In July 2016, an arbitral tribunal assembled under the Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) issued a significant ruling that favored the Philippines over China. The tribunal determined that maritime boundaries must be defined by UNCLOS, not by historic claims like those used by China to support its nine-dash line.
The tribunal further decided that China’s artificially constructed “islands” are not actual islands and do not justify an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Additionally, it found that China failed to protect the marine environment.
Part of the ruling process revolved around the tribunal’s observations that China had repeatedly violated the Philippines maritime sovereignty, and that Chinese maritime law enforcement not only endangered Philippines assets, but also violated multiple rules of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. The ruling also found that China had aggravated the disputes throughout the course of arbitral proceedings.
A decade later, China has shown precious little regard for the ruling and has only further entrenched precedent of highly selective adherence to international law.
Despite the ruling declaring the nine-dash line invalid, China continues to include the nine-dash line on maps of the region, and continues to ignore UNCLOS – a binding multilateral treaty framework which China voluntarily belongs to. For example, the tribunal ruled that China had illegally prevented Filipino fishermen from fishing at the Scarborough Shoal. Yet as recently as April 10, multiple Chinese vessels used floating barriers to block the entrance to the Scarborough Shoal, thus denying entry to Filipino fishing vessels.
Between 2013 and the present day, China has created 3,200 acres’ worth of artificial islands in the Spratlys. The island-building initiative shows no signs of stopping: China began creating a new artificial island along the Antelope Reef near Vietnam, working at breakneck speed amidst global attention spans’ diversion to the conflict in Iran.
Meanwhile, since legal proceedings began under UNCLOS in 2013, Malaysia has reported no fewer than 270 incidents of China Coast Guard and Maritime Militia harassing or assaulting ASEAN member states’ vessels. One such incident took place in December 2025, when five China Coast Guard and several Maritime Militia vessels harassed 20 Filipino fishing boats at the Escoda Shoal, damaging two of the fishing ships and injuring three Filipino fishermen.
This disregard for a U.N. convention signed by China comes as Chinese state-run news sources vehemently criticize Operation Epic Fury as departing from “fundamental norms of international relations,” and have similarly criticized the United States’ capture of Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro as a “clear violation of international law,” while stating that recent U.S. tariffs “gravely violate WTO rules.” The double standard could not be clearer.
Moreover, this double standard is not merely some moral squabble. It creates a dynamic mired with catch-22 style decision-making, with China’s competitors – including the United States – increasingly forced into two strategic pathways: either they continue to abide by international norms and find themselves on an unequal footing, or they attempt to compete on an even footing with China.
Beijing’s double standard in the South China Sea is reminiscent of, for example, its regulatory approach to international trade. China has not played by the “rules of the game” as had been expected when Beijing joined the WTO in 2001. China has continued to engage in irregular trade mechanisms, blatant disrespect for other countries intellectual property, and other violations – thus forcing other countries into difficult policy-making decisions.
China’s decade of flaunting the arbitral ruling paints a particularly grim picture for smaller countries, who often lack the trade toolkit and leverage of larger economies in any face-off with Beijing. Washington can implement tariffs and does not need Chinese development finance, but countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere possess a shorter menu of options.
Indeed, it is one of the features of China’s international engagement that, on the one hand, Chinese maritime forces routinely violate a nation’s sovereignty, while on the other hand, Chinese state-owned companies buy up shares in the same country’s key domestic infrastructure. It is not only bizarre, but clearly predatory.
Other countries’ deference to Beijing is obvious, and fears manifest even in multinational institutions of small to medium powers: ASEAN did not issue a collective statement on aggression in the South China Sea until 2023 – seven years after the tribunal’s ruling. Even then, the statement of reference failed to directly address China’s malign behavior. Beijing’s disregard for international law is doubly effective as a deterrent.
The aftermath of the 2016 ruling points in only one direction: Beijing will disregard international law when in its own interest, it will validate international law when criticizing the United States, and it will exert maximal pressure on other countries to either ignore or abandon international standards and norms in favor of pragmatic Chinese interests. Difficult decisions await American allies and partners across Southeast Asia.
