Kyiv Post’s Five Questions for an Expert – Swedish Defence University Professor Kjell Engelbrekt
Our rapid questions for Kjell Engelbrekt explore what Sweden has learned from the war in Ukraine, why Sweden joined NATO, the new transparent battlefield, and Sweden’s Russophobia.
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Kjell Engelbrekt – distinguished professor of political science at the Swedish Defence University, and prominent author – answers five questions from Kyiv Post
Kyiv Post: What has Sweden learned from Ukraine, thinking about Russia’s invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022?
Kjell Engelbrekt: Before 2014, Sweden didn’t pay enough attention to what the Russian Federation was gearing up to do. There were specialists watching the increased defense spending and military reforms, but it was a limited group of people.
After 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, general knowledge of Russia’s development in the security and defense sector dramatically increased, I would say.
But it wasn’t until February 2022 that the wider public was awakened to Russia’s intentions. It was a shock to most people in Sweden that Russia would conduct a large-scale war, risk its reputation and its economy. That is also why Sweden decided to seek NATO membership.
Despite earlier skepticism from some political parties and parts of the population, most were quick to support in that situation – both in supporting the NATO application process and supporting Ukraine.
Would you say that this approach has remained the same since 2022 or has it changed since Sweden became a NATO member in 2024?
Being a non-NATO member in February 2022 to some extent gave Sweden freedom to maneuver. We didn’t have to consult with Brussels or Washington. Sweden could choose its own path when it came to supporting Ukraine and could move swiftly with political decisions concerning military support.
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Once Sweden formally joined NATO in 2024, nobody pulled us back. Most countries in the alliance were very happy with Sweden being among those countries committed to supporting Ukraine.
It was perhaps a bit of a fluke that Sweden was outside of NATO in the sense that Sweden was very forward leaning at the time, and the Swedish government and several Swedish authorities are very active in Ukraine today.
The battlefield has changed, with widespread use of small drones near the front line. How are discussions relating to the new transparent battlefield - characterized by pervasive surveillance technologies – being reflected in the Swedish Armed Forces and in defense academia?
This has been an evolution. I mean, this was not happening in 2022, nor even in 2023 did we have this kind of full throttle on the battlefield. Swedish defense institutions like mine, but also the Swedish Armed Forces, have over these past four years evolved when it comes to learning lessons from what we are seeing on the battlefield in Ukraine.
We have elements of trench warfare similar to the First World War, but we have also seen rapid technological developments with drones perhaps being the clearest representation of that. In terms of the battlefield itself, transparency has become a new thing. It matters especially to infantry and how infantry works.
We also must learn to deal with the information domain, intelligence, and the broader applications of having a war going on for four years and unfortunately beyond – and what that means in terms of economic, military and political resources, not least manpower.
Manpower is a big issue both in Ukraine and in Russia as we know, so there are many things to consider when thinking about large-scale warfare – something we stopped thinking about in the mid-1990s in many European countries.
What are Sweden’s lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, and have some lessons already been applied?
We are mostly still in the learning stage, but to the extent that we are now educating many more officers than we used to.
We have an iterative process going on between the needs of education and the lessons learned from the battlefield and interacting with people who have actual experience. This was one of the reasons why I came to Ukraine to meet people – not just colleagues and professors – but also military veterans who have actual battlefield experience.
You listen to what they have to convey – not only how to apply weapons systems and other auxiliary systems – but also (for example) how to deal with rotation, which is a very important issue in any long war.
When I visited the Military Academy in Odesa three years ago, I learned that most of its cadre had been part of defending Mykolaiv just a year prior to that.
So, in Ukraine, you have people who both teach and have actual military experience – we have nothing of that in Sweden. My faculty would be very happy to borrow individual teaching staff who have exactly that kind of experience.
Regarding hybrid warfare – are you still discussing “grey zone” in Sweden or do you see incidents like airspace violations and the broader pattern of sabotage across Europe as a form of direct confrontation?
The “grey zone” concept was used by the Swedish Armed Forces for several years, which had to do with the idea that it was the prior stages to a military conflict. It is about trying to connect the dots between what’s going on in one field to another. This work could relate to the information domain or intelligence operations of various kinds.
I believe that Sweden today is aware of these kinds of hybrid activities and is vigilant in security defense.
In the mid-1990s, Russophobia was at a low level and we had this period of Swedish people doing business and starting companies in Russia. But times change, they eventually left Russia and moved back, and Russophobia is now at a high level among a vigilant society.
Sweden’s support for Ukraine has remain unchanged since February 2022. I would argue that Sweden is a country where you cannot talk about Ukraine fatigue – there is still very broad, very deep support for Ukraine and the war effort and the resilience of Ukrainian society.
