countryside told Syria Direct, requesting anonymity for security reasons. Military factions in the province had previously “categorically refused to negotiate with the Damascus government,” he noted.
The journalist pointed to the role played by increasing local social pressure. “People want to know the fate of their detained and disappeared sons, and to return to their homes and land” in villages controlled by Damascus since last July, “and this in turn has pressured the National Guard to agree to negotiations,” he said.
“Simply starting to negotiate means that we are on the path toward a solution in Suwayda,” in his view. He expected this process would take several months, but in the end “the stalemate will come to an end,” particularly given “US, Israeli and Arab pressure—especially from the Jordanian side—for Suwayda to negotiate.”
The journalist revealed there is a negotiating track between Damascus and Suwayda overseen, on the Suwayda side, by a “figure acceptable to both sides, a commander in the National Guard who is close to Dar al-Qanawat [al-Hijri’s headquarters] who, before the former regime fell, worked with the team of Syria’s current foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, in Suwayda.” However, there are people on both sides who “do not want a solution,” he said.
Kenan Masoud, the spokesperson for the Third Current initiative, said the “exchange is a goodwill gesture, and turns the tables on those monopolizing Suwayda’s decision,” as “the deal came after eight months of stalemate and polarization in Suwayda, to confirm that there is no solution but dialogue.”
“The operation could open the door to subsequent steps to help build trust and open a broader negotiating path to achieve the rightful demands of all components of Suwayda, rather than remaining in a stalemate,” Masoud told Syria Direct. “Those who monopolize Suwayda’s decision were not willing to negotiate, but were forced to negotiate with the government.”
Fears remain that any understandings that are reached could be obstructed, as happened repeatedly in the months before last year’s violence, when al-Hijri rejected multiple announced agreements with Damascus. However, the journalist in Suwayda said “al-Hijri agrees to the negotiating path and is involved in it—the exchange would not have happened without his consent and acceptance of negotiation.”
Qutaiba Jamal Azzam, another journalist living in Suwayda, took a dimmer view of the significance of the exchange agreement, which he said “reflects the victory of the cause in Suwayda” rather than an opening of space for negotiations.
“It is unacceptable for an authority and state to take people hostage and enter into a prisoner exchange deal—these detainees were not brought before a judge, and most are civilians—in exchange for fighters, some of whom are not Syrian and not affiliated with the army and internal security [forces],” he told Syria Direct.
“The deal increased the hostility and hatred towards the authority in Damascus, while the National Guard did not leave our sons detained,” Azzam added, ruling out any “broader negotiating path” as a result.
For his part, Syrian academic Refaat Amer said “it is not possible to open a negotiating path as a permanent solution to the Suwayda issue without going back to the foundations upon which the state should be built.” In order to “reach an actual negotiating path, one that is not imaginary or temporary, the state needs to reopen a national dialogue to select a committee to begin work on an inclusive draft constitution in preparation for elections,” he told Syria Direct.
Amer, who is from Suwayda and lives in Sweden, emphasized the need to “put forward the file of transitional justice, without which neither Syria nor any part of it can live peacefully.”
Rather than progress, the Suwayda prisoner exchange is little more than “a form of rapprochement or freezing the conflict—an important step given the complete deadlock of all other avenues in Syria,” Amer said. Still, “opening any such channel is positive and important—any step that protects people and releases detainees is important—and gradually restores trust in light of the distrust people in Suwayda have of the authority, and the distrust [Damascus] and its factions have in Suwayda’s factions,” he added.
On the other hand, military and security expert Asmat al-Absi, who is close to the Damascus government, said the exchange operation “does not necessarily constitute the beginning of an official negotiating path, but can be considered a technical de-escalatory measure.” Echoing Amer, he considered the biggest obstacle to be the “low level of trust between the government and the dominant forces in Suwayda, in addition to the alignment of these forces’ decision-making with Israel.”
The complexity of the Suwayda file goes beyond tensions between the Syrian government and local factions, extending to divisions within the province itself. While last month’s detainee swap reveals the emergence of a new channel of communication with Damascus, it also brings back into focus the issue of who represents the province, and who holds a monopoly on decision-making.
On February 20, less than a week before the exchange, security tensions broke out in Suwayda following the kidnapping of Sheikh Yahya al-Hajjar, the former leader of the Men of Dignity movement, one of the province’s most influential military formations. Al-Hajjar—who was replaced one day before the faction joined the National Guard last August—was taken from his farm by a “security office affiliated with the National Guard” and released a few hours later, Azzam said.
“Tension between the Men of Dignity and the National Guard reflects a struggle for power and influence within the Druze scene,” al-Absi said. Azzam, however, downplayed the incident, saying local groups and factions are in a phase of “integration and cohesion, setting aside their internal differences to activate the police and judiciary.”
Another notable development last month was the departure of Emir Hassan al-Atrash—one of the most prominent social figures in Suwayda—from his residence at Dar Ara, south of Suwayda city. Two days after leaving for neighboring Daraa on February 16, al-Atrash appeared in a video filmed at Marjeh Square in Damascus, explaining he left the province to “prevent bloodshed and discord that was being secretly orchestrated, aimed at eliminating me and my family.”
