Australia, New Zealand Set Ambitious Course for Deeper Defense Cooperation

There are few closer bilateral relationships in the world than that of Australia and New Zealand. There may be a significant body of water between the two countries, but it is mostly vowel sounds that separate them. Culture and cooperation run deep, and the defense relationship is particularly tight – driven by the first Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) established during World War I and persisting to this day whenever there is a joint mission. 

This shared legacy was the backdrop for the “Operationalizing the Australia‑New Zealand Alliance: ANZAC 2035” statement released in mid-March by Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles and New Zealand Defense Minister Judith Collins. The agreement sets out an ambitious vision for defense cooperation over the next decade.

The agreement builds on the long-standing bilateral alliance under the ANZUS Treaty and the framework of Closer Defense Relations (CDR), aiming to translate political commitments into greater practical military cooperation by 2035. The statement reflects a shared assessment that the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more uncertain and contested, requiring the two countries to operate more closely together in order to deter threats and safeguard regional stability.

A central theme of the statement is the ambition to develop a more integrated “Anzac force” capable of operating seamlessly across the full spectrum of military activities. This includes aligning defense planning, expanding joint exercises, and embedding personnel within each other’s defense institutions – much of which is already occurring and can easily be expanded upon. 

But given the far more fragile and dangerous global environment, the intention is to ensure that both forces can deploy together rapidly and effectively should crises or conflict come to the region. This necessitates making sure that there are shared doctrines, compatible equipment, and coordinated operational planning. 

The agreement outlines several “lines of effort” designed to further operationalize the alliance. These include improving interoperability between the two militaries, strengthening force posture cooperation across each country’s territory, and expanding joint capability development and sustainment. The statement emphasizes practical collaboration in areas such as defense industry cooperation, logistics, training, and the acquisition of compatible platforms and systems, with the aim of reducing duplication and improving collective readiness. 

Central to this is a commitment to joint engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in support of Pacific Islands security. Both governments stress that their alliance should contribute to regional stability by working with their Pacific neighbors to strengthen regional security structures. The objective is to work through the South Pacific Defense Ministers’ Meeting to align the defense engagement with the priorities of Pacific Island states, while improving collective readiness and operational coordination. 

The practical outcome of this is to embed the Pacific Response Group as the key regional capability designed to facilitate coordinated deployments, particularly in disaster response scenarios that frequently affect Pacific Island states. Increased support for Pacific-led maritime activities will also form part of this strategy, reflecting the centrality of maritime security to the region and reinforcing the broader vision of maintaining a peaceful and cooperative “Blue Pacific.”

In this context, the statement positions the Australia-New Zealand partnership as a foundational pillar of broader regional security architecture. Without wishing to dominate the region, there is a recognition that, alongside France, these are the two most capable security forces within the south Pacific – with only Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga having militaries – and therefore Australia and New Zealand have a broader responsibility to respond to any crises in region.

This places the new ANZAC 2025 agreement as part of the broader security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. It hones in on where Australia and New Zealand can be most influential, and where they can help to boost the capabilities of their neighbors; complimenting existing security architecture in the wider Indo-Pacific region.

However, the one potential inhibiting factor to greater integration of the two countries’ defense capabilities is AUKUS. Should AUKUS be successful, and Australia acquires a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, given Wellington’s longstanding nuclear free zone, these vessels will not be allowed to dock in New Zealand ports, or operate within the 12 nautical miles of the country’s territorial sea. 

This may not be significant to how Australia envisages utilizing these submarines, but as Canberra hopes to make these vessels the centerpiece of its blue water navy capabilities, it does limit the interoperability with New Zealand’s navy. All joint maneuvers involving these submarines would need to be conducted outside of Wellington’s territorial waters. 

This also highlights that for all the familial closeness of the relationship between the two countries, there are still a few issues where Canberra and Wellington don’t align.