When the United States and Israel commenced their joint military operation in Iran on February 28, Donald Trump and his closest advisors expected a quick and easy victory. After two weeks of fighting, the war shows no sign of abating. Although the Trump administration has claimed to have achieved several key objectives, including the elimination of much of Iran’s senior leadership and the destruction of significant portions of Iran’s military capability, it has yet to find a solution to a far-reaching and apparently unforeseen challenge: reopening the Strait of Hormuz and restoring global energy supplies.
Trump’s continued ambiguity about the objectives of his military “excursion” allows him a degree of discretion when it comes to deciding when the campaign has been successfully completed. Indeed, he has already made multiple declarations of mission mostly accomplished. But while regime decapitation and military degradation are flexible metrics, the continued obstruction of the Strait of Hormuz is not fungible and carries direct and measurable cost to the United States. Unfortunately, no American military action, US-led international coalition, or near-term US-Iran diplomatic agreement is likely to resolve the issue. In fact, pursuing these options may only exacerbate the situation. Trump has only one alternative: walking away, restraining Israel, and shifting the pressure of reopening the strait onto Iran’s closest partners and Tehran itself.
Any attempt to open the strait through military measures is likely to fail and may come at huge cost. Trump has floated the idea of naval escorts, but this would strain U.S. capacity and place U.S. navy warships at risk. Military analysts suggest that 10 U.S. destroyers — about 20% of the U.S. deployable fleet of these vessels — plus supporting aircraft would be needed to escort a dozen or so tankers per day through the strait. This would cap tanker traffic at less than 10% of its pre-war capacity. Naval escorts themselves would also be vulnerable during such operations and could be targeted by sea and air drones or the hidden threat posed by naval mines (which even minesweeping could not fully eliminate).
More extreme measures involving the deployment of ground troops are no more likely to succeed. The decision to move the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit from Japan to the Middle East has fueled speculation that the Pentagon plans to seize territory on Iran’s coast as part of an effort to guarantee the free passage of commercial vessels through the strait or to take Kharg Island as a way to choke off Iran’s economic lifeline and force capitulation. An amphibious operation in either location would be near suicidal, and neither would guarantee restored freedom of navigation. If U.S. forces did establish a beachhead on Iran’s coast, they would be vulnerable to drone and artillery attacks from what remains of Iran’s military, making their presence unsustainable and ineffective as means of protecting tanker transits. Taking Kharg Island would be even less useful for those hoping to end the war. There is no reason to expect that after losing its prize asset, Iran would surrender, especially if it retained the ability to target energy production in the Gulf.
A US-led effort to mobilize international pressure to compel Tehran to open the strait is no more promising. Trump has called on allies to bring ships and has suggested that China should get involved. Few countries have been interested in this offer, and none have been willing to commit definitively to playing a role. In fact, many have refused, either due to lack of necessary assets or concern about the high risks involved. And even if allies did contribute ships, it wouldn’t substantially change the logistical challenge or ease the capacity constraints involved in the proposed escort mission.
Finally, there is little prospect of a diplomatic deal to reopen the strait, given Iran’s well-founded mistrust of its American interlocutors. Trump pulled out of the JCPOA and now has twice used negotiations as a cover to prepare for war. Even if Washington were to propose a return to talks today, Iran would have to wonder if the move were just a pause before the next round of U.S. strikes. Moreover, Tehran will be loath to cede the leverage it has gained through the closure of the strait. After absorbing two weeks of U.S. and Israeli attacks, Iran has proven its ability to inflict pain on the United States by raising global energy prices. Tehran has publicly signaled that it will only accept a deal that includes significant U.S. concessions, such as reparations, sanctions relief, and a firm pledge that the U.S. will not renew hostilities. Trump is unlikely to agree to such terms.
Facing what seems to be a no-win situation, Trump is not without cards to play. But his best move is neither to escalate nor de-escalate, but rather to disengage. Specifically, if the United States declares “mission complete,” commits to a unilateral ceasefire, and compels Israel to stop as well, this unexpected withdrawal could create enough pressure on Tehran — not from Washington, but from Iran’s remaining partners — to change the regime’s strategic calculus, driving it to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and cease attacks on other regional energy targets.
To be sure, the effect might not be immediate, and, in the near term, energy prices would continue to rise. But this would affect all countries, including Iran’s closest allies and supporters and Gulf state exporters who need access to the strait to restore their profit streams. Already, Iran appears to be permitting the transit of vessels bound for China and is cutting deals with other energy importers. Tehran would probably make further arrangements with other friendly and neutral countries, including India, Pakistan, and others, if the United States pulled back in earnest. All these states desire low energy costs and economic stability — something only achievable once normal traffic resumes. Entreaties for Iran to relent would likely grow substantially if the U.S. pulled back, placing Iran’s new leaders in a vulnerable position, facing blowback from their closest supporters and observers in Europe and Asia who depend most heavily on energy flows through the Gulf to survive.
Trump has already stated that other countries have a greater stake in the flow of energy from the Persian Gulf than the United States. Some of his Truth Social posts and statements from his press secretary have hinted at a willingness to leave the challenge of reopening the Hormuz Strait to states — allied and adversarial — that rely on it much more than does the United States. Trump should make good on this musing, removing the United States from the equation and leaving other actors to look after their own needs. The result may look like ceding control of the strait to Tehran, but, in effect, Washington would only be recognizing a reality that already existed. The United States does not need to control every waterway in the world — only the ones upon which it most relies.
There is no guarantee this plan will work, but given the lack of viable alternatives, it is at least worth testing the proposition that a U.S. withdrawal would actually increase pressure on Iran to reopen the strait, while depriving it of its main motivation — and justification — for restricting navigation through the Persian Gulf. The effect of a U.S. ceasefire could be strengthened if the Trump administration moves ahead with its plan to lift some sanctions on Iranian oil. Though intended to ease prices, such action would also indirectly meet one of Iran’s longstanding demands. By closing the strait, Tehran is tempting Trump into a trap. Any American attempt to actively restore transit through Hormuz will only further entangle the United States. Unilateral disengagement, on the other hand, would immediately lessen Iran’s leverage.
Critics may complain that for the United States to walk away now would leave the rest of the world to clean up Washington’s mess. There is truth to this. But if U.S. disengagement did create a pathway toward a resolution of the present energy crisis, it would offer a powerful precedent for the future. Perhaps there are other military roles the United States could surrender without sacrificing core national interests. The Middle East is a good place to start. Washington might find that a decades-long source of difficulties might become more benign if U.S. forces left for good.