Al-Atrash is the grandson of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, the leader of the Great Syrian Revolt against French colonialism in Syria. Dar Ara, which al-Atrash leads, represents significant political and social influence in the province, in contrast to the religious influence of Dar al-Qanawat, the seat of al-Hijri’s family, the journalist in the Suwayda countryside explained.
“When the head of Dar al-Qanawat and the head of Dar Ara meet at a doorway, the emir of Dar Ara enters first. The same is true at a madafa [guesthouse]: coffee is served first to the emir, before al-Hijri,” he explained, in reference to the traditionally superior social standing of Dar Ara within Suwayda.
This traditional hierarchy has not prevented a reshaping of the balance of power in Suwayda, however. Over the past several months, al-Hijri has been able to “neutralize the other two Sheikhs of Reason [top Druze spiritual authorities], as well as the emir of Dar Ara and all other religious and traditional leaders in the province,” the journalist said. “Hassan al-Atrash’s weak personality and lack of leadership character enabled al-Hijri to successfully marginalize him, resulting in him losing his social status.”
In this monopolized landscape, new initiatives have emerged in Suwayda that aim to offer a different path out of the tense stalemate with Damascus. The most prominent is the Third Current, which seeks to offer a civil path to address polarization between the various forces within Suwayda.
Those involved hope to turn the political stalemate into clear and actionable demands, spokesperson Masoud said. “We are putting forward the idea of transforming the impasse in Suwayda into legitimate demands with a specific timeline. As activists from diverse backgrounds, we are setting a new example that stands apart from the monopolization of decision-making that prevails in Suwayda,” he added.
The initiative is trying to break the dichotomy between supporters and opponents of the authorities in Damascus. “We named it the Third Current because we refuse to align ourselves with either the current that is hostile to the authority, whatever it is, or the current that supports it,” Masoud explained. “We are against separatist and foreign projects, but at the same time do not agree with every action taken by the authorities in Damascus.”
However, the initiative faced pressure after it was announced last month, pushing some of its organizers from inside Suwayda to withdraw from it “two hours after it was announced, because of death threats,” he said.
With lowering temperatures in northeastern Syria in recent weeks following integration agreements between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), some eyes have turned to southern Suwayda, considering the possibility of moving towards a resolution.
However, the distinct nature of Suwayda, with its complex internal power dynamics, as well as the sensitivity surrounding any presence of government forces after the events of last July, has ensured that a settlement remains elusive so far, despite limited steps such as the recent detainee exchange.
“The general mood in Suwayda is waiting for a resolution, but people have deep fears of government forces entering again. There is a rift that a political settlement cannot bridge, and the community will not accept a settlement that allows the army and security services to enter the province—even if those [personnel] are from Suwayda,” journalist Azzam said.
“The signals coming from the authority and its officials to the people of Suwayda are provocative,” he added. “The government rhetoric and decisions are negative, fueling the state of alienation and distrust.”
On the other hand, the journalist from the Suwayda countryside drew attention to the fragility of internal balances in the face of any external pressure. “We hope the government does not repeat the same mistake made last July,” he added. Despite internal disputes and sharp divisions, “the Druze community closes ranks and becomes a single bloc in the event of external danger, setting aside internal differences to safeguard its existence.” Therefore, “the government must not fall into the same mistake and increase this inward turn.”
As he sees it, Damascus’s approach to the SDF file in the northeast has given residents and armed factions a “sense of security and confidence” and “weakened the separatist current in the province,” he said. “The attitude of Suwayda’s factions is that as long as the SDF has integrated [into the state], the thread has not been severed, and our own integration into the Syrian army and security forces remains possible.”
“The factions are always looking out for their interests: their forces’ salaries, their organization in the government forces,” he added.
The journalist warned the Syrian government against any military scenario, “even if limited or surgical, because it will complicate the scene in Suwayda.” He stressed that “the solution must come from untangling the stalemate politically.”
Through his interactions with the local community, the journalist said he has observed “people have started to change their views,” suggesting a settlement could be accepted, provided it is “similar to the SDF settlement in its political part, not the military part, with the integration of the National Guard, appointment of a governor from Suwayda and granting the province administrative decentralization.”
For his part, military expert al-Absi said “the roadmap for resolving the crisis in Suwayda and stabilizing southern Syria, announced by the foreign ministry, is based on an approach of stabilizing the ceasefire, restoring security and stability, integrating minorities and implementing joint mechanisms with Jordan and the US.”
As al-Absi sees it, there are three possible scenarios ahead. The first, and most likely in his view, is “relative stability, continuing the ceasefire and implementing the roadmap by internationalizing the file with Jordan and the US.”
A second scenario involves “intermittent escalation and limited security setbacks, persistent tension between factions and the security agencies and continued limited Israeli intervention to destabilize the situation,” he said.
A third scenario could include “a partial settlement of specific issues—such as prisoners and security files—while disagreements continue over fundamental issues: local governance and administration,” he added. This would represent a “freezing of the crisis without a fundamental solution.”
While al-Absi leans towards the first scenario, he noted the “possibility of a limited wave of violence erupting over the coming months, particularly given the presence of foreign and regional factors influencing Syria in general, and Suwayda in particular.”
This report was originally published in Arabic and translated into English by Mateo Nelson.
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