Although the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established the fundamental legal framework governing maritime rights and jurisdiction, the absence of judicial interpretation on key issues such as historical rights, the legal status of maritime features, and the basis for generating maritime entitlements allowed competing legal narratives to persist and evolve in different directions.
One of the most important legacies of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award was not the final settlement of maritime disputes in the region. Rather, it fundamentally clarified the interpretation of maritime entitlements under UNCLOS. In other words, the award has altered the manner in which states formulate and justify their maritime claims under UNCLOS. Thus, the overlapping and complex maritime claims in the South China Sea have begun to be slowly reframed in a more transparent and clearer legal framework.
Reinterpreting Maritime Entitlements in the South China Sea
In the South China Sea before 2016, the disputes were not only about competing sovereignty claims and overlapping maritime zones but also about different interpretations of the legal basis for establishing and justifying maritime entitlements.
Taking advantage of these ambiguities, China adopted a strategy of calculated ambiguity through its “nine-dash line” claim, citing historical evidence to justify its claims in the South China Sea. Beijing pointed to alleged “historic rights” over waters that it asserted had long been used and exploited by Chinese nationals. Nevertheless, the ambiguous legal meaning and vague geographical scope of the “nine-dash line” created large gray areas in the disputes between China and other claimant states.
The 2016 Arbitral Award clarified these ambiguities considerably. Rather than addressing questions of territorial sovereignty or maritime delimitation, the tribunal concentrated on clarifying a number of basic legal questions under UNCLOS. In particular, it made influential interpretations on two basic issues.
First, regarding historic rights, the tribunal ruled that the exception concerning “historic title” under Article 298 of UNCLOS could not be used to justify the ill-defined “historic rights” claimed by China. Furthermore, the tribunal confirmed in paragraph 246 of the award that, for states parties to UNCLOS, any pre-existing historic rights that are incompatible with the convention are superseded by the maritime rights established under UNCLOS.
What this meant was that historical arguments could not, by themselves, support an independent legal claim to maritime entitlements beyond those permitted by the convention. The tribunal therefore concluded that China’s claims to historic rights had no legal basis because they were incompatible with the regime of maritime rights and interests established in UNCLOS.
Second, the award provided a significant clarification of the legal status of maritime features under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. Before the award, although the convention distinguished between islands and rocks, the criteria for determining whether a feature could generate an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf had not been fully developed in international practice. This was especially the case in the South China Sea.
For the first time, Article 121 and Clause 3 of Article 121 were interpreted in a detailed manner by an international tribunal. The tribunal held that only features capable of sustaining “human habitation” or “an economic life of their own” are entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf under Article 121(3). Features that fail to meet this threshold are entitled only to a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles.
The tribunal’s interpretation was based on the natural capacity of a feature to sustain human habitation and economic life, rather than the presence of military personnel or economic activities dependent on external support. Although this interpretation remains the subject of academic debate, the 2016 Award nevertheless provided a significantly more concrete interpretative framework for Article 121(3) than had previously existed.
Why the Arbitral Award Is Not a Dead Letter
Despite Beijing’s continued adherence to its “Four No’s” policy toward the 2016 Award (no acceptance, no participation, no recognition, and no implementing), the ruling’s legal significance and practical impact have never been diminished. On the contrary, the award has become a framework reshaping the broader landscape of disputes in the South China Sea. Over the past decade, coastal states in the region, including China, have increasingly been compelled to adjust and reinterpret their maritime claims in light of the legal standards established by the tribunal.
Although China continues to characterize the award as “null and void,” it has nevertheless modified the legal justification underpinning its South China Sea claims. Since 2016, Beijing has gradually reduced its reliance on the “nine-dash line” while increasingly emphasizing the “Four Shas” doctrine (referred to by China as Nanhai Zhudao, the South China Sea Islands).
China’s shift has been an attempt to recast its maritime claims by adopting terminology more closely aligned with UNCLOS. This evolution is evident in China’s official statements from 2009, 2014, 2016, 2020, or 2025, which reveal a growing tendency to avoid explicit references to the “nine-dash line” after the award was issued.
At the same time, China’s relentless efforts to discredit the award paradoxically underscore its continuing relevance. Beijing would not have invested significant diplomatic, legal, and media resources in countering the Award if it were worthless. Such efforts show that the award has dealt a direct blow to the legitimacy of China’s maritime claims.
Meanwhile, the Philippines codified key aspects of the award into domestic law through its 2024 Maritime Zones Act, which recognizes that high-tide features in the Spratly Islands are entitled only to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea measured from appropriate baselines. This legislative step helps to ensure continuity in the application of the award regardless of future political changes.
Malaysia’s cautious approach toward the award is partly due to some of the tribunal’s findings possibly affecting its claims in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, Malaysia’s December 2019 submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) regarding its extended continental shelf in the northern South China Sea demonstrated that Kuala Lumpur determined its continental shelf entitlements on baselines drawn from its mainland coast in accordance with UNCLOS. Malaysia’s approach appears to entail significantly fewer legal uncertainties than asserting extended continental shelf rights from disputed features in the Spratly Islands.
Indonesia has, likewise, used legal arguments based on the award to reject China’s vague “historic rights.”
The arbitral tribunal’s ruling in 2016 is of great significance for Vietnam. During the arbitral proceedings, Vietnam proactively asserted its legal position through a statement of position submitted to the tribunal in December 2014, reaffirming its lawful rights and interests under UNCLOS. Over the past decade, Vietnam has actively applied the legal principles articulated in the Award to support its position in the South China Sea. This was particularly evident in the exchange of diplomatic notes at the United Nations between 2019 and 2020.
For example, Vietnam has acknowledged the award’s finding that submerged features and low-tide elevations (LTEs) cannot be subject to territorial sovereignty claims and are incapable of generating maritime zones of their own. This position establishes a strong legal basis for Vietnam to assert its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over features such as Vanguard Bank, Rifleman Bank, Alexandra Bank, and Grainger Bank, and to reject attempts to associate these features with the Spratly Islands to manufacture sovereignty disputes. Vietnam maintains that these features fall exclusively within its jurisdiction as part of the natural prolongation of its continental shelf and are unrelated to any territorial claims based on offshore rocks.
This systemic shift is proof that the 2016 Award is not a “dead letter.” Rather than existing solely as a legal document, it has increasingly become an influential legal framework shaping the evolution of disputes in the South China Sea. By redefining the rules of the game, the award has encouraged parties to align their positions more closely with international law. Accordingly, China’s “Four No’s” policy cannot diminish either the finality or the legally binding nature of the Award.
The ruling does not lose its validity with the passage of time. On the contrary, as its 10 year anniversary approaches, the 2016 Award has become an integral part of contemporary international law. China’s failure to comply merely reflects its ongoing breach of international law.
The central question for the next decades is whether this legal and normative pull will ultimately be strong enough to draw China closer to the UNCLOS framework, or whether the centrifugal force of China’s growing power and presence on the ground will prevail. The answer might depend largely on whether the smaller claimant states, particularly Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, can maintain and strengthen their UNCLOS-based legal positions in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.
